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ABSTRACT 
 
The Discursive Functioning of Knowledge Claims in Research Studies on Children’s Conceptual 
Knowledge of Number 
by 
Patrick Byers 
 
Advisor: Joseph Glick 
 
Researchers interested in the development of conceptual knowledge of number have studied 
children’s behavior in various tasks or other contexts in order to draw conclusions about what 
they know. The guiding assumption of this work is that the presence or absence of a given form 
of knowledge is typically reflected in the ability/inability to perform certain types of behavior. 
Researchers complicate this assumption when they claim that (1) the ability to perform a given 
behavior may also reflect simple imitation or rote learning in the absence of understanding, 
and/or (2) that the inability to perform a certain behavior may reflect extraneous performance 
demands, rather than the absence of underlying conceptual knowledge. Most problematically, it 
is not clear how to distinguish these alternative explanations of the relationship between 
behavior and conceptual knowledge. The difficulty of making this distinction has led to ongoing 
issues in cognitive development research that have persisted despite researchers’ attempts to 
resolve them through the ongoing study of children’s behavior.  
 The current research explores how and whether the issues researchers face in 
interpreting behavior vis a vis knowledge might be clarified by studying the discursive practices 
in terms of which these interpretive processes themselves occur. The current study analyzes 
the discursive functioning of knowledge claims—assertions about what children know, e.g., s/he 
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understands the cardinal principle—in the texts of eleven published research articles on 
developing conceptual knowledge of number. Therefore, while the goal of this study is to 
contribute to the general research area of cognitive development, the methodology used in the 
current study was a discourse analysis. The focus of the analysis is on the strategies and 
conditions under which knowledge claims are asserted and justified (i.e., claimed to be valid). 
The results suggest that knowledge claims are descriptions of behavioral dispositions, that are 
produced in response to the observation of behavior in situations presumed to make that 
behavior interpretable. The behavioral tasks used by researchers to assess children’s 
conceptual knowledge function as ways of eliciting concrete instances of the behavior that is 
described in more general terms by the knowledge claim. The fact that knowledge claims are 
descriptions of behavior is shown to be obscured by deeply rooted discursive practices that reify 
knowledge in ways that allow it to be categorically distinguished from behavior. Ironically, the 
use of this knowledge-behavior distinction in the research reports, and subsequent issues it 
causes, are parsimoniously explained by the theory that knowledge claims are descriptions of 
behavioral dispositions, articulated in response to situations that are presumed to allow general 
interpretations of observed behavior.  
 The findings of the current research suggest that the entrenched distinction between 
competence and performance is problematic, and that its use comes at the expense of a clear 
view of what it means to say that someone knows something. However, these problems may 
represent growing pains in the development of a new and better conception of knowledge in 
cognitive psychology.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Historically, epistemology has been advanced by pursuing questions about knowledge 
from alternative directions, and in alternative contexts. For example, important insights about 
the nature of knowledge have resulted from Piaget’s investigation of the topic of knowledge in 
terms of its ontogenetic development, which revealed insights that were largely unrecognized by 
philosophers—specifically that knowledge must be embodied and emerge/self-organize through 
the organism’s interaction with the environment—but which are gradually being recognized for 
their importance (e.g., Bickhard and Terveen, 1995).  
 Inspired partially by the success of Piaget’s alternative approach to the study of 
knowledge, the current research hopes to take yet another approach in the hope that it will yield 
new insights about epistemological issues. The current study is concerned with the discursive1 
dimension of knowledge, specifically, how claims about what a person knows are made, how 
they may be justified, and what determines whether they are valid or invalid. These discursive 
dimensions of the topic of knowledge have been largely overlooked in existing research on 
conceptual development. In the current study, claims about what a person knows are labeled 
knowledge claims, which may be defined as ways of characterizing what someone knows such 
as s/he knows how counting works, or s/he understands that objects continue to exist when they 
are out of view (knowledge claims will be defined in greater detail later on). 
The current research aims to study the ways that claims about what people know are 
discursively constructed on the assumption that the discursive dimensions of knowledge have 
been overlooked in existing research and theory on knowledge, and that by focusing on these 
dimensions, we may reevaluate existing theoretical ideas about knowledge and inform their 
ongoing development.  
1.1 Specific Focus 
                                                
1 Discursive refers to the phenomenon and processes of language use considered in 
their own terms—not as a representation or reflection of something else. A discourse 
(singular) refers to a conversation in a general sense that covers any set of utterances 
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 There is not a single discourse on knowledge. Presumably, knowledge is talked about in 
different ways in different contexts, and these may be more or less different discourses. The 
ultimate aim of the current research is to contribute to a general understanding of knowledge by 
analyzing how it is constructed discursively in specific cases. Given the undetermined 
heterogeneity of the discourses on knowledge, the current study focuses on a narrowly 
delimited area of knowledge discourse: claims about what children know about numbers made 
within the texts of a particular selection of cognitive development research studies. While it is 
hoped that the conclusions from the study of this limited area will be applicable more generally, 
this is an empirical matter; generalizability cannot be guaranteed and must be determined by 
future investigations.  
1.2 Investigations of Children’s Knowledge of Number 
Research on the development of conceptual knowledge of number in preschool children 
has been prominent to the field of cognitive development. While studies in this area have 
illustrated relevant and important findings regarding children’s use of numbers in naturalistic and 
contrived settings, a coherent picture of how children’s conceptual knowledge of number 
develops, as well as a clear consensus among researchers about what a child knows at any 
given point in time has yet to be achieved. One central issue is that, although young children 
have been shown to use numbers with some proficiency, researchers disagree about what a 
given behavioral proficiency implies about what the child knows about numbers, specifically 
whether a behavioral performance reflects either procedural knowledge or conceptual 
knowledge of the principles embodied in the performance.  
Attempts to determine whether a given behavioral performance reflects either procedural 
or conceptual knowledge have ultimately been inconclusive,2 as the next section illustrates. This 
                                                
2 The “inconclusiveness” in question refers to the researchers’ own conclusions. Given the 
wealth of theoretical frameworks in psychology, there are multiple ways to make sense of many 
of the findings reviewed here; e.g., to consider experimental situations as social interactions in 
which the child’s behavior is an emergent result of their construal of the demands of the social 
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inconclusiveness raises questions about what it means for a child to understand numbers or 
counting. The current study argues that to adequately resolve these issues, the relevant 
empirical phenomena are not additional findings regarding how children use numbers. Rather 
they are discursive processes through which claims about what a child knows are asserted, 
contested, and negotiated: the ways and conditions under which knowledge claims such as s/he 
knows how counting works, or s/he understands that the last word reached in counting a set of 
items represents the numerosity of the set are asserted, contested and negotiated, as well as 
the significance and implications of these claims. In short, the premise of the current research is 
that analyzing the ways that knowledge claims are used in discourse may provide a way to 
resolve the interpretive difficulties involved in cognitive development research.  
1.3 Choice of Studies 
 The research that is focused on in the literature review beginning in the following 
sections, as well as the research texts that are the focus of current discourse analysis is not 
representative of all investigations of the cognitive development of number use in children. For 
the sake of a clear and manageable analysis, the research that is focused on is delimited by 
several criteria intended to limit the focus to a specific discourse, or set of related discourses. 
The types of studies that are analyzed conduct observational or experimental investigations of 
children’s counting with the intent of verifying the accuracy of claims about what research 
participants know (including propositional knowledge as well as knowledge of how to do 
something). For example, these studies might investigate whether children know that the last 
word reached in counting signifies the entire set or whether children know how to produce a set 
of a requested number of items. Although there are other ways to characterize and study a 
child’s knowledge of number (e.g., in terms of the neurological structure of the brain), the 
research in question is highly visible and central to the field of cognitive development (in terms 
                                                                                                                                                       
situation. However, for the purposes of the current project, the emphasis in the literature review 
will be on researchers’ own interpretations. This is in keeping with the ultimate goal of making 
sense of the discourse in the research studies themselves. 
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of citation counts, NIH funding, and in informing educational standards such as the Common 
Core). 
Additionally, with some exceptions, the analyzed studies will be primarily focused on 
numerical thinking in preschool-aged (3 to 5-year-old) children. There are several reasons for 
choosing this age range. First, a very substantial amount (if not most) of the research on 
children’s conceptual knowledge of numbers has focused on it. Second, a consistent age range 
allows for consistent examples to be used. Finally, the preschool age range is a unique moment 
in cognitive development in which a child’s capacity for action is simultaneously sophisticated 
enough for observation of more complex forms of action (as opposed to younger children who 
must often be observed through looking time or habituation studies), but at the same time, the 
child’s grasp of conventional forms of activity is qualitatively distinct from that seen in older 
children and adults. 
The analyzed research comes (unless otherwise noted) from American or European 
contexts, and generally involves empirical studies of middle/upper class children. These 
populations are heavily overrepresented in psychological research, and in particular, within the 
type of research that is the focus of the present paper (as described in the beginning of this 
subsection). This limited sampling limits the external validity of the research findings insofar as 
there is substantial evidence of variability across communities in the ways that numbers are 
used, and the ways that this use develops. Although it is important for researchers to consider a 
wider variety of developmental pathways for developing number use, this issue is tangential to 
the concerns of this paper, which pertains to the discourse within a specific body of existing 
research on children’s number use. Whether the issues raised here will also be found in 
research with more varied populations is a matter for further investigation.  
1.4 Terminology 
The research studies that are the focus of this paper are concerned with a small variety 
of phenomena surrounding children’s knowledge of numbers. Some of the studies are more 
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explicitly focused on children’s use of counting, while others are more focused on numbers used 
in non-counting contexts. Despite these differences, the analyzed studies are connected in that 
they are focused on children’s conceptual understanding of the cardinal properties of number, 
which may be approached in terms of counting or by other means. For the sake of simplicity, 
children’s general use/knowledge of either numbers or counting will be described as 
use/knowledge of number, with further specification used as necessary. 
Similarly, some of the analyzed studies characterize children’s conceptual knowledge 
with the word understanding, whereas others use the word knowledge. Unless a difference in 
the intended use of these terms is apparent and relevant, they will be used interchangeably, 
with the choice of one or the other made only to enhance grammatical flow. 
1.5 Organization 
The goal of this analysis is to (first) introduce problems in the use of knowledge claims in 
cognitive development research, and (secondly, and as a solution), construct a model of how 
knowledge claims function discursively. To do this, an initial analysis of knowledge claims in a 
selected group of texts is used to refine a rough set of analytic categories. These categories 
raise additional questions, which are addressed through further analysis, the results of which 
are used to further refine the analytic categories. Eventually, the iteratively refined analytic 
categories are integrated into a model of the discursive functioning of knowledge claims, which 
in turn generates still further questions, analysis and ongoing refinement of the model. 
Therefore, to explain the ultimate conclusions of this research, it is necessary to report 
preliminary results and interpretation from various stages of the analysis. The division of the 
results and interpretation into two separate studies (Study 1 and Study 2) facilitates the 
presentation of preiminary results and interpretation (Study 1) that serve as the foundation for 
subsequent analyses (Study 2). This approach is further reflected in the organization of the 
current paper, which is as follows.  
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After the current chapter (Chapter 1; the introduction), Chapter 2 is a literature review of 
research on the development of number and counting knowledge in preschool children. The 
purpose of this is to illustrate basic findings, technical terms, and interpretive issues that are 
relevant to the current study, and necessary for explaining its rationale. Chapter 2 also 
introduces discursive psychology as an alternative approach that provides a useful framework 
for addressing the aforementioned issues. 
The remaining chapters (3-8) deal with the current study. Chapter 3 explains the overall 
rationale, goals, and methodology of the study. The initial analytic categories used in the 
discourse analysis are also introduced in this chapter. Chapter 4 describes the results and 
interpretation of the initial discourse analysis of one of the selected texts. Based on these 
results, a larger analysis of more texts is conducted, and its methodology, results, and their 
interpretation are discussed in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, the final model of knowledge claims is 
described, based on the results of the text analyses. Chapter 7 describes a quantitative 
assessment of intra-rater reliability, intended to demonstrate that the model was consistently 
applied to the analyzed texts. Chapter 8 discusses issues raised by the results and their 
interpretation, while Chapter 9 is a discussion of the broader implications of the findings. In 
addition to these chapters, Appendices 1-20 contain various supplementary information to 
extend certain peripheral topics mentioned throughout the paper.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 This chapter describes research on developing numerical knowledge in preschool 
children, identifies interpretive problems in that research, and introduces an alternative 
framework that may be useful for addressing the problems that have arisen. 
2.2 Claims of Early Numerical Competency 
Rochel Gelman’s work (Gelman, 1972; Gelman & Gallistel, 1978) claims that young 
preschool children implicitly understand certain principles about number and counting. In one 
study, Gelman (1972) observed 3- to 6-year-olds’ reactions to a situation in which a small set of 
objects was transformed, either in terms of number or displacement (i.e., after participants had 
been shown the set for the first time, items in it were surreptitiously either added/removed, or 
simply moved around, then participants were shown the changed set, and their reactions were 
recorded). Contrary to Piaget’s (1965) claims that young children do not perceive number as 
invariant, Gelman showed that children would show surprise when the number of items 
surreptitiously changed.3 Similar findings of awareness of numerical invariance in very young 
children have been reported by a variety of other researchers (e.g., Mix, Levine and 
Huttenlocher, 2002; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007; Wynn, 1992, although these findings have been 
challenged by Feigenson, Carey and Spelke, 2002). 
Gelman and Gallistel (1978) argued that very young children’s numerical competence is 
a reflection of their understanding of various principles that govern counting. These include the 
‘one-to-one principle’ (one and only one number word should be applied to each counted item), 
the stable order principle (the number words in the count-sequence must be stated in a stable 
order), the abstraction principle (the understanding that heterogeneous sets of entities can be 
counted), the order irrelevance principle (the realization that the order that objects in a set are 
                                                
3 It should be noted that this latter research focused on very small numbers (<5), which 
Piaget and collaborators intentionally avoided. 
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counted is irrelevant), and the cardinal principle (the understanding that the last number 
reached when counting a set of items refers to the entire set). The development of children’s 
understanding of cardinality—which, more generally, refers to the way in which numbers are 
used to refer to numbers of things, as opposed to being used to order (1st, 2nd, 3rd) or name 
things (the 49 bus)—has been the focus of extensive research, particularly in the context of 
counting. 
Gelman and Gallistel’s claims about early conceptual knowledge of the counting 
principles are derived from observing young children’s behavior in situations that are carefully 
designed to remove any extraneous difficulties that may interfere with demonstrating their 
conceptual knowledge. While the resulting observations are typically of relatively limited “slices” 
of behavior, the situations in which these occur are carefully designed to support arguments that 
conceptual knowledge of number is the only explanation for the observed behavior.  
Gelman and Gallistel’s work is typical of post-Piagetian work (e.g., Saxe, 1979; 
Schaeffer, Eggleston and Scott, 1974) in that it embraces counting as a relevant site of 
developing numerical thinking. However, many subsequent researchers’ interpretations of 
children’s behavior vis a vis their knowledge are quite different. While Gelman and colleagues 
tended to argue that children had conceptual knowledge of number at a young age but had 
difficulty putting it into practice, subsequent researchers have argued that children develop 
procedural competence in using numbers without having a conceptual understanding of what 
they’re doing (Briars & Siegler, 1984; Fuson, 1988; Wynn, 1990).   
Researchers have found that many children will respond conventionally when asked 
common questions (e.g., giving their correct age when asked how old are you or counting a set 
of objects when asked how many are there). However, when asked variations on these 
questions that require them to use numbers in novel ways, children often demonstrate very 
unconventional or seemingly illogical uses of number. Several comprehensive surveys of 
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counting proficiency in American children (Fuson, 1988, 1992; Sophian, 1987; 1992; Wynn, 
1990) provide an abundance of examples to illustrate this. 
Wynn (1990) describes children who, after counting a set of items in response to the 
question ‘how many are there’, would respond to a repeat of the question by counting the set of 
objects again, suggesting (to Wynn) they viewed the question as nothing more than an invitation 
to count (this behavior persists even when the task is changed to minimize the pragmatic 
strangeness of asking a child the same question twice in close succession). Similarly, Sophian 
(1992), who asked children to count in a variety of different ways (e.g., counting to compare the 
numerosity of two sets, counting up to a certain number, counting the items in a set), reports 
that although very young children often counted, they frequently used counting in 
unconventional or illogical ways, even on seemingly similar questions. 
Interestingly, even in cases in which children begin to use number in more sophisticated 
ways that appear to be more connected to an underlying body of conceptual knowledge, it often 
turns out that they have merely increased the sophistication of their participation in the rituals of 
number use without deeply understanding the mathematical and logical significance of what 
they are doing.4 
                                                
4 One critique of this interpretation is that it requires that children’s behavior be interpreted solely 
in terms of its conformity to mathematical/logical rules. There are valid arguments against such 
an interpretation. A particularly useful way to view the development of children’s early number 
use is suggested by Munn (1998) who argues that children’s developing ability to use numbers 
reflects their increasingly sophisticated engagement (and eagerness to engage) in the social 
interactions in which number use occurs, rather than as the unfolding of a logical understanding 
of number. Other researchers have described similar participatory approaches to children’s 
developing number use (Sfard, 1998) and cognitive development more generally (Rogoff, 1991). 
The participatory approach to understanding children’s number use underscores the fact 
that children’s use of numbers is a function or more than abstract conceptual knowledge of 
number and performance/memory/processing demands. To the extent that numerical activities 
are social scripts (see Saxe, 2012 for an in-depth exploration of this possibility), children’s 
aptitude with them reflects a desire to take part in a community at least as much as the outcome 
of developing conceptual understanding of the logical principles of number.  
Despite the validity of this objection, the goal of the current study is to analyze these 
findings as representative of a given discourse. Therefore, objections made about certain 
discursive practices, while valid, are not relevant for the current purposes. 
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In one such instance, Fuson (1992) describes the responses of older preschoolers that 
were asked to count a set of (five) toy soldiers. Upon completing their count, she asked them to 
hand her the five soldiers, to which some children responded by handing the last counted (fifth) 
soldier only. Other children made similar sorts of errors in other situations, e.g., by referring to 
the last counted item as the “fives.” Wynn (1990) identifies similar children whom she labels 
“last word responders.” These are children who appear have learned that the question how 
many is not just an invitation to count. They treat the last word as important, responding to a 
repeat of the question (“how many”) with the final counted number words they reached in their 
count, rather than simply counting again. Nevertheless, Wynn found evidence that this did not 
reflect conceptual understanding of the cardinal principles of counting. The children reported by 
Wynn were unable to accurately produce a set of a requested number of items, something that 
is assessed with the so-called give-a-number task, a widely used measure of preschooler’s 
counting competence (Condry & Spelke, 2008; Gunderson & Levine, 2011; Le Corre & Carey, 
2007; Levine et. al., 2010; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008; Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004; Sophian, 1992; 
Wynn, 1990). 
Two things are striking about performance on the give-a-number task. First, children who 
give out an incorrect number of items tend to do so in a cavalier manner, grabbing a seemingly 
random bunch of items in response to a request for a specific number. The second striking 
finding is that, over the course of the preschool years, children appear to achieve competence 
on the task one number at a time (Le Corre & Carey, 2007). For instance, a child may first learn 
to give out one, then two, then three items correctly, while grabbing an arbitrarily large number 
of items for all other requested numbers. Eventually, around the end of preschool for many 
middle class North American children, the correct response appears to be generalized to all 
numbers they can reach with counting. Once children generalize the ability to produce a 
requested number of items to all numbers, researchers consider them to understand how 
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counting works, or (as alternately described by the same researchers) to understand the 
cardinal principle (Sarnecka & Carey, 2008). 
Recent work has used performance on the give-a-number task as a reference point for 
assessing other aspects of children’s numerical knowledge, relating performance on these tasks 
to their level of performance on the give-a-number task. For example, Sarnecka and Carey 
(2008) conducted a study that 
compared 2- to 4-year-olds who understand how counting works (cardinal principle 
knowers) to those who do not (subset knowers), in order to better characterize the 
knowledge itself. New results are that (1) Many children answer the question ‘how many’ 
with the last word used in counting, despite not knowing how counting works; (2) Only 
children who have mastered the cardinal principle, or are just short of doing so, 
understand that adding objects to a set means moving forward in the numeral list 
whereas subtracting objects means going backward; and finally (3) Only cardinal-
principle-knowers understand that adding exactly 1 object to a set means moving 
forward exactly 1 word in the list, whereas subset knowers do not understand the unit of 
change. (Sarnecka & Carey, 2008, p. 662). 
Other work that builds on the give-a-number task as a reference point for children’s competence 
with counting has attempted to determine what children understand about “unmapped” number 
words, i.e., number words that they are unable to produce correctly on the give-a-number task. 
In several studies, researchers have investigated whether children understand that unmapped 
number words nevertheless indicate specific, unique numerosities (Condry & Spelke, 2008; 
Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004). In these studies, preschool-aged participants were presented with a 
set of items, which were given a cardinal number label by the researchers (e.g., “Here are 5 
blocks”). Then, the set was altered in ways that either did (removing an item) or did not (shaking 
the set of items) affect its numerosity. Afterwards, participants were asked about the number of 
items currently in the set(s). The presumption was that if children realize that the set had 
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contained a specific, unique numerosity, and understand how this is related to the number of 
items in the set, their answer to the question should depend on whether the set had been 
numerically altered, or merely shaken. Surprisingly, both Sarnecka and Gelman (2004) and 
Condry and Spelke (2008) found that slightly different versions of the above question/task elicit 
different responses from children. In the version of the task with a single set of items (described 
above), preschool participants claimed that the numerosity changed only when an item had 
been added or removed (not when the set had been shaken). However, in a similar version of 
the task that involved two sets, children showed no inclination to distinguish between the effects 
of numerical and non-numerical changes to the sets. 
Understood as measures of children’s numerical knowledge, the difference between 
these two tasks is unclear. The researchers ruled out simple memory effects, and other likely 
confounds, and found the same results. If the tasks assessed children’s underlying numerical 
knowledge, it was unclear why they would elicit different performances, since both require 
essentially the same competency—the understanding that number words refer to specific 
numerosities. 
Recent findings by Brooks, Audet and Barner (2012) shed light on this paradox. They 
replicated the original results, but also included non-numerical versions of the original tasks in 
which the numbered sets were replaced with novel conglomerations of objects made of blocks 
and loops of rope, and given novel names. They found the same differences in performance on 
non-numerical versions of the tasks. These results strongly suggest that differences in children’s 
performance across the two types of tasks was driven by pragmatic inferences relating to the 
question and context. The fact that children answered in similar ways on numerical and non-
numerical versions of the same task raises the possibility that their answers to other numerical 
tasks are not a function of conceptual thinking that is uniquely tied to numbers.  
2.3 Overall Conclusions from Researchers’ Reports of Findings on Children’s Number 
Use 
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 The previously described research on children’s number use has produced a rich body 
of evidence that provides an in-depth glimpse at the emergence of various numerical skills in 
(generally middle class North American) preschool children. It is clear from several decades of 
research that the use and sophistication of children’s counting increases dramatically over the 
preschool years. Children begin simply reciting a few number words, and gradually learn to 
apply their counting in different contexts and in different ways. Their ability to show reasoning 
and reach conclusions regarding numbers becomes increasingly sophisticated as well. 
 To a significant extent, the extensive body of findings on children’s counting has been 
driven by the recognition that many of children’s observed uses of counting appear to be 
nothing more than the execution of rote behavior, rather than conceptually informed action. In 
fact, the rate at which researchers have reported new, more valid demonstrations of children’s 
counting knowledge appears to be matched by the rate at which assumed-to-be-valid 
indications of knowledge are shown to be merely the execution of rote behavior (Byers, 2016). 
The latest example of this comes from Davidson Eng and Barner (2012), whose findings 
undermined the validity of the give-a-number task as a measure of children’s understanding of 
the cardinal principle/how counting works. They report that children who had mastered the give-
a-number task “often do not know (1) which of two numbers in their count list denotes a greater 
quantity, and (2) that the difference between successive numbers in their count list is 1.” 
(Davidson, Eng & Barner, 2012, p. 162). If, as previous researchers have claimed (Condry & 
Spelke, 2008; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008; Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004; 
Sophian, 1992; Wynn, 1990), the give-a-number task is a valid measure of children’s 
understanding of the cardinality principle, this gap in performance makes no sense. 
2.4 What it Means to Understand Number 
 The failure to come up with valid criteria for determining whether and when children 
understand certain things about numbers raises fundamental questions about what it means to 
‘understand’ number. Part of the problem is an inherent consequence of the researchers’ 
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approach to investigating children’s conceptual knowledge. An inherent problem in this research 
is that, on one hand, in attempting to study children’s conceptual knowledge, this knowledge 
has been measured in terms of specific forms of behavior (e.g., the ability to produce a set of X 
items). On the other hand, a consistent theme throughout these investigations has been the 
discovery of children’s conceptually impoverished (rote or mimicked) uses of number, and the 
resulting attempt to distinguish rote actions from conceptually grounded ones.  
Trying to use behavioral criteria to distinguish rote from conceptually informed activity is 
problematic at best, and a dead end at worst. There is no sign or consistently valid criterion that 
distinguishes between behavior that is carried out by rote and behavior that is guided by 
conceptual knowledge. Researchers may claim that a given measure of some form of 
knowledge involves too many performance demands, and substitute it for another task. Yet, this 
new task will itself have new performance demands, and could in turn be claimed to 
underestimate the child’s knowledge. Finally, to the extent that a task involves minimal 
performance demands, it becomes increasingly possible to claim that it is being carried out by 
rote. This raises serious questions about what it means to ‘understand numbers’, and how this 
topic could be the focus of investigation. 
The difficulty of pointing to what conceptual knowledge is can be illustrated, using as an 
example the description of what “it means to know numbers” from Sarnecka and Wright (2013). 
Understanding what numbers are means knowing several things. It means knowing how 
counting relates to numbers (called the cardinal principle or cardinality); it means 
knowing that each number word is generated by adding one to the previous number 
(called the successor function or succession), and it means knowing that all and only 
sets whose members can be placed in one-to-one correspondence have the same 
number of items. (p. 1493) 
This passage puts the meaning of what it means to understand numbers in terms of relations 
with other descriptions of what is known. Yet, it fails to provide a valid way of distinguishing rote 
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from true conceptual knowledge.5 What does “knowing that each number word is generated by 
adding one to the previous number” refer to? As the previous argument showed, behavioral 
criteria are not enough. Is the knowledge supposed to be understood as a set of statements or 
contents that is somehow neurally encoded? Insofar as a statement or content could be 
memorized, this cannot be the criterion for conceptual knowledge. Does it instead mean that the 
person would say these things about him- or herself (i.e., I know that each number word is 
                                                
5 It is important to stress that not all claims about numerical knowledge are problematic. In 
everyday contexts, a person may be described as “knowing how to count” or “understanding 
counting” in a way (i.e., in a context) that has important practical utility in specifying a person’s 
capacity for actions that are normative in a certain community of practice. In more concrete 
terms, we might imagine a preschool teacher, speaking to another teacher, who describes a 
student as knowing how to count. This might be done in preparation for some sort of activity in 
which counting is mutually understood to play a certain role. In this type of context, the claim 
has a clear utility. For example, the teachers might be concerned with whether the student in 
question could be expected to perform the activities typical of the game. Claiming that a child 
knows how to count would therefore be interpretable in terms of this context of activity. The 
precise delineation of the term would be irrelevant. 
The use of knowledge claims becomes problematic when researchers attempt to 
generalize them beyond their highly contextualized everyday use, making them the focus of a 
scientific investigation that aims to determine (conclusively) whether children actually 
understand counting. The differences between these and everyday uses are crucially important. 
They involve a reversal of the relation between the knowledge claim and the capacity for action. 
In everyday uses, knowledge claims are meaningful in terms of their implications within a 
community of practice, i.e., in terms of a delimited set of activities that a member of the 
community would be expected to perform. In the cognitive development research reviewed 
here, there is no sharply delimited set of a few normative practices common to a community. 
Instead, as the previous research shows, researchers assess a child’s knowledge of number or 
counting in terms of a continually expanding (and, in principle, unlimited) set of possible 
normative uses of counting. In the cognitive development research, the issue of whether or not 
a child understands counting is not one determined by their capacity to normatively engage in a 
small number of normative practices in a particular community. Rather, it is determined by 
whether or not they show a capacity to normatively engage in virtually any variation or 
permutation of the basic counting activity. In summary, whereas the claim that a person “knows 
how to count” may be meaningful within a community where certain forms of counting are 
normative, researchers studying children’s number use have intentionally conceived of new, 
relatively novel situation in which to test children’s number use, and by extension, their counting. 
As a result, there is no clearly defined space onto which claims about children’s knowledge of 
number can be meaningfully fielded. 
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generated by adding one to the previous number (which, by the way, is something that 
researchers generally have not expected children to do. This also doesn’t seem to be a 
sufficient criterion for knowing. One could claim to know X, despite being conventionally seen by 
others (possibly including developmental researchers) as not knowing X. 
2.5 Towards an Alternative Approach to Knowledge 
So far, researchers’ attempts to determine when (or for a particular age or ability level, 
whether) children come to understand number have been driven by the assumption that 
behavioral data pertaining to children’s use of numbers can address this issue. Insofar as it is 
unclear what type of findings would conclusively demonstrate true conceptual competence, it is 
unclear how continued behavioral research could ever answer the question of when children 
actually understand number. This suggests that another approach is needed. What type of 
alternative approach could shed light on these questions? 
 If continued behavioral research has raised problems that it cannot address, this 
suggests that the problems may have to do with the classificatory and analytical schemes used 
in the research itself, i.e., with the concept of “understanding numbers”. It may be that the 
difficulty in determining when children come to understand certain things about numbers may be 
a result of the way that concept itself is used or formulated in research.  
These issues may be usefully addressed by taking a step back and reconsidering the 
issue of ‘knowledge of number’ from a very different perspective. One way to do this is to move 
away from the assumption that knowledge claims describe entities that exist independent of 
language (i.e., that exist independently of the discourses in which they are talked about). As an 
alternative, we may consider how descriptions of what a person knows are intrinsically 
discursive phenomena that exist in language, and are constructed through social interaction and 
social consensus. From this perspective (which is described at length in the next section), the 
issue of whether or not a child understands particular things about numbers is nothing more 
than a matter of whether or not it would be in line with typical practices of language use to say 
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that they understand these things. In this way, knowledge of numbers might be understood in a 
way that is similar to the value of money. Just as currency tokens have value to the extent that 
they are treated as having value, children have knowledge to the extent that they are claimed to 
have knowledge.  
 One objection to this argument would be that the child’s knowledge cannot be socially 
constructed, since the abilities and competencies that the child can display are there regardless 
of whether or not they are recognized or talked about. These abilities are a matter of the 
dynamics of the child’s nervous system in interaction with its surrounding environment. Certainly 
this is not a social construction.  
While it is certainly true that the child's competencies are, in some sense, still there, 
even if people cease to describe them as such, it is also true that to say anything about these 
competencies (indeed, to say that they are competencies in the first place) can only be done 
with language. Therefore, claiming that knowledge is discursive is to claim that knowledge 
cannot be characterized or conceptualized except through language, and that the meaning of 
any claim about what someone knows is a function of the consensual construction of meanings 
through language use--i.e., agreements about how certain words or phrases are used. These 
ideas are elaborated in the area of psychology known as discursive psychology, which is 
described in the following section. 
2.5.a Discursive Psychology 
Discourse is defined in different ways by different authors. In general (and for the current 
purpose) it maybe understood as referring to the patterned language use of a specific 
community context, or as a “a conceptual generalization of conversation” (Discourse, n.d.). A 
discourse (singular) refers to a conversation in a general sense that covers any set of 
utterances linked by addressivity. For the present purposes, an utterance may be loosely 
defined as a discrete statement, while addressivity refers to the way that an utterance functions 
as a response to some previous utterance (see Bakhtin, 1986) for a more comprehensive and 
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subtle explanation of both terms). The analysis of discourse covers a wide variety of 
investigations of various dimensions of language including the personal and interpersonal 
processes through which language is used to construct arguments, ideas, concepts, identities, 
values etc.  
The study of discursive phenomena partially encompasses the study of what might be 
called semiotic phenomena. The words semiotic and discursive are used to refer to different, 
albeit interrelated aspects of the functioning of knowledge claims. A semiotic analysis is an 
analysis of the ways that words like knowledge function as meaningful signs: what they mean 
and why they have this meaning. A discursive analysis describes a wider variety of analyses of 
language. While discourse analyses may be focused on the referential (semiotic) or expressive 
aspects of language, they may be concerned with other dimensions as well, such as the ways 
that arguments or values are constructed and negotiated, through narrative and other forms (for 
more information and examples of related work, see Bamberg and Andrews (2004), Daiute and 
Lightfoot (2004); Edwards (1997, 1993), Foucault (1972), Garfinkel (1967), and Potter and 
Wetherell (1987)). For the sake of simplicity, the term discursive will be used to refer to the type 
of analysis used in the current study, with the implication that the specific dimensions of 
discourse at interest here may be elsewhere addressed under the label semiotic analysis. 
Additionally, it should be noted that the analysis conducted in the current study is by no means 
representative of all (or even most) work done under the label “discourse analysis.” 
Another term that is closely related to, and relevant for understanding discourse is 
normativity. To say that something is normative is, in the present context (see Bickhard, 2003 
for a broader definition) to say that it is seen as appropriate or correct in terms of the 
established conventions of a particular community. For example, the use of a particular word 
(dog) to refer to the canine animal would be normative for most English speakers. In a 
discourse, certain features may be identified as normative, meaning that they constitute 
appropriate (relative to some community) uses of language.  
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Discursive psychology (DP) emphasizes the discursive nature of much human reality, 
and seeks to show how many psychological questions may be addressed through the study of 
discourse on account of the fact that folk-psychological concepts such as knowledge, beliefs or 
attitudes are discursive constructions. To understand these concepts, we must look to the 
discourses in which they are constructed and elaborated. More specifically, if we wish to 
understand what knowledge, beliefs, or attitudes are, we must study the discourses in which 
these words are used. As this implies, in DP discourse is not treated as a mirror of the 
discourse-independent world, and discursive psychologists do not study discourse as if it 
provided a proxy for understanding the discourse-independent world. To do so would be (from 
the perspective of DP) to commit a category error.6 Instead, discourse is treated as a quasi-
autonomous level of activity (where meanings are constructed, modified, and negotiated) that 
can be studied on its own terms for its own sake. These claims are elaborated by Edwards, who 
claims that discursive psychology is 
not the study of the concepts, memory, and thinking, as revealed in discourse. Rather it 
is the study of discourse itself, which includes as part of its business how participants 
deal with those matters. Discourse analysis studies the nature of descriptions, versions, 
reports, formulations about the mind and world, and so on, in terms of the situated, 
communicative actions that they perform. It inverts the psychologist’s question about 
underlying competence from “What are the real thoughts, real concepts, real memories 
that underlie versions?” to, “What is the psychological basis of all this talk-as-action?” 
Note that once the inversion is done, we cannot just bolt it onto the original question; it is 
not a separate topic, another brick in the wall of knowledge. With regard to children’s 
conceptual thinking, for example, it is not clear that they “really think” anything, at least 
                                                
6 This claim hinges on the philosophical distinction between reasons and causes, as elaborated 
by Ryle (1949), and more implicitly, but also more thoroughly in the later work of Wittgenstein 
(1953; 1981). An explanation of this distinction, and its relation to DP can be found in Appendix 
1. 
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not in the sense of carrying around in their heads ready-made explanations that merely 
await discursive opportunities to be revealed. (Edwards, 1993, p. 219; see also Harré 
and Gillette, 1994). 
From the perspective of DP, claims about knowledge are not more or less valid or accurate 
based on the extent to which they mirror extra-discursive cognitive phenomena (which is not to 
say that they lack any intricate relationship with extra-discursive phenomena). Rather, particular 
ways of talking about knowledge can be valid or invalid as a function of whether they are 
normative (i.e., acceptable or appropriate in terms of the conventions of a particular community). 
Consideration of whether or not an utterance is normative means to consider whether it is seen 
as appropriate (i.e., the right or correct way of speaking), and as conforming to an unarticulated 
pattern set by previous utterances. So, from a discursive-psychological perspective, we would 
not assess the validity of a particular claim about a child’s knowledge (e.g., she knows how to 
count) in terms of whether it accurately represented the child’s inner cognitive structures, but in 
terms of whether and how it constitutes a normative way of talking about knowledge.   
 A cognitive realist who treats entities like beliefs, knowledge, as discourse-independent 
phenomena might respond by arguing that, while it is literally true that scientific conclusions 
about what children know are dependent on the ways language is used (since if language were 
used in other ways, a given conclusion would be formulated differently), this point is trivial since 
language is simply a mediator between the investigator and the actual phenomenon of study. To 
claim that scientific conclusions are determined by the way that language is used would be, in 
some ways, like saying that the meaning of what someone says on the phone is a function of 
how the phone works. The cognitive realist might argue that, although language is used to 
express conclusions about children’s knowledge, the truth of these conclusions is not just a 
function of whether they constitute a normative use of language, but of how accurately these 
uses describe the entities that this knowledge-talk is about: e.g., how accurately they describe 
some structural aspect of the nervous system. If children’s knowledge has no existence outside 
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of language, how, one might ask, are children able to do what they do? If knowledge is simply a 
social construction, why do children have a different set of capacities than adults, infants, or 
other animals?  
This cognitive realist line of thinking is correct in asserting that there must be some 
causal explanation for the way that an organism is able to interact with its environment. Its error 
is in the assumption that the causal processes constituting an organism’s interaction with its 
environment are isomorphic with the structures and/or processes distinguished by folk-
psychological concepts (knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, etc.). (This error can be illustrated, in the 
case of the concept of knowledge, with the claim s/he did X because s/he knew Y, being 
interpreted to mean that Y (the knowledge) literally caused her action to unfold in the way that it 
did.) While this approach may appear to eliminate mind-matter dualism by treating psychological 
concepts as denoting causal entities in the physical world, it brings up problems. In using folk-
psychological concepts (specifically knowledge) to provide a causal account of behavior, the 
possibility that these concepts are not reducible to the underlying structures and processes of 
the organism is overlooked.  
Although for some purposes the idea of language as a mirror of extra-discursive reality is 
a useful metaphor, it is incorrect to deny that the only distinctions, equivalences or demarcations 
that can be made in language are those that already exist in the world beyond language. The 
distinctions made in language reflect its use in goal-directed human interactivity, where it 
provides a set of tools for doing things, rather than merely being a decontextualized and 
objective map of the world. Statements about someone’s knowledge of number are therefore 
necessarily more than depictions of brain or cognitive phenomena. They embody distinctions 
that originate in the forms of life—the varieties of cultural practices, of human interaction—which 
cannot be reduced to the individual organism (or even to an extended conception of the 
organism, including tools that are integrated into processes of activity). 
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These issues are particularly relevant to the social sciences, which often involves 
concepts that are more discourse-dependent (intensional) than the concepts of the hard 
sciences. This can be shown with the following example. While the use of the word granite is 
strongly shaped by direct phenomenological interactions with granite rocks as a discourse-
independent entities and can be given an ostensive definition, this is less apparent in the case 
of knowledge. We may interact with people (who, we may claim, know things), but we cannot 
point to the knowledge itself. Or to the extent that we can, we will be pointing to something 
much less discrete (in sensory-motor terms) than we would in the case of ostensive pointing to 
a piece of granite. Even if we claim, as Chomsky did, that knowledge can be identified with 
some structures or processes in the brain (Chomsky, 1988), our relative ignorance of these 
structures and processes, and our lack of direct experiences with them, limit the extent to which 
the concept of knowledge can be extra-discursively grounded in these structures or processes. 
 The perspective of discursive psychology provides a possible way to understand the 
issues that emerged in the previous analysis of literature. For example, it can readily account for 
the issue of conclusively determining what a child knows about numbers, since this would be 
understood as akin to conclusively determining whether or not a certain picture is pretty, or the 
precise moment at which someone becomes an adult. These are simply discursive claims that 
are made, whose validity is never solely a function of the structure of the extra-discursive world, 
but of received ways of talking about knowledge, beauty or adulthood. From the discursive 
perspective, we could make sense of these claims by looking at the ways that they are made, 
justified, undermined, and otherwise negotiated.  
 Some existing research has been done in the discursive psychological tradition (broadly 
construed) on topics relating to knowledge, and specifically children’s conceptual knowledge—
including, in some cases, numerical knowledge (e.g., Edwards, 1993; Lampert, 1990; Sfard & 
Lavie, 2005). However, these investigations (see also, Nelson and Nelson, 2002; and Saxe and 
Esmonde, 2012) have been focused on discursive interactions that are taken, from the outset, 
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to implicitly constitute knowing—i.e., (inter)actions that in a particular setting might be normative 
grounds for claiming that someone knows something (e.g., about numbers). For example, both 
Nelson & Nelson (2002) and Saxe and Esmonde (2012) show the interdependence between the 
competence of members of a certain cultural community, and the symbol systems and other 
technologies that support these competencies and their evolution into new forms. This work 
foregrounds those practices themselves, developing across historical time and through the 
influence of changing cultural values and tools. While these topics are important in their own 
right, they are different from the focus of the current research, which is on the discursive 
functioning of knowledge claims themselves, claims about what someone does or doesn’t know, 
as well as a central component of this discourse, the signs to know and to understand, and their 
objectified (Sfard, 2008) form knowledge and understanding. Here, the focus is not on the 
activities that are assumed to be relevant to or constitutive of knowledge (e.g., children’s uses of 
counting and number words), but on the claims made about knowledge on the basis of such 
activity, and the ways that various forms of the words knowing and understanding function 
discursively.  
2.5.b Rationale for the Study of Knowledge Claims 
Insofar as knowledge is constructed in discourse (i.e., insofar as it is a discursively 
constructed object) what is said about it is always a matter of consensus. Therefore, the 
meaning/use of knowledge claims is inherently variable, at least in principle. The way that a 
particular knowledge claim (e.g., s/he understands counting) is used is a matter of historical 
consensus; it is a function of how this claim is normatively7 used by people in social interactions. 
Therefore, phrases such as he understands counting have no inherent meaning or referent that 
                                                
7 Something is normative if it is perceived, without explanation, as correct or appropriate. 
According to Baerveldt and Verheggen (2007) “Normativity in the realm of everyday conduct 
involves implicit standards for the correctness and appropriateness of actions and expressions.” 
(p. 175) 
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precedes, anchors or provides a guide for their use.  This idea is applied to the concepts of the 
social sciences by Slunecko and Hengl (2007) who write,  
For discourse analysts, things such as the state, madness, religion, humanity, freedom, 
and so on may be understood solely out of the discursive practice that created them at a 
particular point in time. These things have no essence and continuity as such; if they 
had, different times and cultures would have no choice but to come to terms with them, 
that is, to react to their given existence with specific practices. To handle these things 
does not mean to respond to some continuous natural essentials. Instead, these things 
(state, religion, madness, etc.) are to be explained out of our discursive practice – and 
never the other way around. (Slunecko & Hengl, 2007, p. 48) 
While Slunecko and Hengl’s point is made with respect to things like madness, religion and the 
state, the point applies just as well to the concept of knowledge.8 Given this, it is particularly 
striking that scientific investigations would attempt to investigate topics like what a person 
knows. Insofar as knowledge claims are discursive phenomena (i.e., consensually and 
normatively determined), the criteria for reaching conclusions in these investigations (and the 
conclusions themselves) are only as stable as the discourse within which the investigation is 
carried out. Stated in another way, what it is that a person knows is essentially a matter of what 
people normatively treat him or her as knowing.  
The possible instability of the discourses that frame and constitute scientific 
investigations has the potential to completely undermine any pretense of objectivity in the 
research that is built on these discourses. How can a definitive scientific conclusion be reached 
if the conclusion is “built” out of concepts with inherently variable meanings, and no historically 
stable point of reference? This issue is not resolved by ensuring that research questions are 
addressed through careful empirical investigation. So long as the research questions are about 
                                                
8 In the case of knowledge, rather than attempting to explain what knowledge the child really 
has, the alternative suggested by Slunecko and Hengl is to study the discourses within which it 
becomes possible to claim that the child has knowledge in the first place. 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
 
25 
abstract discourse-dependent objects (e.g., concepts like knowledge), no amount of empirical 
support for specific findings can guarantee a stable or final conclusion. Slunecko and Hengl 
make this point forcefully, arguing that, 
Because madness or sexuality … are not natural entities, but discursively constructed 
ones, there is no point for science to go asking people about their attitudes toward these 
objects. Rather, science has to analyze the discursive practice, by which madness or 
sexuality emerge in their specific historical appearances. This critique blatantly affects 
human and social sciences, as long as they thoughtlessly take their starting point from 
the false entities and overlook the process of their creation. The methodical 
consequences of that critique are cogent: when asking people about their attitudes, 
judgments, or opinions on madness, beauty, sexuality, and so on, that is, about their 
beliefs on false entities – an endemic practice in psychology – all one does is 
corroborate the faith in false objects. Instead of trying to leave the illusionary circle, one 
ultimately ends up substantiating and reproducing the dominant discourse and ideology. 
(Slunecko & Hengl, 2007, p. 48) 
While this argument has important implications for the social sciences, the fact that discursively 
constructed objects (e.g., knowledge, but also madness, sexuality, etc.) have been studied as if 
they were—to use Slunecko and Hengl’s term—“natural entities” is something that demands 
explanation, since from the discursive perspective, such investigations make very little sense. 
As the previous literature review showed, an abundance of studies have attempted to draw 
conclusions about what children know about numbers. If there is no knowledge “out there” to 
study (apart from the use of the word knowledge in discourse), how are such conclusions 
possible?  
To understand how conclusions about what children know are made, the central 
phenomena of interest are the ostensibly definitive conclusions about what people know—along 
with the ways that these conclusions are justified. How do these claims function—specifically, 
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under what circumstances is their assertion considered valid/invalid? These questions may be 
answered by analyzing the discourse in which such conclusions are asserted, contested and 
justified, such as might be reflected in the text of research articles on children’s conceptual 
knowledge. Analysis of such articles could reveal how knowledge claims function within a 
system of interrelated semiotic components that relate according to a particular discursive logic: 
in other words, a language game (Wittgenstein, 1951) or speech genre (Bakhtin, 1986). 
2.5.c Interpretive Approach 
Of course, in such an analysis of research texts, the number of relevant features would 
be essentially infinite. Any discourse, or aspect of a discourse (such as conclusions about 
knowledge), functions the way it does (i.e., has the meaning that it does) by virtue of a 
practically infinite number of features. Besides the words themselves, there is the context in 
which they are spoken/written/read (e.g., what has been previously stated, or the location of the 
text in some larger publication) and their physical characteristics (e.g., font/tone). Furthermore, 
the functioning of all of these is affected by further historical and contextual factors.  
The later work of Wittgenstein shows that contextual factors that are involved in 
meaningful language use are not only numerous, but also a vital precondition for meaningful 
language use. Wittgenstein’s view of language is fundamental for the current research. 
According to this view, (1) language is always understood as language use; and (2) this use is 
always intentionally communicative in nature, as opposed to being separated from the context 
of intentional communication. The implication of (2) is that language is always being used in the 
context of two or more specific people, with certain perspectives and certain assumptions, 
including certain assumptions about what the other assumes. Building from the last point, (3) 
any instances of language use (utterances) are only intersubjectively meaningful against a 
shared background that Wittgenstein calls a form of life (Wittgenstein, 1953), which is akin to 
the notion of a habitus (Taylor, 1977, drawing on Bourdieu, 1977), and cannot be 
comprehensively articulated. As he shows in his later work (Wittgenstein, 1953, 1979, 1981) it is 
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not possible for the intended implications or meaning of any utterance to be unambiguously 
determined in terms of the explicit features of the utterance itself. For a summary of these 
arguments, see Appendix 1.   
The arguments in Appendix 1 show that the existence and functioning of knowledge 
claims cannot be fully accounted for in terms of the explicit features of texts or other 
communicative expressions, and that extra-discursive aspects of language (e.g., 
intersubjectivity, shared assumptions, and mutual participation in particular forms of life) provide 
its fundamental grounding and are necessary to explain its use. These relevant extra-discursive 
aspects of language are essentially infinite in number and complexity. While a full cataloguing of 
them would be necessary for a fully comprehensive account of how knowledge claims function, 
the current research aims to show how the functioning of knowledge claims may be usefully if 
not comprehensively elucidated solely through the analysis of a relatively small number of 
explicit features of the discourse in which these claims are made (specifically, as this discourse 
manifests itself in peer reviewed and published research articles).  
So, rather than comprehensively analyzing the functioning of knowledge claims, the 
analysis in the current research starts from the assumption of approximate intersubjectivity with 
the authors/editors of the analyzed research texts. In this approach, the identification of 
knowledge claims is the starting point for the analysis, rather than its ultimate goal.  
Consequently, this approach will not provide a complete account of knowledge claims and their 
functioning: e.g., it will not fully explain why a given utterance is interpreted as a knowledge 
claim as opposed to anything else discursively.  
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CHAPTER 3. GENERAL FOCUS OF THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
3.1 Research Question 
The current research examined how conclusions about what children know about 
number are asserted, justified, and contested. For instance, when a researcher claims that a 
child understands the cardinal principle, on what basis is this claim validly asserted, what are its 
implications, and if its assertion is contingent on some sort of evidence, what makes that 
evidence valid/invalid?  
3.2 Sites of Analysis 
To answer these questions, the current study analyzed texts of peer reviewed published 
articles on children’s understanding of cardinality. While these texts are not a full record of the 
use of knowledge claims in the entire research process (not to mention in the discursive 
community within and with respect to which such claims are made), they are sufficient for the 
goals of the current analysis for several reasons. First, the texts include descriptions, 
explanation and analysis of previous research (i.e., part of the discursive context), the statement 
and justification of research questions about children’s knowledge, the description and 
justification of methods for addressing these questions, reports of the results of empirical 
observations, and conclusions drawn based on the results. Secondly, since these articles are 
produced in relative isolation from their intended audience, details may be made explicit which 
are relevant to the current analysis that would otherwise be unmentioned. As a result, it is 
hoped that published research articles will provide a sufficient record of the general discursive 
logic through which conclusions about what children know are reached.  
3.3 Initial Analytical Categories 
The goal of the current research is to model the components (and their interrelations) of 
the discursive processes through which conclusions are reached about what children know. 
While this model will be developed based on the analysis of published research texts, it is 
necessary to begin the analysis with several assumptions about these components and their 
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interrelations. Without such initial categories, the analysis could not be conducted. The two 
categories described below are the initial categories used to guide the analysis.  
3.3.a Knowledge claims 
Knowledge claims refer to descriptions of what a person does know, doesn’t know or may 
know. Knowledge claims are not just claims about the presence or absence of knowledge in 
some broad sense, but rather claims that describe what is known. For example, the following 
would be considered knowledge claims: 
• s/he knows that each number word refers to a set of items, rather than any one of its 
individual members.  
• s/he understands how counting works 
• s/he knows that the sequence of counting words must be repeated in the same order 
• s/he knows that each number spoken while counting must be applied to one and only 
one item in the counted set. 
• s/he knows the principle of cardinality [descriptions of what cardinality is that are given or 
referenced elsewhere in the text would be considered a part of this knowledge claim]. 
Statements that are phrased in different ways may still be considered knowledge claims, so long 
as they are, in some way, a description of what is known. So, for example, if in any of the above 
examples, the word knows was replaced with understands, grasps, realizes, comprehends, or if 
the child were claimed to have the concept of any of the above predicates, these would still be 
considered knowledge claims. Additionally, while the above examples involve claims about what 
a child does know, claims about what the child doesn’t or may know were also treated as 
knowledge claims, e.g., the claim that s/he doesn’t understand cardinality would be considered 
a knowledge claim.  
 Claims about knowledge that are not claims about what is (or isn’t/may be) known are 
not considered to be knowledge claims, since these are not assertions about what it is that a 
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person knows. For example, the phrase knowledge is important would not generally function as 
a knowledge claim.  
Finally, while statements of knowing-how and knowing-that have been distinguished in 
other work, especially in philosophy (Ryle, 1949), both types of statements will be considered 
knowledge claims for the current purposes. This is not meant to imply that there is no difference 
between them, but that both fall under the umbrella of knowledge claims, even if within that 
category, they function in different ways. If, in the analysis of knowledge claims, claims of 
knowing-how function in systematically different ways from knowing-that, then these differences 
will be incorporated into the general model of the discursive functioning of knowledge claims. 
3.3.b Justifications 
A justification is any statement that serves to justify the actual or conditional assertion of 
a knowledge claim. In other words, a justification is the direct reason given for asserting a 
knowledge claim, with the consequence that, had the justification not been given, the assertion 
of the claim would be considered invalid. For instance, if it is claimed that a child understands 
how counting works because they can pass the Give-N task, (i.e., to correctly construct sets of a 
requested number of items for any number up to six) then passing the Give-N task (and any 
included or referenced description of what this entails) would be considered the justification. To 
further illustrate the analytic category of justifications, the following artificial examples (not from 
actual texts) show statements with the knowledge claims in italics, and the justifications 
underlined: 
• s/he doesn’t understand how counting works because when asked for “four toys” 
from a larger pile, she responded by grabbing a random number of toys. 
• s/he has a concept of cardinality because she passed the Give-N task. 
• After an experimenter removed an item from a previously counted set, s/he 
correctly responded when asked how many items it now contained, suggesting 
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that s/he knows the subtraction of an item from a counted set means that the 
number of items in the set decreases by one. 
• Passing the give-N task involves correctly giving out any requested number of 
items from a larger set … s/he passed the Give-N task. … [therefore] We can 
conclude that she understands the cardinal principle. 
 
3.4 Locating Knowledge Claims and Justifications in Scholarly Research Reports 
 In the current research (and in the previous explanation of the analytic categories), 
certain statements are identified as exemplars of knowledge claims or justifications. The 
identification of discrete statements as exemplars of these categories is somewhat misleading. 
These categories do not demarcate discrete features of the text. As is true for any other 
meaningful statement, a knowledge claim or justification exists as such because of its relation to 
the surrounding text or utterance. So, while a particular statement can be identified as a 
knowledge claim or a justification, the meaning of this statement is partially constituted by other 
statements, whose meaning is in turn constituted by other statements. For this reason, it is not 
always possible to make a clear distinction between parts of the text that are and are not 
knowledge claims or justifications.  
While knowledge claims and justifications will be treated if they are exemplified by 
discrete statements, these examples should be interpreted as abstractions from the text as a 
whole, rather than discrete parts of it. So, when a statement is extracted from a text and labeled 
as a knowledge claim/justification, the knowledge claim/justification in question is not literally the 
statement itself, but rather a property of the discourse as a whole that is particularly salient in 
the extracted statement. For example, if it is claimed that a child understands cardinality 
because they pass the give-n task, then passing the Give-N task would be the most directly 
given reason (justification) for the claim, but descriptions of what this task is, what a passing 
performance entails, and why it is relevant, would all be a part of the justification as well. 
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Similarly, if a knowledge claim is justified with a citation for another research article, the relevant 
parts of the cited text would be considered an indirect part of the justification.  
The difficulty of demarcating justifications from other parts of the text is anticipated to be 
particularly acute in the method and results sections of articles. In these sections, details that 
will ultimately furnish the justifications of knowledge claims will be discussed in great detail, and 
referred to in various direct and indirect ways. Whereas in certain sections, it may be possible to 
identify rather discrete statements as embodying knowledge claims and justifications, the depth 
of discussion of justifications in the method and results sections will preclude this.  
3.5 Goal of Analysis: A Model of the Discursive Functioning of Knowledge Claims 
In the current study, the categories of knowledge claim and justification will be used to 
analyze a sample of research texts in order to refine the categories themselves, as well as to 
better understand their interrelations. The ultimate goal of this analysis is the construction of a 
model depicting the discursive functioning of knowledge claims, from here on referred to as the 
model of knowledge claim functioning or simply the model for short. To develop the model, the 
initial categories of knowledge claim and justification will be refined, developed, and elaborated 
with additional categories through the analysis of multiple articles, eventually resulting in the 
final model.  
The model will provide an account of the functioning of knowledge claims that answers 
the following questions: Why does a particular justification provide a valid9 or appropriate (as 
opposed to irrelevant) reason for asserting/contesting a particular knowledge claim? On what 
basis are the justification and the knowledge claim related? Is there an argument given to 
substantiate this relationship, or any explanation for why the justification brought to support a 
knowledge claim does in fact provide grounds for making this claim? If so, how do the 
arguments work? Are they part of the justification? If not, why are they necessary? Overall, what 
                                                
9 From the standpoint of the author, or their assumed audience. 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
 
33 
do they say about the functioning of knowledge claims, and the relation between a claim and its 
justification?  
 
3.6 Methodology 
3.6.a Process of Analysis 
The present research involved the analysis of the discursive functioning of conclusions 
about what children know about numbers and counting (knowledge claims) in a selection of 13 
published research articles. The text analysis is unique in that its final product (the model) is a 
refined, developed and elaborated version of the categories used in the analysis themselves—
which at the start of the analysis were just the previously described knowledge claims and 
justifications. The text analysis and development of the model occurred through the following 
steps:  
1. Preliminary analysis of one initial text using the initial categories (knowledge claims and 
justifications). 
2. Refinement and elaboration of the categories and their relations to produce a rough 
prototype model of knowledge claim functioning.  
3. An iterative process in which additional texts were analyzed to determine their fit to the 
model, and the model itself was changed to accommodate to previously unaccountable 
aspects of knowledge-claim use. These two phases followed each other in a repeated 
fashion as updated versions of the model were assessed for their fit to a gradually 
broadening selection of texts. This continued until saturation was reached: i.e. until the 
analysis of new texts—including texts from diverse journals and different historical 
areas—ceased to require changes to the model. 
3.6.b Selection of Texts for Analysis  
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Texts included in the analysis were edited, peer-reviewed and published research 
articles on children’s knowledge of numbers and counting. These were focused on the following 
questions: 
1. When do children understand the cardinal principle? 
2. How can we better characterize children’s knowledge of the cardinal principle? 
3. When do children know that the last word reached in counting represents the cardinality 
(i.e., number of items) in the counted set? 
4. What do children at age X know about the cardinal properties of numbers? 
The sampled texts (selected according to a rationale described below) are listed in Table 1 
(below).   
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Table 1. Texts included for analysis in Study 2 
Texts Selected for Study 2 
Authors Title Journal Year Pgs 
Rochel Gelman Logical Capacity of Very Young 
Children: Number Invariance Rules 
Child Development 1972 15 
Rochel Gelman 
Eizabeth Meck 
 
Preschoolers’ counting: Principles before 
skill 
Cognition 1983 16 
Diane Briars 
Robert S. Siegler 
A Featural Analysis of Preschoolers’ 
Counting Knowledge 
Developmental Psychology 1984 17 
Catherine Sophian Early Developments in Children’s 
Understanding of Number: Inferences 
about Numerosity and One-to-one 
Correspondence 
Child Development 1988 19 
Douglas Frye 
Nicholas Braisby 
John Lowe 
Celine Maroudas 
Jon Nicholls 
Young Children’s Understanding of 
Counting and Cardinality 
Child Development 1989 13 
Karen Wynn Children’s Understanding of Counting Cognition 1990 37 
Neon Brooks 
Jennifer Audet 
David Barner 
Inference and Number Words Developmental Psychology 2012 9 
Kathryn Davidson 
Kortney Eng 
David Barner 
Does Learning to Count Involve a 
Semantic Induction? 
Cognition 2012 11 
Ana Nikoloska Development of the Cardinality Principle 
in Macedonian Preschool Children 
Psihologija 2009 16 
Barbara W. 
Sarnecka 
Susan Carey 
How counting represents number: What 
children must learn and when they learn 
it 
Cognition 2008 12 
Barbara W. 
Sarnecka 
Charles E Wright 
The idea of an exact number: Children’s 
understanding of cardinality and 
equinumerosity 
Cognitive Science 2013 13 
Kevin Muldoon 
Charlie Lewis 
Norman H 
Freeman 
Putting counting to work: preschoolers’ 
understanding of cardinal extension 
International Journal of 
Educational Research 
2003 26 
Bob Bruce 
John Threlfall 
One, Two, Three and Counting Educational Studies in 
Mathematics 
2004 24 
 
The selection of these particular texts was guided by the following considerations. First, 
the original impetus for the current research arose out of issues in recent studies of children’s 
understanding of counting and numbers. Insofar as the goal of the current research is to 
address these issues through a study of the discursive functioning of knowledge claims, studies 
on children’s understanding of cardinality provide an appropriate place for doing so. Therefore, 
the sample includes studies that were prominently analyzed in the literature review including 
Sarnecka & Carey (2008), Wynn (1990), as well as articles that address similar topics (e.g., 
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Fuson, 1992; Sarnecka & Gelman, 2004; Sarnecka & Wright; Sophian, 1992). The studies by 
Brooks Audet and Barner (2012) and Davidson, Eng and Barner (2012) are also included 
because they are direct responses to some of the previously mentioned studies, and provide 
counterarguments to their claims regarding what children know about number.  
 To assess the degree to which findings regarding the discourse on knowledge observed 
in these more recent articles can be generalized beyond these texts (and to further refine the 
model to evaluate its validity), several older articles will also be analyzed. These articles, from 
the 1970’s and 1980’s are focused on the same general issue as the others—children’s 
knowledge of numbers and counting—but arose out of a different historical context. The choice 
of the specific older articles was driven by their (1) topical similarity to the topics analyzed in the 
more recent articles (to avoid having to re-introduce unfamiliar concepts) and (2) prominence in 
the field of research on children’s numerical knowledge (these articles are frequently cited in 
studies of children’s numerical knowledge, including in the more recent articles analyzed in the 
present research). 
 The choice of texts from different historical points is anticipated to introduce differences 
that will challenge the model and possibly allow it to be further refined. Shifts in historical 
context amount to shifts in what can be taken for granted, what is assumed to be understood, 
what must be explained—i.e., assumptions about the audience. These differences will be 
attended to and explored, but only as they bear on the general model of how knowledge claims 
function with respect to the normativity of a particular community. In other words, by examining 
texts from different eras, the goal is not to say something about these eras, or to explain 
differences in the texts in terms of already-known historical changes. Instead, the goal is to 
introduce diversity into the selection of analyzed texts, allowing the model of knowledge claim 
functioning to be tested in the context of (possibly) very different texts.  
 The selection of texts also includes more than one text from several different journals. 
Specifically, Sophian (1988) and Frye et al. (1989) are from the journal Child Development. 
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Sarnecka and Carey (2008) and Davidson, Eng and Barner (2012) are from Cognition. Finally, 
Bruce (2004) and Muldoon et al. (2003) are from educational research journals (Educational 
Studies in Mathematics and International Journal of Educational Research, respectively). The 
inclusion of multiple articles from the same journals was intended to facilitate comparison of the 
role of addressivity at the level of the journal, in order to enhance the validity of the 
generalizations about addressivity in the model. (Appendix 2 provides additional information 
from an analysis of addressivity-related differences across the texts analyzed in Study 210) 
References to quotes in each of these texts are given in terms of the following format: 
[page number; line number/range]. For example, [5; 4] would refer to p. 5, line 4. For quotes 
spanning multiple pages, the format is given as [page range; first-last line number]. For 
example, [5-6; 16-4] would refer to a quote spanning pages 5-6, from line 16 (on page five) to 
line 4 (on page 6). 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
10 Note: Appendix 2 is written from the perspective of the final results/conclusions of the current 
research, and may incorporate presuppositions that have yet to be explained.   
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 1: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF SARNECKA AND CAREY ARTICLE IN 
TERMS OF INITIAL CATEGORIES 
The initial text analysis, i.e., Study 1, used the initial categories of knowledge claims and 
justifications to analyze a single research article (Sarnecka & Carey, 2008), and in the process, 
to refine the categories in order to construct an initial model. The selected article is focused 
specifically on children’s knowledge of cardinality and their understanding of counting. 
Moreover, it is especially relevant to the question guiding the current research (How can a 
discourse object be the focus of scientific study that does not treat it as such?) insofar as the 
goal of the article is to determine “what children know [about cardinal numbers] and when they 
know it”, and to “characterize the knowledge [of cardinality] itself” (p. 662). 
4.1 Identifying Knowledge Claims and Justifications in the Sarnecka and Carey Text 
The analysis began by attempting to identify the initial categories (knowledge claims and 
justifications) with specific parts of the analyzed text. This required several careful readings of 
the text in order to clearly identify knowledge claims and justifications that were (a) distributed 
across the text rather than found only in one area, or (b) apparent as exemplars of either 
category only in terms of the wider text.  
The passage below, which is actually from Schaeffer et al. (1974), quoted by Sarnecka 
and Carey (2008), provides a relatively straightforward example of what knowledge claims and 
justifications looked like in the text.  
After the child had counted the chips, the line was immediately covered with a piece of 
cardboard and the child was asked how many chips were hidden. Evidence that he 
knew... [the cardinal principle] was that he could respond by naming the last [numeral] 
he had just counted. [3; 18-24] 
In this quote, the categories of knowledge claim and justifications refer to the following 
statements: 
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Knowledge claim: he knew... [the cardinal principle]11  
 
Justification: After the child had counted the chips, the line was immediately covered 
with a piece of cardboard and the child was asked how many chips were hidden. … he 
could respond by naming the last [numeral] he had just counted. 
 
Appendix 4 illustrates how knowledge claims and justifications were identified and 
analyzed in the Sarnecka and Carey text. That appendix contains a reprint of the Introduction 
section of the text, in which the statements that express or directly reference knowledge claims 
are highlighted, while the justifications are underlined. As knowledge claims and their 
accompanying justifications were identified, they12 were entered into adjacent cells on a 
spreadsheet.13 The spreadsheet helped to keep track of each knowledge claim and justification, 
and facilitate understanding of these categories and their interrelationships themselves. Since 
each knowledge claim and justification could comprise multiple related excerpts from across the 
text, entries on the spreadsheet often cited more than one location in a text, in order to provide 
a more comprehensive representation a knowledge claim or justification. So, for example, in the 
case of the knowledge claim understanding the cardinal principle, its entry would include 
additional clarification (if provided by the text) describing what is meant by the cardinal principle. 
Likewise, if children claimed to understand the cardinal principle because they passed the Give-
N task, the described procedure of this task would be included as a part of the justification. 
                                                
11 The cardinal principle is interpreted in terms of the authors’ immediately preceding description 
as “the recognition that the last numeral used in counting tells the number of items in the set”. 
[3; 17] 
12 The immediate text of a knowledge claim, and if necessary additional clarification, if available 
(e.g., in the case of vague claims such as knowledge of the counting principles which reference 
previously mentioned information) 
13 This spreadsheet is included as Appendix 8. However, it is not presented here as an 
accessible presentation of data, but rather as an example of an initial tool used in the analysis.  
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
 
40 
Because knowledge claims were often repeatedly referenced in ways that drew on 
previous explications, and because the degree to which they are explicitly present in the text 
ranges from claims that are only implicitly entailed14 to those that are fully explicit, it is not 
possible to report a discrete frequency count of knowledge claims. Another way of stating this is 
to say that the unit of analysis in this research is not a discrete feature of a text, but a discursive 
entity that is continually being reconstructed and elaborated by particular texts. A knowledge 
claim may be understood as a property of a particular discourse. While this property is not 
something that exists discretely in a particular place in a particular text, it is elaborated in 
particular places in texts, and therefore may be investigated as such.  
Even if it were possible to report descriptive statistics, doing so at this point would be 
premature, because the categories in question remain underdeveloped. The goal of reliably and 
validly coding statements as knowledge claims or justifications drives the development and 
refinement of the analytic categories, which are reported in the following sections. Therefore, to 
report general conclusions about the first analyzed article in terms of these categories would be 
problematic at this point.  
 
4.2 Initial Development of Analytic Categories 
4.2.a Clarification of Knowledge Claim and Justification Categories 
 The results of the initial coding of the Sarnecka and Carey article made it necessary to 
slightly revise the initial categories of knowledge claims and justifications due to the flexibility 
and variability of statements that could be considered to exemplify either category. The most 
basic form of knowledge claim-justification pairings in the Sarnecka and Carey text was a 
description of some behavioral performance given as a direct reason for a knowledge claim, 
                                                
14 For example, when Sarnecka and Carey (2008) consider the “principles-after view” of 
children’s number development, they are implicitly claiming that children understand the one-to-
one principle, the stable-order principle, and the cardinal principle from the time they are early 
preschoolers. Such implicit mentions contrast with explicit mentions of these knowledge claims. 
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such as the case illustrated in the previous example (i.e., Sarnecka and Carey’s quote of the 
Schaeffer et al., (1974) article [3; 18-24]) 1. While there were many other examples like this, in 
at least as many other cases, knowledge claims and justifications were identified that derived 
from this basic structure as transformed through the use of various linguistic devices.  
A common derivation of the basic knowledge claim-justification structure is seen in 
cases where a task itself is mentioned as a measure of a given form of knowledge, as when 
Sarnecka and Carey ask “if the How-Many task doesn’t test understanding of the cardinal 
principle, what does it test?” [4; 5-6]. In the text analysis, this statement was considered to 
contain a knowledge claim (understanding the cardinal principle), a justification (the How-Many 
task), and an implied but unspecified knowledge claim (the “it” that is tested by the How-Many 
task). (It should be noted that in this case, per the quote, these were not paired with each other.) 
The How-Many task may not be immediately apparent as a justification, since it is not given as 
the reason for asserting any knowledge claim. Yet, deconstructing this statement shows it to be 
clearly derived from the basic knowledge claim-justification structure, as is shown in Table 2 
below, which shows how a short question is shown to be expandable into three knowledge 
claim-justification pairings: 
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Table 2. Deconstruction of a statement to reveal implicit knowledge claims and justifications 
Original statement 
Deconstructed form of statement 
Knowledge Claims Justifications 
if the How-Many task 
doesn’t test 
understanding of the 
cardinal principle, what 
does it test? 
Understanding the cardinal 
principle 
Something besides passing 
the How-Many task15 
 X (undefined knowledge, i.e., 
the answer to the question “what 
does it test?”) 
Passing the How many task 
Does not know X (the absence 
of some undefined knowledge; 
“what does it test?”)16 
Failing the How-Many task 
 
Numerous instances of knowledge claims and justifications the text showed how the basic 
structures of knowledge claims and justifications could be transformed with great flexibility. 
While these transformations often entailed complex uses of knowledge claims, analysis (such 
as that shown above for Table 2) revealed that these did not fundamentally depart from the 
basic structure. Still, to fully account for these transformations, it was sometimes necessary to 
broaden the categories of knowledge claim and justification to include the various possible 
transformations and derivations from their basic structures. The two initial ways in which this 
was done are listed below (incidentally, the features that drove these changes are both found in 
Table 2): 
1. Knowledge Claims or justifications may be present only as undefined placeholders: 
Undefined placeholders are knowledge claims or justifications that are implied, but not 
explicitly defined or fully described. In Table 2, the question “…what does it measure?” 
indicates an undefined placeholder. As another example, the statement There is some form 
                                                
15 Later on in the text, the undefined justification here is shown to be the Give-N task.   
16 Later on in the text, this is stated explicitly as “a procedural rule about counting and 
answering the question ‘how many.” [6; 6] 
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of knowledge that can be measured by some task contains undefined placeholders for its 
knowledge claim and justification.  
2. Groupings comprising related knowledge claims or justifications may be formed: Groupings 
involve a set of either knowledge claims or justifications that may be combined and treated 
as a single knowledge claim/justification. There were two forms of this: 
a. Groups comprised of the presence, absence and similar variations of a given 
knowledge claim or justification. Examples: 
i. The set of typical performances on a task (passing/failing) that could be 
justifications for/against a given knowledge claim. The “measure” or “test” for a 
given form of knowledge may be considered to be a grouping of justifications. 
ii. The assertion and non-assertion of a given knowledge claim. For example, the 
claims that a person understands the cardinal principle or doesn’t understand the 
cardinal principle are grouped in knowledge of the cardinal principle.  
b. Groupings of related variations of a type of knowledge claim or justification. Examples: 
i. Children’s knowledge of the counting principles (this statement groups together 
knowledge of each individual counting principle).  
ii. Children’s performance on measures of counting skills (various counting tasks 
are grouped together). 
Table 2 shows instances of both undefined placeholders (an undefined knowledge claim) and 
groupings (the set of possible performances on the How-Many task). Many more examples of 
each of these were identified in the text.   
4.2.b New Analytic Categories 
4.2.b.i Higher-Order Knowledge Claims. In the Sarnecka and Carey text, there were 
some cases in which knowledge claims involved more than just these basic categories of 
knowledge claim and justification. Although the basic distinction between knowledge claims and 
justifications was evident in these constructions, their unique qualities are worth mentioning, and 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
 
44 
these qualities were partially responsible for an additional analytic category derived from the 
initial analysis: higher level knowledge claims. Higher-order claims are knowledge claims that 
are made (i.e., asserted or contested) through the combination of multiple individual knowledge 
claims, and possibly through the use of additional discursive devices. A simple example of a 
higher level knowledge claim would be the claim that children know x before they know y, which 
would be constructed on the basis of juxtaposing the age at which a child can normatively be 
claimed to know x versus y.  
 Higher order claims were often reached by integrating individual knowledge claims in the 
context of additional a reified or objectified (Sfard, 2008) notion of knowledge. In the case of 
knowledge, objectification involves transitioning from talking about what the child knows to 
talking about the knowledge itself. Sarnecka and Carey (2008) arrived at findings about 
knowledge itself (as opposed to about what a child knows) by first identifying a child who was 
claimed to have knowledge of the cardinal principle on the basis of performance on a task (the 
Give-N task). Then, they used the child’s performance on a different task to draw conclusions 
about the knowledge of cardinality itself using the claimed-to-know child as a proxy for the 
knowledge of cardinality and relying on the assumption that the second task measured a 
different aspect of the same body of knowledge. Additional examples of objectification and 
higher-order knowledge claims can be found in Appendix 7.  
 Despite the use of objectification, or in other words, the shift towards conceiving of 
knowledge as an object in its own right, these and other higher order knowledge claims still 
function like the other claims in the text. Objectifying knowledge leads to different types of 
conclusions or predictions being made (e.g., about the knowledge itself), but the basis on which 
these predictions are made is only superficially different from what obtains in the basic model: 
Claims about knowledge as an object are just made by identifying persons with the knowledge 
they are claimed to have, and then treating future findings about their knowledge as if these 
were findings about the knowledge itself, rather than about a person.  
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 While higher-level knowledge claims were frequently found in the analyzed texts, they 
will not be given special emphasis, since they are not fundamentally different from other 
knowledge claims in ways that are relevant to the current paper. So while these claims will 
continue to be analyzed where relevant, higher level knowledge claims do not appear to 
function in a special way but rather extrapolate generic knowledge claim discourse. 
4.2.b.ii Explanations. There were several instances in the Sarnecka and Carey (2008) 
text in which the assertion of a knowledge claim on the basis of some justification was 
supported by arguments not readily categorizable as justifications themselves. These 
arguments—from here on referred to as explanations—supported the assertion of a knowledge 
claim indirectly by explaining why a given justification would (or would not) be valid grounds for 
asserting the knowledge claim. Explanations did not fit the category of justifications because 
they supported the choice of a particular justification as grounds for asserting a given 
knowledge claim just as much as they supported the implication of a particular justification 
contingent on the truth of a particular knowledge claim. Simply put, they were equally related to 
knowledge claims and justifications.  
A clear example of an explanation in the Sarnecka and Carey (2008) text can be seen in 
the quote on the top section of Table 3, which argues that performance on the How-Many task17 
is not a valid justification for the claim that a child knows the cardinal principle. Although the 
argument behind the explanation is only hinted at (and cited) without being described explicitly 
(and hence, this quote is only a part of the whole explanation), the quote in Table 3 makes for a 
simple example in which all relevant components—the knowledge claim, the justification, and 
the explanation of the relationship between them—appear in some form. As it is developed 
elsewhere throughout the Sarnecka and Carey text, the argument mentioned in the quote (i.e., 
                                                
17 The version of the How-Many task relevant to the current purposes (there are several 
versions) involves a child first counting a set of items, and then, at the conclusion of their count, 
being asked how many are there? Two common responses to this question are (a) repeating 
the last word reached when counting or (b) recounting. 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
 
46 
that the How-Many task overestimates knowledge of the cardinal principle) addresses the lack 
of concurrent validity between performance on the How-Many task and performance on other 
measures of cardinal-principle knowledge, in particular the Give-N task. The lack of concurrent 
validity undermines the assumption that both tasks are measures of the same knowledge. To 
resolve this inconsistency, the How-Many task is claimed to overestimate knowledge of the 
cardinal principle.   
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Table 3. Quote with knowledge claim, justification and explanation components extracted.  
Original Quote 
Some investigators have argued that the How-Many task overestimates children’s 
knowledge [of the cardinal principle], because some children actually do repeat the last 
numeral used in counting without (apparently) understanding that it refers to the cardinal 
value of the set (Frye et al., 1989 and Fuson, 1988). 
Knowledge Claim Justification Explanation 
Knowledge of the 
cardinal principle 
[performance on] 
the How-Many task 
Many children actually do repeat the last numeral 
used in counting without (apparently) 
understanding that it refers to the cardinal value 
of the set (Frye et al., 1989 and Fuson, 1988). 
The upper row of Table 3 shows a quote (1989) that contains an explanation, knowledge claim, 
and justification. The lower rows of Table 3 show how different parts of the overall quote 
embody a knowledge claim, justification, and explanation 
 
4.2.b.ii.1 Explanations and concurrent validity. The explanations initially identified in 
the Sarnecka and Carey article all involved concurrent validity. This occurred in two main ways. 
First, as in Table 3, explanations may address a lack of concurrent validity18 between ostensible 
measures (i.e., justifications) of the same knowledge claim. This is done by arguing one of the 
following: (a) that one of the “justifications” in question indicates a different type of knowledge 
from what was originally assumed, or (b) that the earlier-achieved (i.e., the one that children are 
able to perform first) justification is a reflection of rote/procedural rather than conceptual 
knowledge, or alternately that the later-achieved justification is delayed due to task/procedural 
or other extraneous difficulties.  
                                                
18 In this case, a lack of concurrent validity refers to a finding (from either a single research 
report, or across multiple research reports) that children perform differently on two measures of 
the same form of knowledge, something which would not be expected insofar as both measures 
are tests of the same thing. 
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The other type of explanations were those premised on the unexpected presence of 
concurrent validity between various tasks, which led to explanations that performance on a 
given task is a justification for a knowledge claim that it was not otherwise assumed to justify. 
For example, in the Sarnecka and Carey text, the presence of concurrent validity between 
performance on the Give-N task and some other measures of counting proficiency is used as an 
explanation for why the former is not only a measure of the cardinal principle, but of a more 
general understanding of how counting works (see [5; 9-32] and appendix 3). 
Explanations dealt with the unexpected presence or lack of concurrent validity across 
two or more ostensible justifications (J1, J2, …Jn) of the same or different knowledge claim(s) 
(K1, if applicable K2, etc.) in the following ways: 
a. Another justification of K1, J2 (and possibly J3, J4…etc.), is achieved after J1. 
i. J1 is accomplished through some other, simpler, means (e.g., by rote) 
ii. Either J1 or J2 measures a different kind of knowledge than was 
assumed 
iii. J2 involves extraneous performance demands 
b. Other justifications of K1 (J2, J3, …) are achieved before J1.  
i. J1 involves extraneous performance demands 
ii. J2 (and possibly J3, etc.) are accomplished through some other, simpler 
means (esp. by rote) 
iii. Either J1 or J2 justifies a different kind of knowledge than was assumed 
c. J1, a justification of K1, has concurrent validity with other presumably valid 
justifications of a different type of knowledge (K2). Therefore, J1 may be treated 
as a justification of K2 (For example, see Appendix 3) 
  
These varieties were distinguished through analysis of explanations in the text. They reflect 
explanations that were observed as well as those that, while not observed, are simple variations 
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on those that were observed, and consequently, might be expected. An in-depth example that 
shows many of these explanations is shown below in Table 4. (As an additional resource, 
Appendix 4 shows a section of the Sarnecka and Carey (2008) text with the explanations 
marked in bold.)
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Table 4. Explanations (and the arguments on which these are founded) concerning the validity of the How-Many or Give-N tasks as 
measures of the cardinal principle. 
Step Description Quotes 
1. The How-many task is presented as an 
ostensibly valid measure of cardinal principle 
knowledge 
Note: “last word responding” or “repeating the 
last numeral used in counting” are forms of 
performance on the How-many task.  
…young children do not understand the cardinal principle. That is, children do not 
seem to recognize that the last numeral used in counting tells the number of 
items in the set. One type of evidence comes from How-Many tasks. [3; 15-19]  
The Give-N task is presented as a measure of 
cardinal principle knowledge.  
Specifically, passing the Give-N task (i.e., being 
a CP-Knower) is taken to indicate knowledge of 
the cardinal principle. 
The Give-N task provides a different way of measuring cardinal-principle 
knowledge. [4; 9-16]  
After the child has spent some time (often more than a year) as a subset-knower, 
her performance undergoes a dramatic change. Suddenly, she is able to 
generate the right cardinality for numerals “five” and above. But whereas she 
progressed through the subset-knower levels gradually (learning “one,” then 
“two,” then “three,”...) she seems to acquire the meanings of the higher numerals 
(“five” through however high she can count) all at once. We call children at this 
level cardinal-principle-knowers (sometimes abbreviated CP-knowers). [5; 3-8] 
2. Evidence is reported showing that performance 
on the Give-N task and the How-Many task is 
not concurrent. Specifically, since subset 
knowers (who are not yet CP-knowers) 
succeeded on the How-many task, it is 
concluded that children succeed on the How-
Many task before they succeed on the Give-N 
task (i.e., children succeed on the How-Many 
task before they are CP-knowers) 
virtually all of our cardinal-principle-knowers did get both trials [of the How-Many 
task] correct, and so did three-quarters of the “two,” “three”- and “four”-knowers, 
and a quarter of the pre-numeral-knowers.   
Clearly, many children learn a procedural ‘How-Many’ rule (i.e., that the answer to 
the question “how many” is the last word reached in a count) long before they 
understand the cardinal principle. These findings confirm earlier reports (e.g., 
Frye et al., 1989 and Fuson, 1988) that How-Many tasks should not be used as a 
measure of cardinal-principle  
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3. The concurrent validity of the Give-N task with
other measures of cardinal principle knowledge
implies that it is a valid measure of this
knowledge.
At the same time, the lack of concurrent validity
of other cardinality tasks with the How-Many
task is taken to indicate that  the How-Many task
measures a simple procedural rule, rather than
understanding of the cardinal principle.
Given that other studies have shown high within-child consistency across 
cardinality tasks including Give-N, the Counting Puppet task, What’s-On-This-
Card, etc. ( Le Corre et al., 2006, Le Corre and Carey, 2007 and Wynn, 1992), it 
seems fair to conclude that the difference we find between How-Many scores and 
Give-N scores in the present study is a result of our task using the exact phrase 
“how many,” which is enough to prompt many children to answer with the last 
word of a count, whether they understand the cardinal principle or not. [21-22; 39-
3] 
Clearly, many children learn a procedural ‘how-many’ rule (i.e., that the answer to 
the question “how many” is the last word reached in a count) long before they 
understand the cardinal principle. These findings confirm earlier reports (e.g., 
Frye et al., 1989 and Fuson, 1988) that How-Many tasks should not be used as a 
measure of cardinal-principle understanding, because they tend to overestimate 
children’s knowledge of how counting works. [21; 8-19] 
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 Table 4 shows the role of explanations in Sarnecka and Carey’s consideration of the How-Many 
and Give-N tasks as measures of children’s understanding of cardinality. Ultimately, the Give-N 
task is explained to be a valid measure of cardinality knowledge, while the How-Many task is 
concluded to be invalid. This argument is developed in three main steps, as shown in Table 4 
above. In the first step, both tasks are presented as at least ostensible measures of an 
understanding of cardinality. Secondly, findings are reported showing that performance on both 
tasks is not concurrent. This cannot be reconciled with the fact that both tasks are measures of 
the same knowledge. Consequently, it is argued that the Give-N task is the valid measure of the 
cardinal principle, while the How-Many task is not. These arguments are premised on (a) the 
claimed concurrent validity of the Give-N task with other measures of cardinality knowledge, and 
(b) the alternative explanation for children’s relatively early success on the How-Many task, 
namely that children passing the task may have merely learned a procedural rule, rather than a 
conceptual principle (i.e., the cardinal principle).  
 
 
4.3 Initial Consideration of the Relationship Between Knowledge Claims, Justifications 
and Explanations 
4.3.a The Relationship Between Knowledge Claims and Justifications  
 In order to develop the basic analytic categories (knowledge claim, justification, 
explanation) into an initial model of how knowledge claims function discursively, it is necessary 
to characterize the relationship between them. The most basic issue in this relationship is the 
connection between knowledge claims and justifications. Why does a particular statement 
provide valid justification for one knowledge claim rather than another? Why does a knowledge 
claim imply some justifications rather than others?19 In analyzing this relationship in terms of the 
                                                
19 Of course, one answer to this question is that such pairings are normative in relation to a 
background of certain forms of life that is shared by interlocutors for whom the pairings are 
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 Sarnecka and Carey text, a puzzle emerged for us. On one hand, there were numerous cases 
in which the relevance of a particular justification to a particular knowledge claim was never 
explained, but treated as self-evident. On the other hand, there were many cases in which, via 
explanations, the knowledge claim-justification connection was explicitly dealt with. As the 
following analysis shows, these contrasting cases are particularly informative about the 
functioning of knowledge claims. To begin examining this issue, we turn first knowledge claim-
justification pairings that are not addressed with explanations, followed by those that are. 
4.3.a.i Self-evident connections between knowledge claims and justifications. The 
following quote is one example of the assertion of a knowledge claim on the basis of a 
justification in the absence of any explanation given to account for the justification being 
relevant to the particular knowledge claim. Tentatively, we may say that these justifications had 
a self-evident or a priori relevance to the knowledge claims they were used to justify. For 
example, consider the following case: 
...evidence that young children do not understand the cardinal principle. That is, 
children do not seem to recognize that the last numeral used in counting tells the 
number of items in the set. One type of evidence comes from How-Many tasks. The 
version used by Schaeffer et al. (1974) is typical:  
 
“Each child was asked to count the chips in a line of x poker chips, where x varied 
between 1 and 7. After the child had counted the chips, the line was immediately 
covered with a piece of cardboard and the child was asked how many chips were 
hidden. Evidence that he knew... [the cardinal principle] was that he could respond by 
naming the last [numeral] he had just counted.” (p. 360) [3; 16-24] 
                                                                                                                                                       
normative. Yet, this answer is assumed by the analysis from the outset. The goal of the current 
analysis is to proceed from this assumption and provide a more specific answer to the question 
that is unique to knowledge claims. 
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 There is no explanation given for why performance on the How-Many task (the justification) is 
relevant to speculation about the child’s understanding of the cardinal principle (the knowledge 
claim), either in the quote above, or in the text surrounding it. Naming the last numeral he had 
just counted is brought forth, without further explanation, as a potentially valid justification for 
children’s knowledge of the cardinal principle. A similar lack of explanation for the relevance of a 
particular justification was found in many instances throughout the text, including with some of 
the main knowledge claims made in the article (e.g., the knowledge claims introduced on [7; 13-
17 are asserted contingent on certain task performances (justifications), but the relevance of 
these to the knowledge claims is never addressed).  
 The fact that the justifications given for knowledge claims have, in some cases, an 
assumed or self-evident relevance is to be expected from the Wittgenstein-influenced view of 
language (for more on this, see Appendix 1): language use is premised on an unstated 
background of shared forms of life. Against such a background, certain ways of talking (such as 
certain ways of reaching and defending conclusions) are, for certain interlocutors, taken as 
normative, without any need to explain. In the case of knowledge claims, this means that a 
justification is related to its knowledge claim simply by virtue of how each statement is 
understood; one implies the other. For further explanation of this kind of normativity, see 
Appendix 1. 
4.3.a.ii Knowledge Claim-Justification Pairs Mediated by Explanations. If 
knowledge claims and justifications are normatively related, what is the role of explanations, 
which mediate between them? If the link between a knowledge claim and its justification has to 
be explained (as it does when explanations are present), it might seem that this link is not a 
normative one (for the author and/or intended audience). However, a close reading of how 
explanations function shows that they are premised on the implicit or default presumption of the 
validity of the ultimately invalid behavior (invalidated justification). That is, they deny the validity 
of a particular justification (e.g., a behavioral criterion or task) when no explicit claims were ever 
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 made in support of the validity of that justification. This denial of otherwise assumed validity is 
illustrated by the following example: 
Many children answer the question “how many” with the last word used in counting, 
despite not understanding how counting works. [1; 13-14] 
This quote is an implicit explanation insofar as it denies the validity of a justification (so-called 
“last word responses” on the How-Many task) for the claim that a child understands how 
counting works. Importantly, giving last word responses has not previously been introduced in 
the text (this quote comes from the abstract). This quote only makes sense if one presupposes 
that answering the question “how many” with the last word used in counting normatively implies 
that one understands of how counting works. This can be illustrated by reference to the way that 
similar quotes lacking such a presupposition do not make sense—e.g., Many children can say 
the word “cat” despite not understanding how counting works. Although this second statement 
also denies that a particular behavior is a valid justification of understanding how counting 
works, the fact that it makes no sense corroborates the idea that the validity of certain 
justifications (in relation to a particular knowledge claim) can be presupposed. 
 This suggests that, although explanations may be used to assert or deny the validity of a 
particular justification, this is only done for justification-knowledge claim pairings whose validity 
is presupposed. As a result, rather than suggesting that knowledge claims are not normatively 
linked to their justifications, the explanations provide further corroboration for this idea. 
 The idea that explanations are premised on normative implications between knowledge 
claims and justifications accounts for why they involve concurrent validity. Explanations for 
particular knowledge claim-justification pairings were almost always20 given when children were 
found to carry out some but not all of the behavioral performances that serve as possible 
                                                
20 The only exceptions to this are explanations that involve the unexpected finding of concurrent 
validity of a justification (J1) with the justifications (J2) for another knowledge claim (K2). In 
these situations, the explanation functions by explaining why J1 is a justification for K2 as well 
as the claim it originally justified, K1. 
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 justifications for a knowledge claim. Such situations are inherently problematic, since the 
achieved justifications imply the knowledge claim while the unachieved justification(s) 
simultaneously contest the claim. Explanations resolve this inconsistency by redefining or 
recasting the inconsistent justifications in a way that eliminates their normative connection with 
the knowledge claim21. 
 This can be illustrated with the case of children’s understanding of the cardinal principle, 
and the use of performance on either the How-Many or Give-N tasks as justifications for this 
knowledge claim (i.e., understanding of the cardinal principle). Both task-performances are 
introduced in the Sarnecka and Carey text as self-evidently valid justifications for the knowledge 
claim. Subsequently, it is found that children who pass the How-Many task may fail other 
cardinality-related tasks like the Give-N task. This is problematic for drawing conclusions about 
children’s understanding of the cardinal principle insofar as performance on both tasks is 
normatively implicated by the cardinal principle. As far as children’s understanding of cardinality 
is concerned, there is no explanation for failing one but not the other task. To address this 
inconsistency, an explanation may be used to redefine performance on the How-Many task—
i.e., redescribing this task performance as following a simple procedural rule for how to answer 
the question how-many, without understanding the conceptual significance of this rule—in a way 
that severs its normative connection with the claim that a child understands the cardinal 
principle.  
 Summing up the findings of the previous paragraphs, the explanations identified in the 
article involved negotiating the already-assumed normative relations between knowledge 
claim(s) and one or more justifications.  In other words, explanations did not establish the 
normativity "from the ground up": they did not explain why a justification that would not (in 
                                                
21 As this suggests, it is not the performances themselves, but rather their characterization that 
is relevant (and normatively linked) to a particular knowledge claim. 
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 general) have any22 relation to a particular knowledge claim is in fact a valid justification of that 
claim. Instead, they negotiated already-assumed normative connections between justifications 
and knowledge claims in order to resolve inconsistent and contradictory patterns of findings. 
4.3.b An Alternate Role for Explanations: Type 2 Explanations 
 Although the explanations in the Study 1 were found to negotiate already-existing 
normative connections between knowledge claims and justifications, this does not mean that the 
establishment or negotiation of this normativity itself could never be an issue. Normative 
connections between a knowledge claim and a particular justification only exist as such for a 
particular community of interlocutors, whose activity establishes and maintains this normativity. 
While such normative connections may be a dependable fact of life in a particular community, 
they are not necessarily established beyond the context of that community. In fact, from a 
hypothetical perspective outside of any particular community, there is no necessary link 
between a knowledge claim and a justification (or any other statements for that matter). From 
this, it follows that the same claim may (normatively) imply different justifications in different 
communities. In other words, the implications (in terms of implied behavioral capacities) of a 
knowledge claim may be understood as contingent on the context of the claim. In terms of a 
concrete example the normative implications of what it means to say that a child understands 
how to count may be different depending on whether the claim is made by a parent or a 
cognitive development researcher.  
This allows us to make a prediction, which can be assessed through the analysis of 
additional texts in the second study. If the links between knowledge claims and justifications 
exist only as normative links—and therefore, only within the discursive context of particular 
communities—then the matter of which links are normative, or whether a link is normative, 
                                                
22 For example, explanations would not explain why the knowledge claim “s/he understands the 
concept of volume” would be justified by the fact that “s/he is able to ride a bike independently.”  
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
58 
 
58
 should be related to the addressivity of the text. In other words, the matter of which knowledge 
claim-justification pairings are normative depends on the assumed audience for the text. What 
this means is that the only situation in which the linkage between a knowledge claim and 
justification would be explained or negotiated without the presumption of normativity already 
linking them would be when the audience has not been firmly established, or when it has been 
made ambiguous.  
In recognition of the possibility of this other kind of explanation, explanations will be, from 
here on out, identified as either Type 1 or Type 2 (this is reflected in the Model). Type 1 
explanations are those that pertain to a knowledge claim-justification pairing whose normativity 
is presupposed. Type 2 explanations deal with the relation between knowledge claims and 
justifications in cases where the normative implication between the two is not taken for granted, 
and needs some explication. Type 2 explanations should only be seen in cases in which a text 
is addressed to an assumed audience for whom a particular knowledge claim-justification 
pairing is not presupposed as normative, or in cases where the audience has not been clearly 
established, since these are the only situations in which normative implications would be 
ambiguous or undefined.  
Although it is not central to the overall arguments of the text (and as such, is not well 
developed, and fairly ambiguous), one statement in the text had qualities of a Type 2 
explanation, and is instructive about what these might look like. The statement in question is 
found at the very beginning of the text, where the authors write, 
It seems uncontroversial to say that some children know how to count and others do not. 
But how can we tell them apart? If knowing how to count just means reciting the 
numeral1 list (i.e., “one, two, three...”) up to “five” or “ten,” perhaps pointing to one object 
with each numeral, then many two-year-olds count very well (Baroody and Price, 1983, 
Briars and Siegler, 1984, Fuson, 1988, Fuson et al., 1982, Gelman and Gallistel, 1978, 
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 Miller and Stigler, 1987 and Schaeffer et al., 1974). That kind of counting is good for 
marking time (e.g., close your eyes and count to ten...) or for playing with one’s parents, 
but reciting the alphabet or playing patty-cake would do just as well. The thing that 
makes counting different from the alphabet or patty-cake is that counting tells you the 
number of things in a set. 
 
Of course, counting only tells you this if you do it correctly, following the three ‘how-to-
count’ principles identified by Gelman and Gallistel (1978). These are (1) The one-to-one 
principle, which says that “in enumerating a set, one and only one [numeral] must be 
assigned to each item in the set.” (p. 90); (2) The stable-order principle, which says that 
“[Numerals] used in counting must be used in the same order in any one count as in any 
other count.” (p. 94); and (3) The cardinal principle, which says that “the [numeral] 
applied to the final item in the set represents the number of items in the set.” (p. 80). 
 
The argument given for how to discern children who know how to count has some of the 
qualities of a Type 2 explanation. A possible justification for knowing how to count (reciting the 
count list) is considered and then quasi-dismissed as the authors make the argument that what 
is special about counting is that it can tell you the number of things in a set, and that this is 
contingent on correct counting. The implication of this is that what is paramount is not knowing 
how to count per se, but knowing how to count correctly.  More than anything else, this first 
paragraph functions to define and justify the focus of the text, which is children’s knowledge of 
how counting works (rather than just how to count) and their understanding of the principles that 
govern correct counting. Yet the way that the issue of “knowing how to count” is considered is 
suggestive of how the contextualization of a discourse within a community of practice 
determines the specific pattern of normative implications linking particular knowledge claims and 
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 particular justifications. It is noteworthy that prior to implicitly dismissing “reciting the count list” 
as valid justification that a child knows how to count, the authors mention a particular discursive 
context (playing with one’s parents)—one which is clearly different from the context in which the 
article is likely to be read. So, over the next few sentences, as the authors implicitly deny count 
list recitation as a justification for knowing how to count, this can only be taken to be with 
regards to a different community of practice (i.e., not playing with parents), where there are 
different normative implications for knowing how to count.  
The very fact that the context of ‘playing with parents’ was brought up may be 
understood as a way to account for consideration of ‘reciting the count list’ as a valid justification 
for knowing how to count. In the discourse in which this text belongs, this justification would 
hardly be taken as normative, so even the briefest consideration of it must be accompanied by 
an explanation. Consequently, the authors evoke the context of ‘playing with parents’. In so 
doing, that “foreign” context functions as a Type 2 explanation for how ‘reciting the count list’ 
may justify the claim that a child knows how to count.   
 
4.4 Summary of Results of Study 1 
 The initial analysis of a single text led to the development of an initial model of 
knowledge claim functioning, through the refinement of the initial analytic categories and the 
elaboration of additional categories (higher level claims, explanations). Before continuing the 
analysis, it is useful to summarize this general model to consolidate the gains made so far in 
order to contextualize the focus of the subsequent analyses. 
4.4.a Basic Model 
 The basic model of knowledge claims involves three basic components: knowledge 
claims, justifications, and explanations. Knowledge claims are descriptions of what a person 
knows, understands, grasps or realizes that take the basic form s/he knows X, with X being 
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 some known proposition, principle or description of something that the person knows how to do. 
The assertion of knowledge claims is typically supported by justifications, which are reasons 
supporting the claim. The relation between a given knowledge claim and its justification is a 
normative one, meaning that the justification makes the assertion of the knowledge claim 
conventionally appropriate, typically without further explanation. Addressivity is evident in way 
that speakers/writers treat certain justifications as self-evidently valid grounds for the assertion 
of certain knowledge claims; i.e., the lack of further explanation for why a particular justification 
supports a particular knowledge claim implies the speaker’s/writer’s assumption of an audience 
for whom such a pairing makes sense. 
The third component of knowledge claims—explanations—negotiate the relationship 
between knowledge claim(s) and justification(s). Explanations are thought to function in two 
main ways. First, Type 1 explanations are used to make sense of why some knowledge claim-
justification pairings that normatively implicate each other are, in fact, not valid. Secondly, Type 
2 explanations may function to situate a knowledge claim-justification pairing within a particular 
discourse in which a normative implication exists between them.  
  
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
62 
 
62
 CHAPTER 5: STUDY 2: ANALYSIS OF ADDITIONAL TEXTS 
5.1 Issues and Directions for Further Analysis 
5.1.a Testing and Refining the Model of Knowledge Claim Functioning  
 An analysis of additional texts (see Table 1 for a list of texts) was carried out in order to 
further test the validity of the analytic concepts, and inform the construction of the model. The 
second analysis was essentially a continuation of Study 1. The general approach was to assess 
the use of knowledge claims in the selected texts in order to determine if they could be 
adequately described with the existing analytic categories (knowledge claim, justification, 
explanation) as these were described above. Lack of fit between the uses of knowledge claims 
and the texts led to consideration of how to best modify the categories. All significant instances 
of such modifications are described in the following sections. The ultimate goal of this analysis 
was the achievement of a saturation point where no further changes would be required in order 
to assimilate additional uses of knowledge claims from the selected texts into the model.  
 
The following sequence describes the approach to analyzing each of the texts:  
1. Thoroughly read the text in order to establish familiarity with the overall focus, 
arguments, and conclusions. 
2. Identify the knowledge claims made in the article 
3. Identify justifications made for these knowledge claims 
4. Identify any explanations that pertain to the link between the knowledge claim and its 
justification. 
a. Are the explanations Type 1 or Type 2? Does it require the delineation of a new 
subcategory (e.g., Type 1b) or a new category (e.g., Type 3)? 
i. If Type 2, is the explanation given in a context where multiple audiences 
are invoked, or where multiple communities of practices are being 
mentioned? How and why is this done? What is the result of the 
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 explanation, and what purpose does it serve in the text? If the intended 
addressees are not made ambiguous, are there other aspects of the text 
that may be taken to account for an undefined audience? 
5. Are there any claims about knowledge that do not fit the basic schema of knowledge 
claims supported by justification? Are these similar to other higher order knowledge 
claims in that they involve conclusions resulting from the overlapping implications of 
multiple knowledge claims, and/or objectify knowledge that is rooted in the standard 
model of knowledge claims? If not, how are these claims constructed? 
6. Are there overall addressivity-related differences in what is assumed-to-be understood, 
versus what is made explicit, vis a vis knowledge claims, across texts? (For any results 
and consideration of this issue, see Appendix 2. Note that Appendix 2 is written as a 
continuation of the final conclusions of the current research, rather than the tentative 
conclusions reached up to this point.) 
7. Based on the overall results of the analysis, how do knowledge claims appear to function 
(in general) and what purposes do they appear to serve? 
 
5.2 Results of Study 2 
 Statements exemplifying the categories of knowledge claim, justification and explanation 
were identified in each of the subsequently analyzed texts,23 and thus, these overall categories 
were retained. Nevertheless, the findings necessitated various changes, including the 
addition/merging of categories and the refinement of other criteria. These changes are 
described in the following sections. The first sections deal with explanations, and the delineation 
of new subcategories of these. Within these first sections, there is also a description of a new 
                                                
23 While the non-discrete nature of statements embodying these categories prevents exact 
frequency counts, relatively discrete instances of knowledge claims and justifications tended to 
be found at least once per paragraph, with explanations found once every few paragraphs. The 
exception to this was the method sections (and to a lesser extent, results sections), where 
demarcation of discrete justifications/explanations was not possible. 
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 process—redescription—which was identified as a way that writers negotiate the connections 
between knowledge claims, justifications and observed behavioral performances. After the 
findings relating to explanations, a number of specific examples of knowledge claims and 
justifications are described which raise questions about the distinction between knowledge 
claims and justifications. Based on these results, and the various changes made to the model to 
accommodate them, it is possible to rethink some of the fundamental categories in the model.  
 
5.3 Revisions to Explanation Categories and New Types of Explanations 
The analysis of subsequent texts continued to confirm the idea (from Study 1) that 
explanations (statements that address, account for, or otherwise negotiate the link between a 
knowledge claim and its justification) can take one of these two forms: 
1. Explanations that are premised on the assumed normativity (for the intended audience) 
of the claim-justification pairing, and address a possible or observed presence/lack of 
concurrent validity between one or more normative justifications for a given knowledge 
claim.  
2. Explanations that seek to establish the normativity of a claim-justification pairing.  
Although these overall categories were maintained, new findings led them to be developed in 
several ways, both differentiating existing categories into new categories (1a/b and 2a/b) and 
amending some existing categories. These changes are discussed in the following sections.  
5.3.a Type 1 Explanations 
5.3.a.i Differentiation of explanation Type 1 into Types 1a and 1b. The original 
category of Type 1 explanations encompassed primarily (but not exclusively24) explanations that 
were premised on the presumption of a particular claim-justification pairing being normative, and 
were used to account for the presence or absence of concurrent validity between particular 
                                                
24 The only exception were Type 1 explanations that involved the presence of concurrent 
validity, e.g., Sarnecka and Carey (2008) [5; 9-32].  
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 knowledge claim(s) and justification(s). The analysis of subsequent texts revealed a new type of 
explanation that fit within the Type 1 grouping insofar as it is premised on the assumed 
understanding of the normativity of the knowledge claim-justification relation. However, unlike 
existing Type 1 explanations, these explanations—from here on referred to as Type 1b, as 
opposed to the original Type 1a explanations—do not address a lack of concurrent validity. 
Instead, Type 1b explanations involve the argument that a given justification is not normatively 
implied by any other reasonably asserted knowledge claim, besides the claim it is being used to 
justify, and that therefore, the justification must constitute proof of the knowledge claim in 
question. In a typical case in which the justification is performance on a particular task, Type 1b 
explanations argue that performance on the task must imply a particular bit of knowledge 
because no alternative forms of knowledge could conceivably account for the observed task-
performance. As an example of a Type 1b explanation, consider the following:  
 
The invention and correct use of idiosyncratic lists is hard to explain unless appeal is 
made to some implicit rules that guide the children's search of their environment for a list 
with which to count. This argument is the same one used to account for 
overgeneralization errors, e.g., runned, unthirsty, in a child's speech. The occurrence of 
such novel but lawful count sequences makes it necessary to postulate an implicit set of 
rules. (Gelman & Meck, 1983) [3; 5-10] 
 
In considering Type 1b explanations, it’s important to note that any given justification cannot, in 
principle, imply only a single knowledge claim. Justifications are descriptions of behavior or 
behavioral dispositions, and any performance can, in principle, be learned and carried out by 
rote, in which case the justification would imply a knowledge claim of “rote/procedural 
knowledge.” However, at least with respect to the counting/number use activities that are 
relevant to the current research, rote performance ability can never be the only possible reason 
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 for a performance. There are always multiple possible reasons or interpretations for the same 
overt behavior. 
This point is argued by Wittgenstein, who claims that the ability to continue a sequence 
that embodies a pattern does not imply knowledge of any particular rule that the pattern 
illustrates, since any finite sequence of events is consistent with an infinite number of patterns. 
For instance, a child who is asked to recite the even numbers, and does so to 100 does not 
necessarily know the rule for counting by even numbers. This child might count by even 
numbers to 100, and assume the rule is to continue on from there in a different way (Taylor, 
1977; Wittgenstein, 1953, § 185). 
Type 1b explanations are intriguing in that they treat these alternative possibilities as 
impossibilities. They claim that a particular knowledge claim implied by a justification is the only 
one that can be expected to be true, without explaining why this is the case (beyond saying that 
there ‘can be no other explanation’). By claiming that a given justification is proof of a given 
knowledge claim because there can be no other explanation, Type 1b explanations imply the 
speaker/writer’s presumption of certain limits on what types of knowledge a person can be 
claimed to have.  
5.3.a.ii Reassessment of concurrent validity in Type 1 explanations. The analysis of 
subsequent texts also raised questions about Type 1a explanations; i.e., those that involve 
concurrent validity between justifications. In several of the texts, statements resembling Type 1a 
explanations were given in cases where concurrent validity was not mentioned. These 
statements resembled Type 1a explanations in focusing on how performance factors could 
interfere with a child’s performance on a task. Such arguments are generally seen in Type 1a 
explanations where they explain the problematic lack of concurrent validity. This is evident in the 
following quote from Gelman and Meck (1983), which is an explanation regarding the use of 
error detection tasks to provide justification that children have knowledge of the cardinal 
principles. 
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 In the error detection experiments children watched a puppet count and told the 
experimenter whether the puppet was right or wrong. Thus children did not have to 
generate the counting performance, they only monitored it for conformance to the 
principles. When the child does the counting herself, she must both generate and 
monitor the performance. Hence, an error detection task should be easier than a 
standard counting task. [3; 36-41] 
The preceding quote functions to explain why the error detection tasks are a sensitive measure 
of children’s knowledge of the counting principles. While this explanation is not explicitly a 
reaction to an observed lack of concurrent validity, a lack of concurrent validity is implied: the 
possibility that a child might differentiate correct counts carried out by a puppet, but that they 
might be too burdened to do this when they have to count themselves means that they would 
succeed at one task before the other, even though both ostensibly measure the same 
knowledge.   Consequently, an explanation for the validity of an error detection task is given 
based on an anticipated, but not observed, lack of concurrent validity with another task.  
5.3.a.iii Redescription as a feature of Type 1a explanations. Type 1a explanations 
were found to share an additional common feature. This feature, redescription, refers to the 
technique of recharacterizing a knowledge claim or justification in meaningfully different terms. 
This is commonly seen in Type 1a explanations in which it is argued (or considered) that a given 
performance was incorrectly characterized, and might be better characterized in different terms. 
For instance, consider the following example from Sophian (1988), where it is argued that what 
was previously described as children’s failure to make inferences about numerosities might be 
better described (redescribed) as children who could have otherwise made inferences failing to 
do so because of processing demands/the suspicion that the experimenter was trying to trick 
them. 
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 Children's performance [in making inferences about the numerosities of sets] also might 
have been impaired by the reliance on verbal statements by the experimenter to convey 
crucial information about the numerosities of the set(s) and/or the correspondence 
between them. Children could always see some elements of both of the sets involved in 
a problem, but one set was always piled together in the bottom of the cup so that 
children could not see for themselves how many objects were in that set or how they 
corresponded to the elements of the other set. Children who thought the experimenter 
might be trying to trick them, and those who simply had trouble processing the 
experimenter’s verbal statements without perceptual support, may have failed to make 
inferences under these circumstances that they could have made if they had had the 
opportunity to see the numerosities or correspondences for themselves. [7L; 21-40] 
 
Redescription can happen in different ways as well, although these cases still involve 
Type 1a explanations. Rather than redescribing a justification (e.g., redescribing the 
performance on a task), the original justification might be preserved, but argued to be the basis 
for an alternative knowledge claim. While these cases might be given their own label (e.g., 
reassignment), they are only trivially different from redescribing performances themselves, and 
will be referred to using the same label. 
One case of this type of redescription constituted one of the most common examples in 
the analyzed texts: redescription of the meaning of children’s last word responses. While 
researchers once took last-word responses as indicating knowledge of the cardinal principle, 
their significance is redescribed in several of the analyzed texts. This is seen in the following 
quote: 
 
More important, Fuson (Fuson & Hall, 1983; Fuson, Pergament, Lyons, & Hall, 1985) 
raises the possibility that the first cardinality responses could follow a principle more 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
69 
 
69
 primitive than the one Gelman has put forward [i.e., the cardinal principle]. Children may 
initially answer the "How many?" cardinality question by using a last-word strategy. They 
may know, perhaps as a part of a conventionalized social game, to give the last counting 
number they reach in response to the usual "How many?" question without realizing that 
the number represents the cardinality (total) of the set. (Frye et al., 1989) [5L; 46-56] 
 
Breaking the quote apart for analysis, we can specify the knowledge claims made on the basis 
of children’s so-called “last word responses,” both prior to redescription, and after redescription. 
These are shown on the first example in Table 5 (below), which contains, from left to right, the 
original quote, the pre-redescription knowledge claim, the post-redescription knowledge claim, 
and background information that describes the context of each quote. Table 5 also shows two 
other examples of redescription, listed in the rows below the first example. 
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Table 5. Examples of re-described knowledge claims from the analyzed texts (chart continues onto next page) 
Quote Before redescription After redescription Background Info. 
More important, Fuson (Fuson & Hall, 1983; Fuson, 
Pergament, Lyons, & Hall, 1985) raises the 
possibility that the first cardinality responses could 
follow a principle more primitive than the one 
Gelman has put forward [i.e., the cardinal 
principzle]. Children may initially answer the "How 
many?" cardinality question by using a last-word 
strategy. They may know, perhaps as a part of a 
conventionalized social game, to give the last 
counting number they reach in response to the 
usual "How many?" question without realizing that 
the number represents the cardinality (total) of the 
set. (Frye et al., 1989) [5L; 46-56] 
realizing that the 
number represents the 
cardinality (total) of the 
set, i.e., the cardinal 
principle 
Knowing, perhaps as a part 
of a conventionalized social 
game, to give the last 
counting number they reach 
in response to the usual 
"How many?" question 
without realizing that the 
number represents the 
cardinality (total) of the set. 
This quote concerns 
children’s responses to the 
question How many are 
there?, asked about a set 
of items they’ve just 
counted. Cardinality 
responses refer to children 
responding to the question 
with the number they 
reached in a previous 
count of the item. 
Other investigators have argued against the view 
that very young children know these principles. 
Illustratively, Sophian and Huber (in press) 
contended that 3-year-olds do not know the causal 
principle of priority. They argued that 3-year-olds' 
successful performance is based on associations 
between familiar actions and their consequences. 
(Briars and Siegler, 1984) [2; 43-45] 
knowing the causal 
principle of priority 
[the ability to act] based on 
associations between 
familiar actions and their 
consequences. 
This quote discusses 
previous debates about 
whether children know 
certain conceptual 
principles before or after 
the age of 3-years. 
Gelman and Gallistel (1978) ... inferred that 
preschoolers know [the counting] principles largely 
on the basis of observations of preschoolers 
counting sets of objects. This use of the standard 
counting situation … may not have been optimal for 
distinguishing between whether children knew 
counting principles or whether their knowledge was 
limited to an ability to execute standard counting 
procedures. (Briars & Siegler, 1984) [1-2; 41-8] 
knowing the counting 
principles 
an ability to execute 
standard counting 
procedures 
This quote is a part of a 
larger discussion of 
children’s understanding of 
the principles that underlie 
different aspects of correct 
counting.  
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When 3-year-olds saw a set labeled with a number 
(e.g., five) and an item was added, they preferred a 
new label (six) over the old one, as though they 
believed that number words have precise meanings. 
… (Brooks, Audet & Barner, 2012) [2; 7-9]  
In Experiment 2, children were tested using similar 
methods, but with novel nouns and objects that were 
transformed, instead of sets. Children showed the 
identical pattern of results despite lacking meanings 
for these words, suggesting that their judgments for 
numerals may not have relied on semantic knowledge 
that numerals have precise meanings. We propose 
that children’s behavior can be explained by the use 
of domain-general pragmatic inference, and does not 
require positing domain-specific numerical knowledge. 
[2; 14-20] … children can exploit the pragmatics of 
contrast. After hearing one label used to refer to a set, 
and seeing the set transformed, children are then 
presented with a second numeral which is directly 
contrasted with the original one, an invitation to 
consider it as the label for the new set.” 
 (Brooks, Audet & Barner, 2012) [22; 4-10] 
they believed that 
number words have 
precise meanings 
their judgments for 
numerals may not have 
relied on semantic 
knowledge that numerals 
have precise meanings… 
children’s behavior can be 
explained by the use of 
domain-general pragmatic 
inference, and does not 
require positing domain-
specific numerical 
knowledge. … children can 
exploit the pragmatics of 
contrast. After hearing one 
label used to refer to a set, 
and seeing the set 
transformed, children are 
then presented with a 
second numeral which is 
directly contrasted with the 
original one, an invitation to 
consider it as the label for 
the new set. 
This quote pertains to the 
question of whether 
preschool-age children 
understand that number 
words refer to precise 
and/or specific quantities. 
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As the first three examples in Table 5 show, researchers may address the 
principles/skills first issue (i.e., procedural versus conceptual knowledge) by redescribing the 
child’s behavior to make it consistent with a different knowledge claim. If this can be done for all 
justifications asserted as evidence for a particular generalized knowledge claim, it may be 
concluded that children lack that knowledge, even though they have achieved what had been 
considered to be its justifications. Conversely, if it has been argued that a child lacks knowledge 
on the basis of failures in performances that would serve to justify that knowledge, this 
conclusion can be contested by redescribing the failures in terms of performance issues. For 
examples of both types, see Frye et al., (1989) [2; 49-16] and [2L; 30-47]. 
The final example in Table 5, from the Brooks, Audet and Barner (2012) text, shows an 
example of a knowledge claim about conceptual knowledge of number being redescribed in 
terms of a knowledge claim of pragmatic knowledge. Although nominally different from the 
redescriptions in terms of procedural/conceptual knowledge, the conclusions are reached in 
essentially the same way. 
 
5.3.b Type 2 Explanations 
5.3.b.i Differentiation of explanation Type 2 into Types 2a and 2b. The analysis of 
explanations in Study 1 led to the identification of Type 2 explanations--explanations that are not 
premised on the assumed (by the addressed audience) normativity of a claim-justification 
relation, but rather establish that normativity. Based on the subsequent analysis, the initial 
category of Type 2 explanations was differentiated into two subcategories.  
 
5.3.b.ii Type 2a Explanations. Type 2a explanations attempt to establish the 
normativity of a knowledge claim-justification pairing through explicit reference to a community 
(form of life) within which such a pairing would be normative. In essence, these explanations 
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 acknowledge that a given task-performance or knowledge claim may implicate different things in 
different communities, but that within the present text, a particular community’s implication is 
taken up. Type 2a explanations have been observed only rarely; in fact the text analysis has 
revealed only two examples of them, both of which only show partial Type 2a qualities (both 
feign the act of questioning the intended audience for rhetorical purposes, rather than out of real 
confusion about who the audience is). The first case was previously discussed above (Chapter 
4, section 3b), and came from the Sarnecka and Carey (2008) article. The second, quoted 
below, is from Sarnecka and Wright (2013): 
 
What does it mean to say that a child understands numbers? There are many early 
milestones in number learning, and parents sometimes say that a toddler who can count 
to five or ten ‘knows’ those numbers. Similarly, young children in literate environments 
learn to identify the written digits 0–9 along with letters of the alphabet and thus, in a 
sense, ‘know’ the numbers. But what does it mean to understand numbers, in some 
important conceptual way? [1; 28-32] 
 
This quote exhibits a Type 2a explanation insofar as it presents two justifications for 
“understanding numbers” (i.e., “[counting] to five or ten”, and “learning to identify the written 
digits 0-9”). These are then discarded, not on the basis of some lack of validity, but rather by the 
suggestion that these reflect different normative uses of the knowledge claim understanding 
number. This suggestion is implicit in the identification of these justifications with other 
discursive communities: parents talking about their children, and unspecified “literate 
environments” (possibly a school classroom).  
This explanation also shows some qualities of a Type 1a explanation. Specifically, the 
“discarding” of the two possible justifications is accomplished, in part, by redescribing the 
knowledge claim itself, through the addition of “understanding numbers, in some important 
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 conceptual way” (emphasis added). Secondly, to some extent, the non-normativity of the 
justifications for “understanding number” is assumed as understood, as reflected by the use of 
quotes around the words know and understand.  
Despite the presence of these Type 1a qualities, they do not fully dominate the 
explanation, and the discarding of the considered justifications is accomplished at least as much 
by the respecification of the knowledge claim as by the identification of those justifications with 
discursive contexts that are clearly distinct from the likely audience of a research text.  
5.3.b.iii Type 2b explanations. The subsequent analysis of additional texts revealed a 
number of explanations that qualified as Type 2 explanations insofar as they did not proceed 
from a presumption of certain knowledge claim-justification pairings as normative for the 
audience. These explanations revealed the author’s assumption that a particular claim-
justification pairing would not be normative for the audience, as evidenced by the explicit 
provision of reasons in support of the validity of the pairing: reasons that did not presume the 
validity of the pairing from the outset (as is the case in Type 1 explanations) or involve 
concurrent validity. However, unlike Type 2a explanations, these Type 2b explanations did not 
justify/contest a particular pairing by enacting the interpretive context of a particular community. 
Instead, Type 2b explanations constructed the normativity of a claim-justification pairing through 
additional specification of the claim or justification itself, in ways that were intended to make 
their pairing normative; i.e., self-evidently appropriate for the addressed audience.  
Table 6 shows examples of type 2b explanations. In the first example (first row of the 
table), Nikoloska (2009) describes Wynn’s (1990) give-a-number task, and explains why it 
measures understanding of the cardinal principle. The addition of the third and fourth sentences 
of the quote (see left column of Table 6) is what qualifies this as a Type 2b explanation. Rather 
than treating the brief description of the give-a-number task as a self-evident justification for the 
claim that children understand the cardinal principle/counting (these are treated as 
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 interchangeable), two sentences are added to make this connection explicit, implying an 
assumed audience for whom this connection would not have been otherwise apparent.  
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 Table 6. Examples of Type 2b explanations. The left column of the table lists a quote that encompasses the explanation and some 
reference to the knowledge claim(s) and justification(s) that the explanation pertains to. The second (from left) column lists the 
knowledge claim; the third lists the justification, and the fourth lists the explanation.  
Quote Knowledge 
Claim 
Justification Explanation 
Wynn (1990) used the give-a-number-task to probe 
preschoolers’ understanding of counting. She asked 
the children to give a particular number of toys (give-a-
number task), and looked whether they counted to give 
the number asked for. The reasoning is that this is a 
true task which measures understanding of the cardinal 
principle, because children will have to count in order to 
determine the number asked for. If they did count it 
would mean that they understand the cardinality 
principle – with the help of counting they can determine 
the number asked for. (Nikoloska, 2009) [4; 25-31] 
understanding 
of counting/the 
carinal 
principle 
give-a-number-task 
… i.e., asked the 
children to give a 
particular number 
of toys (give-a-
number task), and 
looked whether 
they counted to 
give the number 
asked for.  
The reasoning is that this is a true task which 
measures understanding of the cardinal 
principle, because children will have to count 
in order to determine the number asked for. If 
they did count it would mean that they 
understand the cardinality principle – with the 
help of counting they can determine the 
number asked for.  
This inference task taps a key aspect of one-to-one 
correspondence knowledge … A finding that pre-
school children perform well on this task would support 
the view that these children already have considerable 
knowledge about one-to-one correspondence, whereas 
a finding of poor performance would suggest that that 
knowledge either has not yet been acquired or is not 
accessible (Sophian, 1988) [2; 15-29] 
One-to-one 
corresponden
ce knowledge 
(whether it is 
acquired 
and/or 
accessible) 
Performance on the 
inference task 
A finding that pre-school children perform 
well on this task would support the view that 
these children already have considerable 
knowledge about one-to-one 
correspondence, whereas a finding of poor 
performance would suggest that that 
knowledge either has not yet been acquired 
or is not accessible (Sophian, 1988) [2; 15-
29] 
Children's success with these inferences appears to 
implicate more knowledge about one-to-one 
correspondence than previous investigators have 
attributed to preschool children. Piaget (1952) claimed 
that at this age children's knowledge about one-to-one 
correspondence is limited to the ability to perceive 
pairings between perceptually aligned sets. This 
conclusion is incompatible with preschoolers' success 
in this study because the two sets were never 
simultaneously visible and so children could not have 
based their judgments on perceptual comparisons 
between them. Gelman (1982) credits preschoolers 
with considerably more knowledge about one-to-one 
correspondence, but she claims it IS implicit in action
schemas and not accessible apart from those schemas 
Knowledge of 
1-1
corresponden
ce that is not
limited to the
ability to
perceive
pairings
between
perceptually
aligned sets,
and not
merely
implicit.
Success on 
inference tasks 
Children's success with these inferences 
appears to implicate more knowledge about 
one-to-one correspondence than previous 
investigators have attributed to preschool 
children. … [Piaget’s] conclusion is 
incompatible with preschoolers' success in 
this study because the two sets were never 
simultaneously visible and so children could 
not have based their judgments on 
perceptual comparisons between them.  … 
[Gelman’s] conclusion does not appear to fit 
with children's successful performance in this 
study because children did not carry out any 
actions with the elements of the two sets
before making their judgments. 
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Again, that conclusion does not appear to fit with 
children's successful performance in this study 
because children did not carry out any actions with the 
elements of the two sets before making their 
judgments. (Sophian, 1988) [6; 9-28]
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 Type 2b explanations, as exemplified by the quotes in Table 6, function to explain why a 
knowledge claim is normatively linked with a justification. This involves describing or explaining 
relevant aspects of the justification, knowledge claim, or both. In all cases, this serves to make a 
connection between these elements appear normative for an audience that is assumed will 
need this clarification. To qualify as a 2b explanation this additional specification must be 
explicitly framed as a reason why a claim and justification are related (i.e., explicit reasons why 
a justification supports a claim, or why a claim implies a certain justification). Specification by 
itself, e.g., providing methodological details, doesn’t constitute a Type 2b explanation, but rather 
a part of the justification itself.  
5.3.b.iv Type 2b explanations and addressivity. Type 2b explanations are important 
indicators of addressivity, since they imply a lack of understanding on the behalf of the assumed 
audience. However, these explanations are not unique indicators of addressivity, since an 
assumed lack of audience understanding (on behalf of the writer) is implied by any type of 
clarification or specification of details. Therefore, cases in which an audience is not assumed to 
have pre-existing familiarity with certain knowledge claims or justifications do not necessarily 
lead to Type 2b explanations. The extent to which the audience is assumed to understand 
something is generally indicated by the overall extent to which that thing is described, 
regardless of whether this description takes the form of a Type 2b explanation or not. The 
presence or absence of such explanations may be a trivial stylistic matter. One author may 
describe a justification in minimal terms, and then explain why it is a valid justification (this 
would constitute at Type 2b explanation). Another author may simply describe the justification 
more comprehensively from the start. Although one approach constitutes a Type 2b 
explanation, both involve the same assumptions about the assumed audience’s understanding.  
Finally, the presence of a Type 2b explanation does not indicate an utterance that is not 
premised on unstated, assumed-to-be-shared assumptions. Rather, it just indicates a particular 
boundary between what was assumed to be understood versus what has to be made explicit. 
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 Such boundaries exist in any case of language use. Their absence would indicate either 
the complete presence or absence of intersubjectivity, cases in which it would be unnecessary 
or impossible, respectively, to say anything. The model of knowledge claim functioning that is 
the final outcome of the present research conceptualizes this boundary and provides a way to 
locate it in any particular knowledge discourse (for more on addressivity, see Appendix 2).  
Type 2b explanations closely resembled Type 1a and 1b explanations, and in fact, the 
latter could almost be considered a subset of Type 2b. (Insofar as the explanation is brought in 
to substantiate the knowledge claim-justification pairing, this implies the author’s assumption 
that this pairing is not normative for the intended audience.) However, for the purposes of 
clearly categorizing the distinct features of type 1a and 1b explanations, they are being kept 
separate. The key to the distinction between Types 1 and Type 2b explanations is that the 
former are focused, first and foremost, on the presence or lack of concurrent validity.  
 
5.3.c Implication of New Explanation Categories for the Model 
Based on the results of the text analysis, the category of explanations has been 
subdivided into four subcategories (Types 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b). These new categories expand the 
model of knowledge claim functioning developed in Study 1, but do not fundamentally challenge 
its underlying assumptions. While explanations were important in the initial analysis, they play 
less of a role in the remainder of the current research. Explanations will be revisited in the 
conclusion of this paper, when the final model of knowledge claims is articulated. In Chapter 7, 
section 3a, the extent to which these explanation categories can be reliably applied to the 
sampled texts is reported. 
 
5.4 Revision of Knowledge Claim-Justification Distinction 
5.4.a Lack of a Clear Boundary Between Knowledge Claims and Justifications 
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 The most important findings of the second analysis involve the distinction (or lack 
thereof) between knowledge claims and justifications. Knowledge claims tended to differ from 
their supporting justifications in certain ways. For one thing, certain verbs (knowing or 
understanding) were used more often for knowledge claims, while others were used more often 
for justifications (e.g., more concrete descriptors of actions). However, across all of the texts, 
the types of statements typically used for knowledge claims were found, in some circumstances, 
to be used for justifications, and vice versa. In some cases, the same claim functioned as both a 
knowledge claim and a justification, with respect to another justification and knowledge claim, 
respectively. The following sections describe these and other findings, which blur the 
boundaries between the categories of knowledge claim and justification, and ultimately lead to a 
reworking of this distinction. 
5.4.a.i Overlap in the range of statements used as knowledge claims and 
justifications. One piece of evidence that brought the distinction between knowledge claims 
and justifications into question is the fact that the range of statements that exemplify either 
category blend into each other; there is no clear demarcation point between the types of 
statements used as knowledge claims and the types used as justifications. This is shown in the 
series of knowledge claims and justifications from the Frye et al. (1989) and Gelman (1972) 
texts shown in Table 7.  
The juxtaposition of the statements in Table 7 (below) reveals a wide variation from 
concrete descriptions of behavior to descriptions of increasingly general conceptual knowledge. 
While the former are more typical of justifications and the latter of knowledge claims, it is not 
clear where a demarcation between the two kinds of statements could be drawn. One solution—
drawing it between statements depending on whether they use verbs like know, understand—is 
not viable since many statements that functioned as knowledge claims didn’t use these verbs, 
and some statements that functioned as justifications did (examples of each are described in 
the following section).  
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 Table 7. Examples of knowledge claims/justifications. 
Examples of Knowledge Claims and Justifications 
Fifteen addition and only four displacement Ss were surprised by the changes [in the 
sets, i.e., either the addition of an item, or the displacement of items].) (Gelman, 1972, 
p. 86) 
detected counting errors caused by violations in the stable order of count words and 
one-one correspondence between count words and objects (Frye et al., 1989, p. 1168) 
Seventy-seven percent of the children who noticed the transformations treated addition 
[as if it] reversed subtraction or treated elongation [as if it] reversed shortening (or vice 
versa) (Gelman, 1972, p. 84) 
judging the standard correct counting procedure—pointing to each object in turn from 
left to right—as being correct (Frye et al., 1989, p. 1168) 
Participants consistently treated the order irrelevant procedure—counting starting from 
the middle or starting with every other one—as incorrect (Frye, et al., 1989, p. 1168) 
accepted order as being irrelevant for correct counting (Frye et al., 1989, p. 1169) 
recognized correct counting procedures (Frye et al., 1989, p. 1168) 
knew that numbers (at least small ones) [are] invariant. (Gelman, 1972, p. 84) 
children knew that subtraction [was] an operation that was relevant and displacement 
as one that was irrelevant to number (Gelman, 1972, p. 84) 
understanding that if nothing about the array changes, then the puppet’s response 
should not change either. (Frye et al., 1989, p. 1168) 
children's invariance schemes contain rules for reversing operations (Gelman, 1972, p. 
84) 
That knowledge [that the cardinal value reached on the second trick trial ought to be 
the same as on the first correct trial] (Frye et al., 1989, p. 1168) 
[knowledge of the] stable order one-one, and order irrelevant principles (various texts) 
[children’s understanding of] cardinality (various texts) 
 
The examples in Table 7 show the lack of a clear dividing point between descriptions of 
behavior (more typical of justifications) and descriptions of conceptual knowledge (typical of 
knowledge claims). Moving down the table, the statements become increasingly abstracted from 
the concrete processes of specific forms of behavior. Descriptions of specific forms of behavior 
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 transition to more generalized descriptions of behavioral dispositions that could apply to multiple 
different situations. With additional abstraction, the statements come to encompass such a 
diversity of situations that the concrete features of specific forms of behavior disappear all 
together.  
Given the lack of a clear boundary between the types of statements used for knowledge 
claims and justifications in Table 7, it is not surprising that, in some cases in the texts, the same 
types of statements were found in both categories. One example of this is seen in the quote 
below from Frye et al. (1989) in which a description of what a child knows (underlined) is given 
as a possible justification of another knowledge claim.  
That knowledge …that the cardinal value reached on the second trick trial ought to be 
the same as on the first correct trial … could be evidence of [an understanding of] 
cardinality, or of a less specific understanding that if nothing about the array changes, 
then the puppet’s response should not change either. [11r; 24-28] 
In the above quote, the finding that children know the cardinal value reached is the same as the 
first correct trial—a statement typical of a knowledge claim—is considered as a justification for 
the claim that they understand cardinality, or that they understand that if nothing about the array 
changes, then the puppet’s response should not change either.  
 There are many other examples of the unclear boundary between knowledge claims and 
justifications. A particularly notable example is seen in Example 1 (below), which is a quote from 
Gelman (1972): 
Example 1: 
Together, the reactions to Phase III indicate the children treated subtraction as an 
operation that was relevant and displacement as one that was irrelevant to number. This 
indicates they had the ability to treat number (at least small ones) as invariant. Lending 
support to this general conclusion is the evidence that the children's invariance schemes 
contain rules for reversing operations. Seventy-seven percent of the children who 
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 noticed the transformations behaved as if they knew that addition reversed subtraction 
or that elongation reversed shortening (or vice versa).  
     ... 
Reactions to the surreptitious changes introduced in Phase III indicate that Ss treated 
addition as relevant and displacement as irrelevant to number. ...The means of 1.5 and 
0.3 reflect the fact that 15 addition and only four displacement Ss were surprised by the 
changes. All addition Ss noted the change as opposed to only six displacement Ss.  [11-
13; 30-28]  
In this quote, the statement children treated subtraction as an operation that was relevant and 
displacement as one that was irrelevant functions as both a knowledge claim and a justification. 
It is used as a justification for the claim that children had the ability to treat number as invariant. 
It functions as a knowledge claim that is justified by the final two sentences of the quote.  
 Many other similar examples were found, which are altogether suggestive of problems 
with the distinction between knowledge claims and justifications. In addition to the blurring of 
knowledge claims and justifications, there was also a lack of a clear demarcation (functionally 
speaking) between knowledge claims describing procedural versus conceptual knowledge. This 
is described in greater depth in Appendix 5, which describe how both types of knowledge claims 
are asserted, justified and contested in essentially similar ways.  
 
5.4.b Implications of the Interchangeability and Similarity of Knowledge Claims and 
Justifications 
The fact that that statements that exemplified knowledge claims and justifications 
showed similar properties could be taken to mean that the distinction between them is a relative 
one, and that both are syntactically and semantically the same type of statement. To say that a 
statement is a knowledge claim or a justification might merely describe its function relative to 
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 another statement in a text; it may not describe a fundamental difference in the intensional 
meanings of the statements themselves.  
Going further, one possibility that is consistent with the results and analysis so far is that 
both knowledge claims and justifications are descriptions of behavioral dispositions, articulated 
in response to situations that are presumed to allow general interpretations of observed 
behavior. A description of a behavioral disposition is a description of a situational capacity to 
perform a range of behavioral forms in flexible ways that fits a particular description. An 
example of a capacity description would be the claim that someone can shuck an oyster. This 
statement describes a capacity insofar as it doesn’t imply a single, accidental, unrepeatable act, 
but instead the tendency for a roughly bounded variety of related actions; i.e., a person who can 
shuck oysters in general could shuck that oyster, or another (slightly different) oyster, etc.  
Knowledge claims function in essentially the same way as the above capacity 
description. If we say that someone knows how to count, we are implying that the person could 
adequately count in some variety of situations in which doing so would be considered to be 
normative.  
Descriptions of behavioral capacities can be more or less general. The capacity to be 
able to count when one is calm and focused is more specific than the capacity to be able to 
count (in general). There is no apparent limit on how general knowledge claims could be. This is 
important because it provides a way to account for how knowledge claims that do not appear to 
be descriptions of behavioral capacities may be just that. These capacities are so abstract or 
generalized, and consequently, they are instantiated by such different forms of behavior that 
they cease look like a description of behavior at all.   
The proposal that knowledge claims/justifications are descriptions of capacities is 
consistent with a variety of findings from the text analysis. These are brought together in the list 
below to form an argument as to why knowledge claims (and justifications) are both descriptions 
of capacities: 
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 1. Knowledge claims and justifications show significant overlap in form and 
meaning: Apart from their intrinsic differences25, knowledge claims and justifications 
function in similar ways. The same statement could, and in some cases does, serve both 
roles with respect to another knowledge claim or justification. There is no clear cutoff 
between statements that function as knowledge claims and those that function as 
justifications. Furthermore, as the quote from Gelman (1972) seen in Example 1 
showed, the same statement might perform both roles in the same text.  
2. Justifications are often descriptions of behavioral capacities: Statements 
functioning as justifications (and occasionally knowledge claims) are typically 
descriptions of behavioral capacities. It is not clear what knowledge claims and 
justifications that are not descriptions of behavioral capacities are, or could be 
descriptions of. 
3. Therefore, knowledge claims and justifications are descriptions of behavioral 
capacities: Based on the lack of a clear distinction in the phrasing and discursive 
functioning of knowledge claims and justifications, and the fact that many of the latter are 
descriptions of capacities, it is reasonable to argue that both types of statements are 
descriptions of capacities, albeit at widely varying levels of generality.26   
 
The preceding argument is corroborated by a number of other findings, as the following 
sections explain. Before describing the relevant findings, it is first necessary to mention another 
detail about knowledge claims and justifications, understood as descriptions of behavioral 
capacities. Knowledge claims and justifications are made on the basis of observations of 
                                                
25 That is, knowledge claims were asserted contingent on justifications; justifications were the 
grounds for asserting knowledge claims. 
26 Because knowledge claims and justifications are both considered to be descriptions of 
capacities, and because a justification may also function as a knowledge claim, the labels 
knowledge claim, behavioral capacity and capacity description should be taken to cover 
justifications as well. The term justification will be used, from here on out, only to refer to 
capacity descriptions as these function as justifications. 
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 behavior in situations that are presumed (by the speaker of the claim, acting in consideration of 
their intended audience) to make the observed behavior amenable to general interpretation. The 
design of these situations, e.g., a standardized experimental task, facilitates the interpretation of 
the elicited behavior in various ways. For example, the available possibilities for environmental 
(especially social) interaction may be limited so as to preclude certain outside influences that 
would afford other interpretive possibilities, e.g., suggestions that are viewed as allowing a child 
to perform a behavior “by rote.” It is only by virtue of constrained situations that are presumed to 
facilitate the interpretation of behavior that knowledge claims may be made; without these 
constraints general interpretation is impossible, because the conditions of emergence of the 
observed behavior cannot be known. Since the origins of knowledge claims/justifications in 
situations presumed to facilitate the interpretation of behavior is a universal characteristic of 
these statements as disposition descriptions, this will be treated as implicit in the following 
discussion and analysis of the current study. 
5.4.b.i Explaining the Normative Pairing Between Claims and Justifications. The theory 
that knowledge claims are descriptions of capacities provides a compelling explanation for why 
a particular knowledge claim would be connected to a particular justification, and why this 
connection often needs no explanation: If a knowledge claim is a description of a behavioral 
capacity, then by extension, within the interpretive context of a particular community, a 
knowledge claim’s justification may be a statement that describes, in more concrete terms, the 
same (or an aspect of the same) behavioral capacity that the knowledge claim describes. In 
other words, a justification is implicated by a knowledge claim because the former describes a 
capacity that itself instantiates some aspect of the more general capacity described by the 
knowledge claim. In addition to being a logical extension of the possibility that knowledge claims 
and justifications both describe capacities, the idea is also strongly corroborated by a number of 
findings from the discourse analysis. Most importantly, it explains researchers’ difficulty 
resolving performance-competence issues, and differentiating between procedural and 
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 conceptual knowledge. This will be examined in greater depth later on. Before getting to that 
corroborating evidence, it is necessary to elaborate the idea that justifications describe the 
behavioral capacity that, in turn, is described more generally by the knowledge claims they 
justify.  
If knowledge claims and justifications are descriptions of behavioral capacities and sub-
capacities (i.e., instances of more general capacities), respectively, then they can be 
represented as hierarchically organized networks of increasingly general/broad capacities.27 
This is shown in Figure 1, which portrays an example of the type of general hierarchical 
structure within which knowledge claims and justifications may be related.  
  
                                                
27 These hierarchical networks can be thought of as the basis for discursive scripts used for 
describing/explaining/predicting children’s uses of numbers. For example, knowledge claims 
varying in generality within the same network might be incorporated into a script of the form: 
Marianne would be expected to do/know [less general knowledge claim] because she knows 
[more general knowledge claim]. 
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Figure 1. The general hierarchical structure of knowledge claims as descriptions of capacities 
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 Figure 1 shows the general hierarchical structure of knowledge claims as descriptions of 
capacities. Descriptions of more general capacities are closer to the top; descriptions of more 
concrete capacities are at the bottom. As this shows, hierarchical networks of knowledge claims 
may contain more than two levels, and a claim on one level may have an indefinite number of 
justifications (i.e., sub-knowledge claims or capacities that concretely instantiate the higher level 
knowledge claim).  
 
This hierarchical structure to knowledge claims/justifications may not be immediately 
apparent in texts and other discourse. Knowledge claims and justifications may not be 
immediately adjacent, and discussions of multiple hierarchical networks of claims may overlap. 
Example 2 (the quote below) illustrates this, but also shows how the hierarchical structure may 
be discerned despite the discursive complexity typical of the analyzed texts. The example 
comes from the introduction of the text by Wynn (1990).  
 
Example 2: 
As a more stringent test of children's counting abilities under novel circumstances, 
consider all the types of entities other than objects that are countable: sounds, actions, 
abstract entities such as thoughts or mental representations, properties of objects, and 
so forth. There have been only a few studies of children's counting of entities other than 
objects. To determine how much of the list of number words their subjects could recite, 
Schaeffer et al. (1974) asked children to count to taps of a drum, saying a number word 
in time with each tap, for up to 10 taps. If the child increased the pace of saying the 
numbers, the experimenter increased the pace of drum tapping. The mean number of 
taps that their younger two groups of children (mean ages 3:5 and 3:8) counted to was 
about 6.5. In comparison, these children counted sets of one to four objects correctly 
about 74% of the time, and sets of five to seven objects correctly 43% of the time. They 
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 thus appear to count drum taps and objects about equally well, which suggests that they 
have an abstract, generalizable representation of counting. However, It is not clear what 
children considered the task to be, given that they were asked to count with the drum 
taps - were they actually counting the drum taps, or were they simply reciting a list in 
time to the beat of the drum? (Wynn, 1990, p. 159) [5-6; 27-4] 
 
This passage can be deconstructed and represented in terms of several hierarchical networks 
of knowledge claims and justifications (i.e., networks in which more concrete claims are 
subsumed underneath more general claims). These networks are presented below.  
 
Network 1 
• [children] have an abstract, generalizable representation of counting. [5; 43] [i.e.], 
abstract knowledge of the counting principles [4; 38-47]] 
o children [are able to demonstrate] counting abilities under novel circumstances 
[5-6; 27-4] 
§ children [are able to count] entities other than objects [that are countable, 
e.g.,] sounds, actions, abstract entities such as thoughts or mental 
representations, properties of objects, and so forth. [5-6; 27-4] 
§ [children] thus appear to count drum taps and objects about equally well, 
[5; 42] 
§ Schaeffer et al. (1974) asked children to count to taps of a drum, saying a 
number word in time with each tap, for up to 10 taps. If the child 
increased the pace of saying the numbers, the experimenter increased 
the pace of drum tapping. The mean number of taps that their younger 
two groups of children (mean ages 3:5 and 3:8) counted to was about 6.5. 
In comparison, these children counted sets of one to four objects correctly 
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 about 74% of the time, and sets of five to seven objects correctly 43% of 
the time. [5; 32-37] 
 
Network 2 
• how much of the list of number words their subjects could recite, [5; 32] 
o Schaeffer et al. (1974) asked children to count to taps of a drum, saying a 
number word in time with each tap, for up to 10 taps. If the child increased the 
pace of saying the numbers, the experimenter increased the pace of drum 
tapping. The mean number of taps that their younger two groups of children 
(mean ages 3:5 and 3:8) counted to was about 6.5. In comparison, these children 
counted sets of one to four objects correctly about 74% of the time, and sets of 
five to seven objects correctly 43% of the time. [5; 32-37]  
 
Network 3 
• Counting the drum taps [5; 3] <<OR>> simply reciting a list in time to the beat of the 
drum? [5; 4] 
o Children were asked to count with the drum taps [5-6; 44-4] (PREVIOUSLY: 
Schaeffer et al. (1974) asked children to count to taps of a drum, saying a 
number word in time with each tap, for up to 10 taps. If the child increased the 
pace of saying the numbers, the experimenter increased the pace of drum 
tapping. The mean number of taps that their younger two groups of children 
(mean ages 3:5 and 3:8) counted to was about 6.5. [5; 32-37] 
 
Networks 1-2 (above) show hierarchical structures of knowledge claims/justifications in which 
more concrete claims are nested beneath more abstract ones. Statements were assigned to 
higher or lower levels based on their position in the chain of supporting>supported claims. The 
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 intermediate level in Network 1 (i.e., demonstrating counting abilities in novel circumstance) was 
not well supported by the quoted text, and might have been merged with the claim immediately 
above it. It was kept separate on the grounds that the higher-level claim an abstract 
generalizable representation of counting could imply abilities beyond demonstrating counting 
abilities in novel circumstances. 
Network 3 is unique in that it shows how a single justification can be a specific 
instantiation of two very different knowledge claims: counting drum taps and simply reciting a list 
in time to the beat of the drum. Thus, (relatively) more concrete claims are not necessarily 
exemplars of only one knowledge claim, but may be used to inductively generalize one of 
several different knowledge claims. An explicit argument given for choosing one or the other 
knowledge claim in network 3 would constitute an explanation.  
 
5.5 Assessing the Validity of the Model Across Historical Periods 
One consideration in selecting the texts for analysis in the current research was to 
ensure that the constructed model is valid across different historical periods. Specifically, the 
goal was to ensure that the functioning of knowledge claims as described by the prototype 
model produced in Study 1 was generalizable over a wider discursive context, not limited to a 
narrow context (e.g., certain discursive features found only within a short historical period). This 
was important because the prototype model constructed in Study 1 was based only on a 
relatively recent text (Sarnecka & Carey, 2008), and consequently may not have been typical of 
the use of knowledge claims over a broader historical period.  
It is assumed as a given that discursive forms are continually changing, and that no 
specific discursive pattern is immutable. While the study of these changes has produced 
fascinating results (for an example, see Tabor (1995)), the goal of the current research is to 
identify patterns in the use of knowledge claims in a specific discourse (research texts on 
children’s understanding of number concepts) that are relatively stable. Moreover, the sampling 
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 method used in the current research is not nearly dense enough to reach reliable conclusions 
about historical changes in discourse. So, although it is assumed that the use of knowledge by 
researchers has changed in some ways over the period of time when the sampled texts were 
produced,28 the intention of the present analysis in selecting texts from multiple decades is to 
ensure that the conclusions drawn are those that are applicable across this entire era.  
The analytic approach taken here was one that guaranteed, by default, that the ultimate 
model would be valid for the entire selection of texts, rather than just those from one or another 
era. Insofar as the model of knowledge claim functioning was derived from texts from different 
eras, it follows that the model should account for those texts, since if texts from a specific era 
were not accounted for by the model, this would have previously arisen as an issue in the 
analysis when those texts were being analyzed in the first place.  
Even if the model does validly account for the use of knowledge claims across the 
different eras of texts, it still may be the case that the claims are used in different ways across 
different historical eras, albeit these differences would be ones that do not go beyond what is 
specified by the model. For example, it might be expected that there are differences across 
decades in terms of the types of knowledge claims that are given explicit justification, versus 
those that are left unjustified. These types of historical changes were analyzed. However, 
because the results did not ultimately have a significant effect on the conclusions of this 
research, they are discussed in Appendix 2.  
Other evidence of historical changes in the use of knowledge claims in the analyzed 
texts can be found in Chapter 7. In that chapter, the reliability with which the model was applied 
to the analyzed texts is analyzed. The reported results of this analysis show both characteristics 
                                                
28 For example, it would be reasonable to assume that the conclusions about numerical 
proficiency early in life reported by Gelman (1972) would be described in that and 
contemporary texts in more depth, reflecting the assumption of an audience that might 
be unfamiliar with these claims. More recent texts might be expected to describe these 
claims more briefly, given their high citation counts in the literature, and the resulting 
expectation that they are familiar for the intended audience.  
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 of the texts themselves, as well as the ways that the model’s categories were applied to them. 
These results, many of which are found in Tables 8-11, are reported for each selected text in 
chronological order, making it possible to view historical changes in the use of knowledge 
claims, and in the application of the model to texts from different eras.   
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CHAPTER 6: REVISED MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE CLAIM FUNCTIONING 
6.1 Components and their Interrelationships in the Model of Knowledge Claim 
Functioning 
 The preceding analysis and interpretation has led to substantial changes in the model of 
knowledge claim functioning. It is therefore necessary to consolidate these gains for the sake of 
clarity, and describe the model as it is currently proposed. The current model describes the 
following set of components and their interrelations (these components are described in greater 
detail, with full criteria, in Appendix 6): 
 
Knowledge claim: A description of a behavioral capacity (or its absence) at any level of 
generality. Knowledge claims are articulated on the basis of observations of behavior in settings 
that are presumed to facilitate the interpretation of that behavior. The category of knowledge 
claim subsumes justifications, and the latter term is taken to be a relative one, i.e., justifications 
are considered to be knowledge claims that instantiate (i.e., provide a specific instance of) more 
general knowledge claims. Examples of knowledge claims: 
• Understanding the cardinal principle 
• Knowing how to count 
• Not being able to count to five 
• Knowing that the addition of an item to a set increases the set’s numerosity 
• Accurately giving a requested number of items when asked 
Justification: A statement that is given as the direct reason or justification for asserting the 
knowledge claim. Justifications are, in all cases observed so far, knowledge claims or indirect 
descriptions of such. Thus, they are descriptions of behavioral dispositions, articulated in 
settings that are presumed to facilitate the interpretation of behavior. Examples (underlined, with 
knowledge claims in italics): 
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 • Knows x because s/he passed the give-n task 
• It can be concluded that s/he can’t x because s/he consistently gave the wrong answer 
on the task intended to measure x. 
• S/he understands how to x because she passed the X task. 
 
Explanation: A statement that explains why a particular justification does/doesn’t provide valid 
grounds for the assertion of a knowledge claim. The four subtypes, which are too lengthy to 
describe here, are described with examples in Chapter 5, section 3. 
 
Redescription: Rephrasing a knowledge claim/justification, possibly in a way that aligns it with 
a new hierarchical network of knowledge claims. Examples (before the redescription is 
italicized; after it is in bold, respectively): 
• Passing the Give-N task doesn’t mean that a child understands cardinality; it may only 
mean that they have learned a procedural rule for how to respond to requests for 
items using their counting sequence.  
• Young children may recite the counting list, but this doesn’t mean that they understand 
counting. It may only mean that they merely know how to repeat a sequence of 
words. 
 
Higher Level Knowledge Claims: Higher level knowledge claims are claims about what a 
person knows (or about the knowledge itself—see Objectification, below) that are constructed 
on the basis of the overlapping or related implications of multiple knowledge claims. Example: 
• As a result of observing the gradual or piecemeal achievement of behavioral capacities 
that exemplify certain aspects of the more general claim understanding the cardinal 
principle, it may be claimed that knowledge of cardinality develops gradually. This is a 
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 higher level claim insofar as it is constructed on the basis of lower level claims and their 
gradual achievement over time. 
 
Objectification: Objectification involves the reification of knowledge described in a knowledge 
claim, i.e., treating the knowledge as if it were a thing. Conclusions that involve objectification 
are typically examples of higher level knowledge claims. Example (higher level claim is in bold): 
• In the case of a child who inconsistently demonstrates that they understand the cardinal 
principle (i.e., a child who inconsistently accomplishes the relevant justifications for this 
knowledge claim), it may be claimed that their knowledge of cardinality is fragile.   
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 CHAPTER 7: VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE MODEL VIS A VIS THE SAMPLE 
The categories and their relationships comprising the model were arrived at by analyzing 
all of the selected texts, i.e., the model is consistent with the use of knowledge claims in the 
selected texts. A comprehensive demonstration of how this is the case would be impractical, 
given the excessive amount of implicit detail involving the use of knowledge claims in the 
analyzed texts, which would need to be explicitly represented in such a demonstration. As an 
alternative way to demonstrate the validity of the model as a description of knowledge claims in 
the texts, and the extent to which it can reliably categorize those claims, a limited portion of 
each text was selected to be comprehensively represented in terms of the model. The sample is 
made up of the middle three paragraphs of the introduction/literature review sections of each of 
the selected texts. The specific page and line numbers included in these samples are listed in 
Appendices 9-19. 
The introduction section was chosen because it tended to contain frequent and relatively 
discrete exemplars of knowledge claims, justifications, and explanations, as well as particularly 
complex and varied uses of these claims. While the content of the conclusion section was (for 
the current purposes) similar to the introduction, the latter tended to offer a greater depth, 
diversity and number of claims. The method and results sections of the articles also contained 
knowledge claims and justifications. However, in these sections, these statements—particularly 
justifications—didn’t exist in as discrete of a form, which would have been less than ideal for the 
analysis. As opposed to the introduction and conclusion sections, in which knowledge claims, 
justifications and explanations appeared discretely and in ways that highlighted their 
relationships to one another, the method sections tended to be taken up with extensive 
descriptions relevant only to a single justification at a time. Although the results sections often 
contained knowledge claims in addition to justifications, these components were related to each 
other in relatively basic ways, compared to their use in the introduction and conclusion, which 
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 often considered the relationships between multiple justifications/knowledge claims and 
explanations.   
The choice of three paragraphs in the middle of the introduction section was intended to 
direct the focus to specific, detailed arguments involving the use of knowledge claims, rather 
than the more general statements likely to be found at the beginning, or the descriptions of 
planned methodology found at the end.  
The basic analytic categories of knowledge claim, justification and explanation listed 
above in the beginning of the current section were applied to knowledge claims in the selected 
three-paragraph samples.29 The criteria constituting each analytic category is described in 
greater detail in the coding manual in Appendix 6.   
Characterizing the use of knowledge claims means constructing a comprehensive 
representation of the claims, their hierarchical interrelations with justifications, and the possible 
presence of any explanations in the selected text segments. This type of representation was 
shown earlier in the deconstruction of the quote from the Wynn article (example 2, and networks 
1-3 in Chapter 5, Section 4.b.i).  
The full results of this analysis are presented in Appendices 9-19. In each of these 
appendices, two separately elaborated representations for each of the selected articles can be 
found, and original and a copy. There are two representations for each as a result of assessing 
intra-rater reliability.  
7.1 Intra-Rater Reliability 
 The main goal of analyzing these samples was to assess the reliability of coding the 
articles in terms of the main analytic categories. Reliability was assessed in terms of intra-rater 
(rather than inter-rater) reliability. While reliability is more often assessed with inter- rather than 
intra-rater reliability, the latter was appropriate for several reasons. First, the complexity of the 
                                                
29 Only the three basic categories were used in order to reduce the complexity of the analysis, 
and because of various difficulties that arise in attempting to represent higher order knowledge 
claims, objectification and redescription. 
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use of knowledge claims in the analyzed articles, the highly technical nature of the articles 
themselves, and the fact that substantial familiarity with the particular body of research literature 
was necessary for valid interpretation meant that extensive training and expertise would be 
required of an outside interpreter.  
 The second reason that intra-rater reliability was sufficient is that the results and 
conclusion of the current research are not directly tied to specific decisions in the coding 
process in the way they might be in other studies. For example, in a study where the 
conclusions involve the frequency or co-occurrence of certain coded categories, reliability is 
crucial for demonstrating that the patterns on which the conclusions are reached are not an 
artifact of a biased coding process. Since the current study did not involve these types of 
results/conclusions, it is less important that reliability be assessed with two or more individuals.  
 Of course, the results and conclusion of the current study are still related to the way that 
the analyzed texts were interpreted or coded. However, compared to a study like the one 
mentioned in the previous example, there is more transparency in the analysis and conclusions 
of the current research. For one thing, the data sources (i.e., the selected texts) are publically 
available. In addition, the process by which the results and conclusions were arrived at from 
these data is much more transparent than it would be in a study that, e.g., conducts statistical 
analyses on the frequency of coded categories. The approach taken in the current research is 
one that makes the conclusions publically verifiable. Any reader of the current study can assess 
the validity of the conclusions by analyzing claims about children’s knowledge in published 
research articles.30 In summary, since the data and the process of analysis and interpretation 
are open to verification by others, there is less of a need to demonstrate the reliability of the 
process through which they were reached with the rigor that inter-rater reliability provides.  
7.1.a Measuring intra-rater reliability 
                                                
30 While the results of the current study were derived from the analysis of a limited body of 
articles, it is hoped and anticipated that they are valid for other articles concerned with the same 
subject, and with the use of knowledge claims in research articles more generally. 
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 Intra-rater reliability was assessed by comparing the original representations of 
knowledge claims from the coded text segments provided in Appendices 9-19 with separately 
produced representations (labeled copy in each appendix) created two weeks later. Perfect 
reliability would mean that both representations of the same segment are identical, both in terms 
of the statements extracted as knowledge claims/justifications/explanations, and the 
organizational (hierarchical) relations between these.  
 To explain how reliability was assessed in terms of the similarity between the two 
representations, Figure 2 (below) will be used as a simplified example of what these pairs of 
representations looked like (for the actual pairs of representations created from each text 
sample, see Appendices 9-19). Figure 2 shows a pair of representations (A and B) ostensibly 
elaborated from the same text sample. Each shows two separate networks (1 and 2 in each 
representation) of hierarchical knowledge claims, and one explanation (E1). The code on the 
explanation is used to link it to citations (i.e., explanation citations), which are found throughout 
the representation, and indicate the knowledge claim justification pair that an explanation refers 
to (explanation citations are indicated next to the justification of the knowledge claim-justification 
pairing that they pertain to).  
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Figure 2. A simplified example of the type of representations created in the intra-rater reliability 
assessment. 
 
7.1.b Characterizing Similarities and Differences Across Representations 
 Graph theory (Bondy & Murty, 1976), an area of discrete mathematics, provides a useful 
way to characterize hierarchical networks of knowledge claims, such as those shown in Figure 
2. Importantly, graph theory provides tools for characterizing and analyzing the isomorphism or 
lack thereof between two corresponding representations or hierarchical networks.31 In the 
terminology of graph theory, each representation created from a text sample is a network 
comprised of a set of interconnected labels (networks are numbered “1” and “2” in 
Representations A and B). Each label occupies a given node. Nodes are the junctions between 
links, the latter referred to as edges. Although nodes and labels are distinct (the node is the 
junction between edges, the label is some content applied to that node), in the current case, for 
                                                
31 The term network refers to a hierarchically linked set of knowledge claims/justifications. The 
term representation refers to the set of networks created to reflect all networks within a given 
text segment. Figure 2 contains two representations, each containing 2 networks.  
REPRESENTATION B 
1. Understanding cardinality 
a. Passing the Give-n task [=] giving 
out six items correctly when 
asked to do so. [E1] 
 
2. A last-word rule 
a. Answered the question how many 
with the last word reached in 
counting. 
 
E1 (Type 1a): The Give-n task is a valid 
measure of the cardinal principle 
because of concurrent validity with other 
measures of cardinality knowledge. 
 
REPRESENTATION A 
1. Grasping the cardinal principle 
a. Passing the Give-n task [E1] 
i. Giving out six items correctly 
when asked to do so. 
 
2. Knowing a last word rule (for answering 
the question how many? 
a. Answered the question how many 
with the last word reached in 
counting. 
 
E1 (Type 1a): The Give-n task is a valid 
measure of the cardinal principle because 
of concurrent validity with other measures 
of cardinality knowledge. 
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the sake of simplicity, the term label will be used to refer to the node and its content, unless 
otherwise specified. 
 A set of representations (or networks), such as the pairs of representations created from 
the text samples for the reliability analysis, may have features in common: repeated labels, 
and/or repeated edges. These are discussed and elaborated in the following sections.  
7.1.c Repeated Labels 
Repeated labels are labels (including knowledge claims/justifications, or explanations) that have 
the same meaning; i.e., are semantically equivalent. Equivalence, in this context does not mean 
exact identity, but approximate semantic equivalence between two statements. This was a 
necessary concession given the way that representations were created. In extracting 
statements (knowledge claims, justifications or explanations) from the text into the 
representation, statements from two different locations in the text often had to be grouped 
together, and this could be done in different ways by the rater working on two different 
occasions, yielding different wordings of statements that nevertheless had the same meaning. 
For example, the label created for a justification might be composed of several different phrases 
from the text that could be ordered in different ways with negligible change in meaning. (The 
actual similarity between labels in the paired representations can be assessed directly by 
comparing the representations themselves in Appendices 9-19.) 
For example, in Figure 2, the statements grasping the cardinal principle and 
understanding cardinality (both numbered “1”) would constitute a pair of repeated labels. Even 
though they are not identically worded, they have approximately the same meaning. While these 
labels were in the same relative location (the top) in each representation, this was not a 
requirement for repeated labels, which could be in different locations in each corresponding 
representation. While such differences in location do reflect a lack of coding reliability, this will 
be accounted for in other ways, which are described below. The goal of identifying repeated 
labels is to demonstrate the extent to which the same components of the analyzed text 
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segments were identified as knowledge claims/justifications/explanations, independently of how 
they were related to other such statements.  
The similarity between explanations in corresponding representations was judged in 
much the same way as with knowledge claims/justifications. An explanation would be 
considered to be a repeated label if its meaning was equivalent to an explanation on the 
corresponding representation. Although explanations could be considered as labels, they will 
still be referred to as explanations (or repeated explanations), in order to differentiate them from 
knowledge claims/justifications, which will be referred to as labels.  
7.1.c.i Asymmetrical Equivalence and Merged Claims. In some cases, two labels in a 
network in one representation would correspond (in terms of meaning) to a single label in a 
network on the other representation. An example of this is seen in Figure 2 in which the two 
lower-level labels (a and i) of network 1 in Representation A are merged into label a in 
representation B. In cases like this, each of the separated labels (i.e., 1.a and 1.a.i) and the 
single merged label  (1.a) in Representation B would each count as repeated labels (a total of 
three). Merged claims count as repeated labels so long as all of the meanings merged within 
them correspond to labels in the other model. If the merged label included a non-repeated 
meaning, it (the merged label) would not count as a repeated label, although labels in the 
corresponding representation that did correspond to part of that merged label would still count.   
7.1.c.ii Enumerating Equivalent Statements. A reference to a repeated or non-
repeated label (or repeated/non-repeated explanation) pertains to individual knowledge 
claims/justifications or explanations that were found to be repeated in the corresponding 
representation. In other words, a repeated label is not the pair of repeated labels (although there 
has to be a pair), just one of the members of such a pair. So, a reference to “four repeated 
labels” does not mean four pairs of labels across two representations, but rather four labels 
within a single representation, each of which repeats a label in the corresponding 
representation.  
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7.1.d Repeated Edges 
In addition to repeated labels, the other dimension of isomorphism between 
representations involves the relations or edges between statements themselves. A repeated 
edge is a link between two labels on one representation that is also found in the corresponding 
representation. To say that an edge is repeated is to say that in two representations, two pairs 
of repeated labels are both linked by an edge in the same direction (i.e., the same labels are on 
the top/bottom in each representation). As this implies, all of the edges in one representation 
may be equivalent to the edges in another, even though the other representation may have a 
different number of edges. Additionally, the fact that all edges in one representation (x) are 
repeated edges does not mean that all edges in the corresponding representation (y) are 
repeated. To say that all edges in Representation x are repeated is merely to say that all of the 
same edges are found in representation y; representation y may contain additional non-
repeated edges of its own.  
To illustrate what is meant by an edge, consider Figure 2 once again. Representation A 
in Figure 2 contains 4 edges. This includes all directly linked labels (1>1.a; 1.a>1.a.i; 2>2.a), as 
well as indirectly linked edges (1>1.a.i) between non-adjacent labels. The only requirement is 
that the (direct or indirect) edges between statements be in the same direction, meaning that the 
same label must be on the top/bottom in corresponding representations. 
All but one of the edges in both of the representations of Figure 2 are repeated edges—
even though Representation A has two more edges than Representation B. The only non-
repeated edge is 1.a>1.a.i, which is not found in Representation B because of those two labels 
being collapsed into each other. It is possible for all other edges in the two representations to be 
repeated because edges can be equivalent even if they connect to merged claims (e.g., 2>2.a), 
or are direct linkages in one representation and indirect linkages in the other (e.g., 1>1.a.i 
versus 2>2.a).  
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Repeated edges are enumerated like repeated labels: a reference to a repeated edge 
refers to the edge between a knowledge claim and justification in a single representation which 
corresponds to a (second) edge in the other representation. Of course, in most32 cases the 
presence of a repeated edge implies the presence of another repeated edge in the 
corresponding representation (the exception would be if corresponding edge in the 
corresponding representation linked a merged claim containing non-repeated elements). In 
some cases a repeated edge does not necessarily correspond to a single link in a 
corresponding representation. For example, the edge 1>1.a in Representation B of Figure 2 
corresponds to three repeated edges in Representation 1 (1>1.a and 1>1.a.i).  
7.1.e Repeated and Non-repeated Explanation Citations 
Repeated explanation citations refer to explanation citations in one representation 
whose location (i.e., placement on a particular label) corresponds to the placement of an 
explanation citation in the other representation. For example, in Figure 2, the explanation [E1] is 
cited next to equivalent labels in both representations. Therefore, Figure 2 would be said to 
contain a total of two repeated, and no non-repeated, explanation citations.   
7.2 Findings Regarding the Equivalence Between Statements, Links and Citations in the 
Representations 
The previously described forms of equivalence between statements can be used to 
report the extent of similarity between statements in the two representations created for this 
reliability analysis. These results are presented in Table 8 (below), which shows the number of 
total numbers of labels, repeated labels, non-repeated labels, and merged labels. 
                                                
32 The only exception are repeated edges that correspond to edges between a repeated label 
and a merged claim that is partially non-repeated. 
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics on repeated/total labels, explanations, explanation citations, edges, and merged labels 
Appendix # 
(location of 
corresponding text) 
Source Article Repeated/ 
Total labels 
(claims &  
justifications) 
Merged 
Labels 
Repeated/ 
Total 
Explanations 
Repeated/ 
Total 
Explanation 
Citations 
Repeated/Total 
Edges 
13 Gelman (1972) 14/15 
14/14 
1 
0 
3/3 
3/3 
8/9 
6/7 
10/14 
12/15 
14 Gelman & Meck (1983) 15/16 
15/18 
1 
1 
1/2 
1/1 
1/2 
1/1 
9/15 
10/19 
9 Briars & Siegler (1984) 15/18 
13/14 
2 
0 
5/5 
5/5 
9/14 
10/10 
16/31 
14/16 
18 Sophian (1988) 16/20 
24/26 
1 
0 
5/5 
5/6 
8/10 
8/16 
10/19 
12/32 
12 Frye, et al. (1989) 16/19 
17/19 
5 
2 
1/5 
1/1 
1/19 
1/1 
7/14 
16/26 
19 Wynn (1990) 31/32 
26/26 
2 
0 
3/3 
3/3 
5/8 
3/4 
29/54 
34/42 
16 Sarnecka & Carey 
(2008) 
4/4 
4/4 
1 
0 
2/2 
2/2 
3/3 
2/3 
2/2 
2/4 
15 Nikoloska (2009) 9/10 
6/7 
0 
2 
3/6 
3/3 
6/10 
5/8 
4/5 
3/5 
10 Brooks, et al., (2012) 16/17 
17/18 
2 
0 
1/2 
1/1 
0/2 
1/2 
9/16 
9/16 
11 Davidson, et al. (2012) 19/19 
26/26 
3 
0 
5/5 
5/5 
7/8 
10/11 
10/10 
12/15 
17 Sarnecka & Wright 
(2013) 
20/20 
17/18 
3 
3 
2/2 
2/3 
5/6 
5/6 
7/11 
5/8 
Table 8 shows the number of repeated and total labels explanations, explanation citations, and edges (the number of non-
repeated entities can be inferred), as well as the number of merged statements. Each row contains the data from both 
representations created from a single source article. Data corresponding to the original representation are on the top row. 
Data from the second (copy) representation are on the lower row. 
10
7 
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7.3 Similarity of Representations Relative to Chance 
 The results reported in Table 8 provide a way to look at the similarity of statements and 
relations between them across the pairs of representations created from each text segment. 
However, what is lacking is any indication of the extent to which this relative similarity differs 
from chance. To what extent would a randomly constructed second representation resemble the 
first? This question is especially pertinent to the equivalence of relations between statements. 
While more of the links in each representation were equivalent than non-equivalent, to what 
extent could this have been due to chance?  
 To calculate this probability, consider first that each representation created for this 
analysis has some number of actual repeated edges (r) (i.e., the number of edges that mirror 
those found in the corresponding representation), and (in most cases) some number of actual 
non-repeated edges. These actual repeated and non-repeated edges are a subset of the total 
number of possible edges (T) between the various labels in the representation. The total 
number of possible edges also includes all non-repeated and repeated edges that were not 
found in the representation, but which could have been implemented between its members. The 
total possible repeated edges, R, includes all possible (and actual) edges that would be 
considered repeated, as a result of their corresponding to (actual) edges in the corresponding 
representation. As this implies, it was not possible to deduce R from the other values in Table 8. 
R had to be calculated by determining possible repeated links that would result from both (1) 
duplications of existing repeated links (r) resulting from duplicate labels, and (2) repeated links 
that were not implemented, but could have been, between the labels in a given representation.  
If there are n labels, then the total number of possible edges (T) that could be 
implemented between them equals n(n-1)/2. The total (T) is reached by dividing by two, not 
because the edges are bidirectional (in fact, they are unidirectional), but because the networks 
cannot be circular. While a statement may function as a justification for one claim and a 
knowledge claim relative to another, the same claim cannot be higher and lower level (a 
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knowledge claim and a justification) with respect to itself, or to any other particular statement. 
While a randomly implemented set of edges would not necessarily have to follow these rules, 
excluding these possibilities makes the current calculations of the likelihood of getting repeated 
edges by chance more conservative, since none of the excluded edges would have been 
repeated edges, so, if they had been included, this would lower the obtained probability values.  
To calculate the probability (p) of a representation with at least r repeated labels 
occurring by chance, the following equation was developed specifically for the current study: 
 
in which R and r are the numbers of possible and actual repeated edges, respectively, and T 
and t are the number of possible and actual edges, respectively. The results of these 
calculations for one member33 of each pair of representations created for this reliability analysis 
are found below in Table 9.  
This probability calculation does not produce the probability of getting a given number of 
repeated edges given the random assembly of both representations. Rather, it gives the odds of 
getting at least a given number of repeated edges (r) on one representation if that 
representation’s t edges are randomly reassigned to any of the T possible connections between 
its labels. Repeated edges are, once again, defined relative to the corresponding member of 
any pair of representations.  
                                                
33 These probabilities must be calculated individually for each representation, rather than once 
per pair, because the probability of getting the number of repeated edges in each member of a 
pair is (most likely) different. Even if both representations have the same number of total and 
repeated edges, the odds may be different if the representations do not share the same labels. 
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Table 9. Descriptive statistics and probabilities for actual/possible edges and repeated edges  
 
As the results in Table 9 show, the number of repeated edges obtained in each of the 
representations is statistically significant, except where the ratio of possible repeated edges to 
possible edges is high, and the number of total actual and possible edges is low; i.e., in the 
Sarnecka & Carey (2008) article. These generally low probabilities suggest that networks of 
knowledge claims/justifications (which are the unit of analysis of the current research) may be 
reliably constructed, meaning that the grouping of certain claims into networks, and the 
organization of links (edges) within those networks can be implemented reliably. While the 
Appendix # Source Article 
Actual/Possible 
edges (t/T) 
Actual/Possible 
Repeated Edges 
(r/R) 
Probability of at least 
r repeated edges 
13 Gelman (1972) 
14/105 
15/105 
10/15 
12/20 
0.0000084% 
0.0000022% 
14 Gelman & Meck (1983) 
15/120 
19/153 
10/15 
12/20 
0.0000024% 
0.0000015% 
9 
Briars & 
Siegler 
(1984) 
31/153 
16/91 
16/31 
14/31 
0.00075% 
0.00018% 
18 Sophian (1988) 
19/190 
32/325 
10/27 
12/40 
0.0024% 
0.0077% 
12 Frye, et al. (1989) 
14/171 
26/153 
7/11 
16/16 
0.00013% 
2.8x10-13% 
19 Wynn (1990) 54/496 37/325 
29/61 
32/57 
8.2x10-14% 
1.0x10-21% 
16 Sarnecka & Carey (2008) 
4/10 
2/6 
3/4 
2/3 
11.4% 
20% 
15 Nikoloska (2009) 
5/45 
5/36 
4/8 
3/4 
0.21% 
0.53% 
10 Brooks, et al., (2012) 
16/120 
16/136 
9/11 
9/16 
0.0000053% 
0.00026% 
11 Davidson, et al. (2012) 
10/171 
15/325 
10/32 
12/31 
0.0000014% 
2.3x10-9% 
17 
Sarnecka & 
Wright 
(2013) 
11/190 
8/136 
7/19 
5/14 
0.00080% 
0.025% 
Table 9. The numbers of actual/possible edges, repeated edges, and the probability of 
getting at least as many actual repeated edges by chance, for each representation. 
Values from the original representation are on the top; those from the copy are on the 
bottom. 
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reported probabilities are for each individual representation, the actual probability of these 
results overall would be lower—specifically, it would be the product of all the individual 
probabilities.  
 7.3.a Reliability in the use of explanation categories. A final dimension of reliability 
that can be assessed concerns the assignment of explanation categories. So far the focus has 
been on the similarity of the explanation statements themselves (whether each explanation in 
each representation was shared or unshared); it is another matter whether a shared explanation 
was reliably categorized as given type of explanation: Type 1a, 1b, 2a, or 2b. Because each 
explanation could be categorized as one of four types, and for each shared explanation from 
each representation, only one of these category assignments would be reliable, the odds of 
randomly obtaining the observed frequencies of explanation-type assignments were calculated 
using a cumulative binomial distribution. These results are shown in Table 10 (below). 
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Table 10. Number of possible and actual shared explanation category assignments for each 
article 
Appendix	
#	 Source	Article	
Possible/actual	shared	explanations	
with	shared	category	assignments	
Probability	
13	 Gelman	(1972)	 3 / 3 1.5625%	
14	 Gelman	&	Meck	(1983)	 1 / 1 25% 
9	 Briars	&	Siegler	(1984)	 5 / 5 0.09765625%	
18	 Sophian	(1988)	 5 / 5	 0.09765625%	
12	 Frye,	et	al.	(1989)	 1 / 1	 25%	
19	 Wynn	(1990)	 3 / 3	 1.5625%	
16	 Sarnecka	&	Carey	(2008)	 2 / 2	 6.25%	
15	 Nikoloska	(2009)	 3 / 1	 57.8125%	
10	 Brooks,	et	al.,	(2012)	 1 / 0 100% 
11	 Davidson,	et	al.	(2012)	 5 / 5 0.09765625% 
17	 Sarnecka	&	Wright	(2013)	 2 / 1 4.375% 
Overall	 31 / 27 0.0000000001% 
The middle column of Table 10 lists the number of possible and actual shared explanation 
category assignments for each article. Shared explanations with shared category 
assignments are shared explanations (identical explanations found in both representations 
created from the same text) that are also categorized as the same type of explanation (i.e., 
both members of a pair of shared explanations are given the same category label, e.g., both 
are labeled Type 1a). The number of Possible shared explanations with shared category 
assignments is always the same as the number of shared explanations, since this reflects 
the value obtained if all shared explanations were categorized in the same way. The “actual” 
value may be equal to or less than the possible value, depending on whether or not any pairs 
of shared explanations were given different category assignments. The probability value in 
the far right column reflects the probability of getting at least the number of actual shared 
category assignments by chance. The overall values in the final row reflect the probability of 
obtaining the total sum of possible/actual values. Because the number of shared 
explanations was the same across both representations, the values in the table are the same 
for the original and copy representation, and consequently only one value is given.  
 
The results in Table 10 show the reliability of assignment of explanation categories across the 
two representations created for this reliability analysis. While the assignment of categories was 
not significant34 for five out of 11 articles individually, this is to be expected from the low values 
involved: in fact, in 3/5 of the cases in which probability values exceeded 5% had perfect 
reliability (for assigning explanation categories). The overall probability, calculated from the 
sums of possible and actual values (27 out of 31 category assignments were consistent across 
                                                
34 That is, probability of getting the observed level of reliability (consistency) in assigning 
explanation categories by chance exceeded 5% for 5/11 of the analyzed articles. 
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representations), was highly significant (0.0000000001%). Consequently, it can be concluded 
that the assignment of explanation categories was reliable.  
7.4 Reliability of Model across Historical Periods 
 The results previously reported on Tables 8-10 are arranged chronologically (by the 
publication date of the analyzed article). This provides a way to analyze possible historical 
changes in the use of knowledge claims in the analyzed texts, and in the use of the model to 
analyze them. While the overall goal of the current research was not to analyze historical 
changes in discourse (after all, the selection of texts is grossly insufficient to allow for any 
meaningful conclusions about diachronic change), the historical dimension is important insofar 
as it provides a way to assess how the model generalizes to the use of knowledge claims in 
research articles from several different decades.  
The chronological presentation of results on Tables 8-10 makes it possible to observe 
several things. First, it is possible to observe historical changes in the use of certain features of 
knowledge claim discourse, e.g., the frequency of knowledge claims/justifications, and 
explanations relative to each other. (It should be noted that values from Tables 8-11a cannot be 
directly compared across texts, because the values are derived from text segments of differing 
lengths. For the sake of comparison across texts, standardized values can be found on Table 
11B.) 
In addition to data on historical changes in the frequencies of different aspects of the 
knowledge claim discourse, it is also possible to assess the extent to which the model was 
applied reliably (consistently) as a function of historical era of analyzed text. The probability 
values found on Tables 9 and 10 quantify the extent to which the model was applied reliably, in 
terms of the likelihood that the similarity between the two constructed representations could 
have been arrived at by chance. Although the small number of analyzed articles, as well as the 
differences in degrees of freedom for the calculations for each article, precludes drawing any 
positive conclusions about a relationship between reliability and year, the fact that these values 
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are mostly very low suggests that the model can be reliably applied to at least some articles 
from the 1970s/1980s through the 2000s. Although some of the observed probability values are 
not significantly different from what might be expected by chance, these (in every case) resulted 
from implementations of the model with few degrees of freedom. Given that the probabilities 
tended to be much lower overall, it is reasonable to assume that any high probability values 
reflect limited degrees of freedom, rather than an unreliable model.  
7.4.a Integration of Knowledge Claims within Hierarchical Networks 
Another dimension of knowledge claim discourse that can be analyzed across historical 
periods is the depth of the networks of knowledge claims observed in the analyzed text 
segments. Depth refers to the number of hierarchical levels or layers in the networks of 
knowledge claims constructed for each text segment. For example, knowledge claims that were 
neither asserted with a justification (lower level knowledge claims), nor serve as justifications for 
any higher level claims, are part of a network with only one level. If a knowledge claim is 
justified, then its network has at least two levels—the justification and the claim. If a network has 
at least one middle level claim that is justified by a lower level claim, and also justifies a higher 
level claim, it has at least three levels.  
Table 11a and 11b show the number of networks of knowledge claims with a given 
depth (1-6) for the representations from each of the text samples from the reliability analysis. 
The two tables present different versions of similar data. Table 11a presents the number of 
networks of a given depth, and the average35 number of knowledge claims/justifications (labels) 
found in networks at each depth level, for each text. The observed number of networks with a 
given depth for each text sample is affected by the length of the sample, and consequently, 
these values cannot be compared across texts. To allow comparison across texts, Table 11b 
                                                
35 Since two representations were constructed from each text, the values for the number of 
networks at a given depth, and the number of claims per network of a given depth are the 
average of the values from the two representations. Hence, the number of networks of a given 
depth is not always a whole number.  
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
115 
 
11 5 
provides standardized values, arrived at by dividing the number of networks of each depth level 
by the length of the text sample they were derived from, and multiplying by 100 (the values for 
the number of claims per network were not standardized, since these are not related to the 
original length of the text sample). Thus, the results show the number of networks for each 
depth level, as well as the overall number of labels and explanations per 100 words. 
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13 Gelman (1972) 2.5 1 1.5 2 1 3 .5 6 .5 6 .5 6 
14 Gelman & Meck (1983) .5 1 6 3.17 1 4.5 0 n/a .5 6 0 0 
9 Briars & Siegler (1984) .5 1 1.5 2 1 6 0 0 .5 13 .5 13 
18 Sophian (1988) .5 1 3.5 2.71 .5 10 .5 17 0 0 0 0 
12 Frye, et al. (1989) 5.5 1 1.5 2 .5 8 0 0 .5 12 0 0 
19 Wynn (1990) 1.5 1 3 2.5 1 4 .5 4 1 14.5 0 0 
16 Sarnecka & Carey (2008) .5 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 Nikoloska (2009) 1.5 1 3 2.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 Brooks, et al., (2012) 4 1 2.5 2.2 .5 3 1 6.5 0 0 0 0 
11 Davidson, et al. (2012) 3.5 1 6 2.75 .5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
17 Sarnecka & Wright (2013) 2.5 1 6.5 2.23 .5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 11a shows the number of networks of a given depth for each of the segments of the 11 selected texts, and the average 
number of claims in the network for each depth level. Each value is averaged across the two representations constructed from 
each text sample, hence the lack of whole numbers for some of the values. “Depth” refers to the number of hierarchical levels 
in a network of knowledge claims. For instance, a knowledge claim with a single justification would have a depth of 2. If that 
justification were itself justified by a lower level justification, the depth would be 3.   
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13 Gelman (1972) 0.60 1 0.36 2 0.24 3 0.12 6 0.12 6 0.12 6 3.5 0.7 
14 Gelman & Meck (1983) 0.09 1 1.13 3.17 0.19 4.5 0.00 n/a 0.09 6 0.00 0 3.2 0.3 
9 Briars & Siegler (1984) 0.17 1 0.51 2 0.34 6 0.00 0 0.17 13 0.17 13 5.4 1.7 
18 Sophian (1988) 0.10 1 0.70 2.71 0.10 10 0.10 17 0.00 0 0.00 0 4.6 1.1 
12 Frye, et al. (1989) 1.33 1 0.36 2 0.12 8 0.00 0 0.12 12 0.00 0 4.6 0.8 
19 Wynn (1990) 0.23 1 0.45 2.5 0.15 4 0.08 4 0.15 14.5 0.00 0 4.4 0.5 
16 Sarnecka & Carey (2008) 0.15 1 0.30 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 1.2 0.6 
15 Nikoloska (2009) 0.55 1 1.10 2.67 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 3.1 1.6 
10 Brooks, et al., (2012) 0.71 1 0.45 2.2 0.09 3 0.18 6.5 0.00 0 0.00 0 3.1 0.3 
11 Davidson, et al. (2012) 0.50 1 0.86 2.75 0.07 4 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 3.2 0.7 
17 Sarnecka & Wright (2013) 1.02 1 2.65 2.23 0.20 3 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 7.8 1.0 
Table 11b shows the number of networks of a given depth for each of the segments of the 11 selected texts, and the average number of claims in 
the network for each depth level. “Depth” refers to the number of hierarchical levels in a network of knowledge claims. For instance, a knowledge 
claim with a single justification would have a depth of 2. If that justification were itself justified by a lower level justification, the depth would be 3.  
Each value is averaged across the two representations constructed from each text sample, hence the lack of whole numbers for some of the 
values. Values are standardized to compensate for the differing lengths of the original text samples, and reflect the incidence per 100 words (i.e., 
values from Table 11a were divided by the number of words from its text sample and multiplied by 100. Values for the “average number of claims 
in each network” are not standardized, since these would not be affected by the length of the original text sample.  
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND EMERGING ISSUES 
8.1 Summary 
The goal of the current study was to investigate how knowledge claims function—
specifically the ways that asserted (or contested) knowledge claim are justified, and what it is 
that makes particular justifications valid. The analysis of research texts has provided clear 
answers to these questions: The results suggest, first of all, that knowledge claims are 
descriptions of behavior. This, in turn, provides a way to explain why particular types of 
statements constitute valid justifications for a given knowledge claim: valid justifications are 
more concrete descriptions of some aspect of the same behavioral capacity described by the 
knowledge claim they justify. One implication of this is that studying children’s behavior in order 
to infer what they know can be described as an attempt to make general claims about how 
children behave on the basis of observing some specific behavioral performances.  
These conclusions are repeatedly corroborated by the ways knowledge claims were 
used in the analyzed texts. The following findings provided particularly strong corroboration:  
1. Knowledge claims were found to be intuitively/normatively linked with certain forms of 
behavior, the performance of which provided the conditions for the assertion of the 
knowledge claim (originally reported in Chapter 4, section 3). Although explanations 
were sometimes given to account for why some particular behavior was (or was not) 
grounds for the assertion of a given knowledge claim, these explanations often 
presupposed the relevance of the behavior to the knowledge claim in question, rather 
than establishing it “from scratch.” 
2. Knowledge claims and justifications functioned in overlapping ways and in many cases 
were interchangeable with each other (results originally reported in Chapter 5, section 
4). At the same time, justifications were almost always descriptions of concrete forms of 
performed behavior. (This supports the overall conclusions because, insofar as the 
knowledge claims and justifications are interchangeable, and the latter are arguably 
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descriptions of behavior, this suggests that knowledge claims are descriptions of 
behavior as well.)  
3. An observed failure to perform just one kind of behavior used as grounds for the 
assertion of a knowledge claim would jeopardize the validity of the entire claim. The 
possibility of continuing to assert the claim was, in every case of inconsistent 
performance, contingent on redescribing the inconsistently achieved behavior (results 
reported in Chapter 4, section 3, and Chapter 5, section 3.  
4. Knowledge claims that did not appear to describe behavior were justified by a wide 
range of behavioral performances. Because of this, and because these claims 
functioned otherwise as if they were descriptions of behavior, it is reasonable to 
conclude that what were ostensibly descriptions of knowledge rather than behavior were 
in reality just highly generalized descriptions of behavior (further explained in Chapter 5, 
section 4).  
 
These four findings provide particularly strong corroboration for the idea that knowledge 
claims and justifications are hierarchically nested descriptions of behavior because, despite 
addressing different aspects of knowledge claim functioning, they all point to a common 
conclusion. The conclusion raises a number of issues, which are discussed in Chapters 8-9. 
Chapter 8 deals primarily with the model itself. The broader significance of the current findings 
in relation to relevant academic literature is discussed in Chapter 9.  
 
8.2 Use of the Model to Characterize the Use of Knowledge Claims in Different Cultural-
Historical Contexts 
 Language use is always in flux, and any local characteristics of human discourse may 
change over historical time. Therefore, it is not possible to assert that the model produced here 
will “always be valid.” It is entirely possible that researchers may shift their discursive practices 
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in such a way that their discourse on knowledge is no longer characterized by the model. 
Certainly there was some previous era during which “knowledge” was not talked about in the 
ways described by the current model.  
 Having noted these limits, the model is intended to be valid across some range of 
cultural-historical variability. It was developed out of a prototype model described in Study 1 
(Chapter 4), which was refined and assessed through the analysis of additional texts (Study 2; 
Chapter 5). These additional texts came from different researchers, journals, and historical 
periods. This diversity was intended to bolster the validity and reliability of the model, enhancing 
the range of the use of knowledge claims that it describes.  
Regardless of whether we examine knowledge claims in Gelman’s (1972) “early” article, 
or in the more recent work of Sarnecka and Wright (2013), the model identifies a common set of 
characteristics in the use of knowledge claims. While there are certainly changes in this 
discourse36, the types of changes expected over a short time are not of the sort that would likely 
invalidate the model. (Appendix 2 contains an analysis of such changes.) Changes that would 
invalidate the model would be the sort of lexical changes that occur over centuries and lead 
words or phrases to be used in distinct ways.  
An example of this type of change is given by Tabor (1995), who, through a 
comprehensive historical analysis, charted a shift in the use of the verb to go. Five hundred 
years ago, to go was only used only to describe literal movement. In the intervening time, the 
phrase be going to has come to be used increasingly commonly as a marker of the future (e.g., 
I’m going to Arizona [next year]). Today, phrasings such as I’m going to the store are 
                                                
36 One likely change that could be unearthed through analysis would be cultural-historical shifts 
in what is assumed (by the author about the audience) to be understood, what is treated as 
needing justification, versus what is asserted without justification. The model has been designed 
to account for these shifts insofar as it can represent knowledge claims that are justified, 
knowledge claims that are not justified, as well as justifications that are themselves justified, or 
knowledge claims that serve as justifications for other (higher level) knowledge claims. While 
the same knowledge claim/justification may be used in any of these ways in different discursive 
contexts, this does not cause problems for the model, since the model makes no specific 
predictions about which claims are justified and which are not.  
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
121 
 
12 1 
ambiguous—they may describe one’s current movement towards the store, or the fact that one 
will be at the store in the future, but is not in the present. Tabor’s findings also suggest that 
exceptions and irregularities in the use of knowledge claims may be indicative of large scale 
historical changes whose course is not evident to the myopia of the present. Such irregularities 
may be an important future topic for research on knowledge claims.  
If the types of changes Tabor describes were to occur with the verb to know (or related 
verbs), this could invalidate the model as formulated here, insofar as the model is based on the 
idea that knowledge claims are descriptions of behavioral dispositions, articulated in response 
to situations that are presumed to allow general interpretations of observed behavior. However, 
across the range of texts that was the focus of the current analysis, such changes were not 
evident. The types of changes that would be more likely to occur over the short duration of 
several decades are those that do not require fundamental changes to the model. Several of 
these are discussed at the end of chapter 7, as well as in Appendix 2.  
Overall, while the current model does not predict all aspects of the specific ways that 
knowledge claims are used within specific communities (i.e., predictions about what is assumed 
to be understood, etc.), it does provide a general model that can apply across some variety of 
communities, hopefully for the next several decades or more. This type of general applicability is 
crucial in the social sciences, which has struggled to make useful generalizations about human 
social life, given the latter’s dynamic variability (Gergen, 1973; Meehl, 1978). 
8.3 Separation of Competence and Performance and the Objectification of Knowledge 
8.3.a Making Sense of “Competence Before/After Performance” Claims 
Some of the most salient issues raised by the model address the distinction between 
competence and performance. In particular, the model raises the following question: If 
knowledge claims are descriptions of behavioral dispositions, then how are researchers able to 
distinguish between competence (or conceptual knowledge) and performance (behavior)? In 
particular, how it is possible to make the claim that competence precedes performance? This is 
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an issue for the following reason: If knowledge claims are descriptions of behavioral capacities, 
then all they describe is a capability for performance. To say that someone has knowledge but 
cannot demonstrate it in performance would therefore be a contradiction in terms.  
Even though they contradict the model, competence-before-performance arguments 
(e.g., the principles-first position) arise in response to issues that are accounted for by the 
model. Specifically, in the analyzed texts, these arguments arose in response to inconsistent 
patterns of behavior (non-concurrent achievement) across measures of the same form of 
knowledge/competence. From the standpoint of the model, these inconsistent patterns are the 
inconsistent achievement of forms of behavior exemplifying a description of some generalized 
behavioral capacity, and their inconsistency means that the behavioral generalization cannot be 
validly asserted.  
Arguments about competence preceding performance imply an alternative view in which 
knowledge is a real entity separate from behavior or its description. According to this alternative 
view, inconsistent achievement of the forms of behavior that ostensibly imply some form of 
knowledge does not make the assertion of the knowledge claim a moot point (which they should 
do according to the model), but are, rather, taken to suggest that one or more of the 
performances/actions (which serve as justifications) is an invalid measure of the knowledge. 
This leads to attempts to determine what is a valid measure of the knowledge in question. The 
way that this is done, and the issues that arise in this search, are precisely what one would 
expect if the knowledge in question were simply a generalized description of a behavioral 
capacity.  
First, possibly valid alternative behavioral measures can be generated a priori. While it is 
not clear how researchers would choose specific behavioral indices of knowledge if the latter 
were construed as some sort of cognitive entity (i.e., somewhat distinct from action or its 
control), such choices are readily explained if we assume that the knowledge claim is a 
generalized description of behavior.  
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Secondly, these new behavioral measures are necessarily (at least in principle) subject 
to the same sorts of issues that invalidated the measures they were brought in to replace: any 
behavioral measure can be claimed to involve extraneous performance requirements, or to be 
carried out by rote (or invalidated for some other reason). Insofar as there are facets of any 
performance that could be labeled “performance demands”, or insofar as any action could be 
performed for more than one reason, it is not at all clear what a valid measure of knowledge 
would or could look like. This second set of issues is also easily resolved by the model, 
according to which there are no valid measures of knowledge, only performances that 
instantiate various descriptions of more general forms of behavior.  
The use of redescription in response to a lack of expected concurrent validity between 
measures of a knowledge claim is also readily accounted for by the model. After redescribing 
either an unachieved behavioral performance as involving additional performance demands, or 
an achieved behavioral performance as having been carried out by rote, researchers asserted 
that the participants in question lacked or had (respectively) a given form of knowledge. The 
model accounts for why redescription was able to accomplish this: Redescribing one or more 
inconsistent behavioral performances “unlinks” them from a given knowledge claim, providing a 
consistent basis for the assertion of the claim.  
The fact that inconsistent performances on ostensible measures of some form of 
knowledge are met with arguments about performance preceding/following competence is 
intriguing. On one hand, these arguments end up creating the impression that knowledge exists 
independently of the behavioral performances with which it is associated. Yet, this impression is 
misleading. As the previous analysis of Type 1a explanations shows, the discursive processes 
that are used to create the ostensible separation between competence and performance are 
derived from a language game within which knowledge claims are fundamentally descriptions of 
behavioral capacities. Therefore, even though this fact may be obscured by certain discursive 
practices, the separation of competence and performance is an illusion. While this illusion leads 
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researchers to try to infer competence from performance, these efforts are bound to fail. The 
reason for this is that, as has been repeatedly shown here, there is no criteria for a competence 
besides some kind of performance, yet at the same time, any performance proposed as a 
measure of some competence can be claimed to involve extraneous performance demands that 
are irrelevant to the competence in question.  
The impossibility of reaching a definite answer to problems of performance versus 
competence is obscured by the objectification of knowledge. At the same time, the assumption 
that the knowledge described in a knowledge claim is an objective thing leads directly to the 
problematic competence-performance debates, as well as to the assumption that definitive 
answers concerning what a person knows can be reached. 
8.3.b Objectification 
As was previously mentioned, competence-performance distinctions come into use in 
response to findings (or anticipated findings) showing a mix of achievement and failure across 
the various performances implicated by a given knowledge claim, as opposed to across the 
board success or failure (which would be implied by the truth or falsity of the knowledge claim, 
respectively). According to the model of knowledge discourse developed here, such “mixed 
results” mean that a given knowledge claim is invalid or inapplicable—neither fully true nor false.  
The objectification of knowledge obscures these facts by creating the impression that the 
knowledge is a thing that exists apart from the discourses in which it is talked about, and the 
behavioral performances to which it pertains. This inverts the relationship between knowledge 
and behavior. Rather than, as the model claims, knowledge being a generalization of behavioral 
capabilities, the objectification of knowledge engenders the impression that knowledge exists 
regardless of whether or how it is reflected in behavioral capabilities. This is evident in cases in 
which researchers have abundant evidence of children’s behavioral proficiency to use numbers, 
but treat the issue of “what they know” as a separate and unresolved matter. Several examples 
of this are discussed in Appendix 7. 
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8.4 Inductive Inferences About Knowledge 
In addition to the question of the performance-competence distinction, the second issue 
raised by the model concerns the role of inductive inferences in conclusions about children’s 
knowledge.37 In the model, both inductive and deductive inferences may be drawn contingent on 
the truth of a given knowledge claim. If a given knowledge claim (k) is assumed to be true, it 
may be deduced that a more specific aspect of the capacity described by k  (i.e., one of k’s 
justifications) is also true.38 On the other hand, since inductive inferences are not necessarily 
true, the truth of k would not necessarily imply the truth of a more general capacity that 
subsumes k, since this more general capacity implies additional capacities besides k which may 
or may not obtain (i.e., may or may not be capacities that the person in question actually has). 
In other words, deductive conclusions would start from the assumed truth of a given knowledge 
claim, and draw conclusions about specific behavior (concrete instances of the assumed-true 
knowledge claims). An example of such a deductive inference might be to conclude that a child 
knows how to count marbles because he or she knows how to count in general. 
Interestingly, despite the limitations of inductive inferences, the model implies that 
conclusions about children’s knowledge in the analyzed research articles must be reached 
inductively, rather than deductively. In the analyzed texts, deductive inferences were used to 
select behavioral performances that would be evidence of more general knowledge claims. 
However, it is not possible for deductive conclusions like this to be reached definitively (i.e., as 
the conclusions of the research itself). For this to happen, the premise of such an inference—a 
general knowledge claim—would have to be treated as indisputably true, which the model 
                                                
37 The focus of this section is the inverse of work on mental logic by Braine and O’Brien 
(O’Brien, 1998). Whereas their concern is with the logic that underlies our ability to reach 
knowledgeable conclusions, the concern of the current section is with the ways that conclusions 
about knowledge are reached as a result of the affordances for deductive and inductive 
inferences that are intrinsic to a hierarchical network of knowledge claims.  
38 An example of such a deductively inferred knowledge claim is as follows: if we assume that 
it’s true that a child knows how to count, we can deduce that they will correctly count these 
cookies. 
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suggests would not be possible. The reason for this is as follows: According to the model, the 
truth of a given knowledge claim is contingent on the truth of all of its justifications (i.e., the 
knowledge claim can only be validly asserted if all its justifications can be validly asserted). Yet 
any given knowledge claim is instantiated by an infinite number of different justifications (i.e., 
there are an infinite number of different instantiations of the capacity described by a knowledge 
claim, albeit many of these are only superficially different). It would be impossible to show proof 
that any person could perform all actions that instantiate a given knowledge claim. Therefore, 
conclusions about what children know can only be reached inductively, on the basis of 
observing some subset of all possible performances that instantiate a given knowledge claim.  
As an example of this, Sarnecka and Carey (2008) claimed that certain children know 
that adding exactly 1 object to a set means moving forward exactly 1 word in the list [1; 17-18] 
on the basis of observing children accurately predict the cardinality of a specific set after an item 
was added. In fact, there are many different actions that could have instantiated this knowledge 
claim. To assert it on the basis of the observation of only one (or a few) is necessarily to reach 
an inductive conclusion, according to the model. Of course, if researchers’ goal is to reach 
conclusions about what children know, there is no realistic alternative to doing this inductively, 
because it is not possible to observe a child performing every behavior that would instantiate a 
given knowledge claim, the truth of which would be the precondition for deductively reached 
conclusions.  
Despite the lack of alternatives, researchers’ tendency to make inductive generalizations 
about children’s behavior is still surprising given the frequency with which previously-asserted 
knowledge claims were invalidated by subsequently discovered inconsistencies in children’s 
behavior. These revelations “come with the territory” of inductive inferences, which are not 
necessarily true, only more of less likely to be true. This begs the question of whether 
researchers have some basis for determining the probability of accuracy for these statements. 
The formal model of knowledge claims does not yet contain any basis for making such 
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estimates of probability. Determining how and why researchers are confident in making 
inductive generalizations is an important subject for future research. 
 One possible explanation is that the practice of making inductive conclusions is 
borrowed from casual, everyday discourse. In these contexts, there are generally constraints on 
what is at stake with any given utterance, which makes the limits on inductive conclusions 
irrelevant. For example, the claim that someone knows how to count may have an indefinite 
number of implications, but when it is uttered in a specific context of a specific activity, few of 
these may be relevant. This does not hold for scientific investigations, where conclusions are 
intended to be generally true and universally valid. 
 Another possibility (not mutually exclusive with the previous one) is that inductive 
generalizations about knowledge are made on the basis of some experience with the 
contingencies of human behavior. Through first-hand and second-hand experience with human 
behavior, individuals may develop some sense of how the performance of one action implies the 
capability to perform another. Such contingencies undoubtedly exist.  
8.5 Described and Actual Capacities 
The fact that knowledge claims are used in discourse at all implies that they are useful. 
This, in turn, implies that there must be some consistency, regularity or patterning to human 
actions themselves; otherwise generalizations about behavior would be useless. Therefore, we 
may speak of two parallel, related, but importantly different phenomena: The related varieties of 
behavior that are described by knowledge claims, and the related varieties of behavior that are 
achievable by the organism itself by virtue of its structure. In other words, we can distinguish 
both described and actual capacities for a given organism.  
While the current research has shown that knowledge claims are descriptions of 
capacities, a crucial question is how these described capacities relate to the actual capacities of 
the organism. Do the descriptions cut along the same lines as organisms’ capabilities tend to? 
This is another important question for future research.  
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CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION 
9.1 Generalizability of the Findings to Other Research on Cognitive Development 
 The current research focused on the topic of children’s number concepts during the 
preschool years. Strictly speaking, the conclusions of the current research are only 
generalizable to the discourse from which the analyzed texts were drawn (peer-reviewed, 
published academic articles about children’s knowledge of number). However, there are good 
reasons to expect that the main findings—the discovery that knowledge claims are descriptions 
of behavior, and are justified by more concrete descriptions of some part of the described 
behavior—are generalizable elsewhere, at least to other areas of cognitive development 
research on conceptual knowledge. For one thing, despite the narrow focus of the texts the 
current results were derived from, there is nothing about the results themselves that appears to 
be limited to numerical knowledge. One limit to the external validity of the current results to 
other discourses on knowledge are cases in which knowledge is characterized in some form 
besides knowledge claims. For instance, if researchers are characterizing certain structural 
features of the nervous system as constituting knowledge (e.g., this might be claimed about 
Luria’s (1973) functional systems, or certain Piagetian structures (Piaget, 1971)), the current 
results would not necessarily be applicable. Of course, these cases would only nominally be 
discourses on knowledge. In all other respects, they would be fundamentally different.  
A followup study might check the predictions of the current work on research in other 
areas. Two good candidates would be research on children’s knowledge of object permanence 
(Baillargeon, Spelke & Wasserman, 1985), and on children’s theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983).  
Ultimately, it would be interesting to investigate whether the current results generalize to 
discursive contexts beyond written, peer reviewed/edited, and published research articles. While 
there is no reason to expect that this would not be the case, these contexts would present 
challenges not encountered in the study of published research articles. Specifically, while the 
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more general audience of a published text leads to otherwise implicit features of a discourse 
being brought forth, the same is likely untrue in many other discursive contexts, particularly 1-1 
interactions. The conclusions reached in the current study would not have been reached if it 
were not for the comprehensive justification, consideration and explanation of conclusions about 
knowledge in the analyzed research articles. This comprehensiveness brought forth subtle 
aspects of the discourse that would have otherwise been invisible. 
Aside from their validity, the relevance of the current findings to other discourses 
focused on knowledge depends on how knowledge is construed in those discourses, and 
specifically the extent to which it is treated as fundamentally separate from behavior. The 
importance of the current findings for research on conceptual development in early childhood 
stems from the fact that researchers investigating that topic have often attempted to go beyond 
children’s behavior to figure out what they know. This emphasis is founded on and reinforces a 
semiotic distinction between knowledge and behavior. While undoubtedly useful for certain 
purposes, this distinction is ultimately an illusion, and causes problems when entire research 
enterprises attempt to construct scientific knowledge around it.  
In general, research on cognitive development of knowledge (or any other discourse that 
is focused on knowledge) risks incoherence to the extent that it misconstrues the discursive 
relationship between claims about behavior and claims about knowledge, or attempts to 
characterize knowledge as ontologically different from behavior. In the context of research on 
children’s understanding of others, or of object permanence, this is evident in researchers’ 
privileging of early evidence of competence as proof of knowledge while ignoring or explaining 
away evidence of (relatively) later incompetence (see Spelke and Kinzler (2007) for examples of 
this, as well as critiques of this tendency in Allen and Bickhard (2013)). In treating early 
competence as valid proof of knowledge, and later incompetence is the result of performance 
demands, the fact that the knowledge in question is simply a description of all of these forms of 
behavior is lost. These themes are continued in the next section. 
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9.2 Contribution to the Competence Performance Issue 
The findings of the current research have much to add to the existing discourse on the 
competence-performance issue in psychology. In this section, several prominent ideas in this 
discourse will be described, and the results of the current study will be used to further develop 
the ideas in question.  
A distinction between competence and performance is undoubtedly a useful one in some 
contexts, as a result of the combination between variability and indeterminacy that defines 
human behavior. Simply stated, while it is not possible to precisely predict how a person will act 
in any given situation, there is sufficient regularity in their action over time to make it possible to 
make generalizations about their competence, and to distinguish this from their performance in 
some particular instance. From this formulation, the ontological status of competence—e.g., as 
a structural cause of behavior, or as the behavior itself—is ambiguous. This issue is dealt with 
below.  
9.2.a Common Positions on the Competence-Performance Issue 
The distinction between competence and performance was most famously articulated by 
Noam Chomsky (1965) around the same time that he published seminal work in cognitive 
psychology (Chomsky, 1959). Not surprisingly, the distinction has been central to cognitive 
psychology from its beginning, and has persisted as a central issue in the field for decades.  
While an enormous variety of theoretical and empirical work has drawn on this 
distinction and developed it in various ways, it is possible to distinguish several primary 
positions that researchers take with respect to it. First, in the work of Chomsky (1965) and 
similarly inclined researchers (Crain and Thornton, 1998; Gelman & Gallistel, 1978), the 
competence-performance distinction is used as a way to defend claims about children’s 
conceptual knowledge in the face of failures to demonstrate this knowledge in their 
performance. In these arguments children’s failures on tasks are treated as performance errors 
that reflect processing, memory, or other cognitive demands, whereas their successful 
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performances on (typically less demanding tasks) are more valid measures of their competence 
itself (Baillargeon, Wasserman and Spelke, 1985; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007).  
Other researchers use the reverse of this argument to claim that “deficient” 
performances are themselves a transparent reflection of a more limited competence, and that 
successful performances elsewhere are the result of imitation, or other rote knowledge, rather 
than the conceptual knowledge in question. This position is evident in the current research in 
the Briars and Siegler (1984) article, and has been explained in more depth by Fuson (1988). 
While these researchers have a different interpretation of performance errors than Chomsky 
and Gelman (to give two examples), their disagreement reinforces the competence-
performance distinction, which is shared by both sides. The shared acceptance of this 
distinction has led to the development of notions such as procedural knowledge, which has 
been used as a conceptual tool to differentiate the middle ground between competence and 
performance (Greeno, Riley and Gelman, 1984; Le Corre, Van de Walle, Brannon and Carey, 
2006; Rittle-Johnson, Schneider and Star, 2015).  
A different position taken with respect to the competence-performance distinction (or 
manifestations of it in the context of specific research topics) are denials of the validity of some 
particular form of competence as an explanatory construct. Such denials take many forms. For 
example, Chomsky’s (1965) assertion that there is a universal grammar has been contested by 
a number of different researchers (e.g., Brooks, 2004; Dąbrowska, 2015; Tomasello, 1992, 
2003). In some of these arguments, the denial of this one form of competence is replaced by 
claims about a different competence. For example, Tomasello (1992, 2003) has claimed that 
children’s interpersonal competence (specifically a capacity for joint attention and 
intersubjectivity) provides an alternative explanation for the learnability problem of language (the 
‘poverty of the stimulus’) that universal grammar attempts to address. An alternative argument 
(albeit one that is also given by Tomasello) is that the support for language learning that 
universal grammar purports to provide can be alternately accounted for by the social context in 
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which language use occurs. Over the last several decades, this argument has become 
increasingly common in the literature on language acquisition (Brooks, 2004; Tomasello, 1992, 
2003). Wittgenstein makes a similar argument, although rather than arguing that the social 
context of language use provides adequate support for language acquisition (training in 
Wittgenstein’s terminology), his private language argument implies that, logically, this is the only 
way that language acquisition could occur (Williams, 2002; Wittgenstein, 1953).  
The emphasis on contextualized action has been developed in the study of complex 
dynamic systems (Dixon, Holden, Mirman and Stephen, 2012; Kloos and Van Orden, 2009; 
Stephen and Dixon, 2009; Van Orden, Holden and Turvey, 2003, 2005), also referred to as 
dynamic systems theory (Thelen and Smith, 1996; Van Geert, 1994). Unlike some of the 
previously cited literature on universal grammar (e.g., Dąbrowska, 2015), certain researchers in 
the dynamic systems theory orientation dispute the notion of competence in general (Thelen & 
Smith,1996), rather than just in specific cases. The latter’s arguments emphasize the ways that 
behavioral performances can only be explained by the ongoing dynamics of the 
organism+context. Invoking some underlying competence, implied to be some entity in the 
behaving person that is the cause of the observed performance ends up being problematic 
because of how performance depends so centrally on the constraints of specific situations for its 
execution (Turvey, Shaw, Reed and Mace, 1981), and can be executed in such an endless 
variety of ways (Bernstein, 1967). Accounting for flexibly adaptive performances with a notion of 
underlying competence quickly becomes problematic insofar as unique contexts for 
performance introduce novel demands that could hardly be accounted for by a competence in 
the form of some predetermined set of rules.    
9.2.b Relevance of the Current Results 
 The findings of the present study are also interesting to relate to these positions on the 
competence-performance issue. Some of these positions are more reconcilable with the current 
findings than others. For example, the current results suggest that debates about whether a 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
133 
 
13 3 
given behavior provides valid evidence for some competence are misguided when they take 
place in scientific investigations. Such debates rely on a separation between the competence 
(or the conceptual knowledge) and behavioral performances that has been undermined by the 
current research, which showed that the difference between what someone knows and what 
they can do is not an ontological one, but instead, just a difference in the degree of abstraction 
of the behavior being described, i.e., what someone knows is simply a generalized description 
of what they (can) do.  
 To object to this characterization of knowledge by claiming that that there must be some 
underlying (efficient or formal) cause of intelligent action is not wrong in itself. It is of course true 
that there must be some cause of any action. Yet, it is problematic to characterize this cause 
with a knowledge claim, since this gives a generalized description of behavior as a cause for 
some specific instance of that generally described behavior. As was mentioned in the previous 
chapter (Chapter 8), the fallacy in this is concealed by the objectification of language and other 
figurative devices. While these discursive practices for objectifying knowledge engender the 
impression that knowledge is a thing that causes behavior, the results of the current research 
corroborated the idea that knowledge claims were descriptions of behavior so consistently, and 
in such diverse ways that this more than outweighs any lack of intuitive plausibility.  
 These ideas are not necessarily inconsistent with the previously mentioned critiques of 
the competence-performance distinction, at least in some of its guises, but they do lead to a 
different position on the distinction itself. From the perspective of the current results, arguments 
about how some or another form of competence doesn’t exist, or that performances are 
emergent in a way that renders the notion of competence obsolete, aren’t intrinsically 
problematic. Yet they overlook deeper issues with the notions of competence they critique 
(admittedly, these issues may not be relevant for certain investigations). These issues are 
discussed further in the following section (“Implications of the Model for Cognitive Psychology). 
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9.2.c Differing Conceptions of Competence 
In addition to researchers’ staking out various positions with respect to the competencies 
that their research participants do/don’t have, another competence-related issue is the way that 
competence is defined in the first place. Two distinct definitions of competence are evident in 
the literature. First, some writers give competence a mentalistic construal that is strongly 
influenced by the computer model for mind/brain processes. This approach was evident in many 
of the analyzed texts, and in certain seminal publications in cognitive development (Gelman and 
Gallistel, 1978; Spelke, 2000; Spelke and Kinzler, 2007). In this construal, competence is a set 
of internalized or mentally encoded rules or principles; it’s a form of mental content or structure 
that serves as the underlying cause of intelligent action. The other definition treats competence 
as the highest level of performable behavior. An example of is described by Fischer, Bullock, 
Rotenberg, and Raya (1993), who treat competence as a person’s “highest” level of behavior in 
a particular context. While there are other construals of competence (see the edited volume by 
Chandler and Chapman (1991) for a comprehensive review), these two are sufficient to illustrate 
the diversity of the concept in a way that is relevant to the current findings. 
The model (i.e., the model developed on the basis of the current study’s findings) readily 
explains the two previously-mentioned construals of competence. The second construal (in 
which competence is identified with an individual’s highest level of behavioral performances) is 
easily accounted for because, according to the model, descriptions of competence (i.e., 
knowledge claims) are descriptions of behavioral performances. The first construal, which treats 
competence as some known content that guides performance, is also explicable, albeit in a less 
obvious way. Insofar as the model treats descriptions of competence as descriptions of 
behavior, it might be supposed that it would be unable to account for the first construal of 
competence, i.e., competence-as-knowledge-rather-than-behavior. Yet, as the findings of the 
text analysis showed, even when knowledge is distinguished from behavior, knowledge claims 
are still intuitively/normatively linked to certain forms of behavior. These links are difficult to 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
135 
 
13 5 
explain, unless we suppose that knowledge claims are descriptions of behavior. Under this 
interpretation, the ostensible but illusory distinction between knowledge and behavior is a result 
of the following: (1) the breadth of the behavioral forms described by many knowledge claims is 
so wide that the fact that the latter are descriptions of behavior at all is obscured; (2) The 
reification of knowledge as a (figurative) thing-in-itself; and (3) conflation of the reasons for 
behavior (which could be descriptions of behavior) with the underlying causes of behavior 
(which could not conceivably be descriptions of behavior).  
   
9.3 Implications of the Model for Cognitive Psychology 
 The current model of knowledge claim functioning has significant implications for 
cognitive psychology. Historically, cognitive psychology is a response to behaviorism and that 
approach’s restriction of psychological research to observable behavior.  Whereas behaviorists 
sought to explain behavior solely in terms of the contingencies of past behavior without recourse 
to mentalistic phenomena, cognitive psychology attempts to “go inside the black box” in order to 
understand the hidden workings of the mind. The need to do this was demonstrated by 
Chomsky (1959), who showed that behavioral events could not be accounted for in terms of an 
individual’s history of learning experiences. To get around the limitations of behaviorism, 
cognitive psychologists sought to infer the hidden underpinnings of observable behavior.  
 This, of course, is a reasonable goal. The structures and processes that underlie human 
action are often hidden, and highly complex, and it not surprising if they need to be accounted 
for in order to explain behavior.  
 The current results suggest that cognitive psychology has erred in attempting to 
characterize the hidden workings of the mind with knowledge claims. Knowledge claims do not 
(at least in the analyzed texts) describe hidden structures/processes/content that underlie 
observable behavior (i.e., the inner workings of the black box of the mind). Rather, they are 
generalized descriptions of observable behavior itself.   
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The use of knowledge claims to describe the causal underpinnings of observable 
behavior occurs as a result of the conflation of reasons and causes of behavior, which has been 
an ongoing problem for psychology (see Appendix 1 for a more in-depth discussion of this 
issue).  
Conflation of the reasons and causes of behavior likely happens for several reasons. 
One possible culprit is the similarity between discursive scripts describing reasons and causes 
(e.g., For example, the ball moved because it was hit by another ball; s/he was able to solve the 
problem because s/he understands addition.). In addition, the objectification of knowledge 
allows talk about knowledge to be assimilated to scripts or metaphors for objects that imply 
causal processes (e.g., one object causing another). 
The conflation of reasons and causes contributes to theoretical dead ends such as the 
homunculus fallacy and the symbol-grounding problem, which pose significant threats to large 
bodies of scientific work (Bickhard & Terveen, 1995). It is also at the root of morally problematic 
applications of “science,” such as attempts to measure intelligence (Gould, 1981). In the case of 
the current topic—conceptual knowledge—it has led to the mistaken impression that 
descriptions of what people know (knowledge claims) are descriptions of the processes that 
underlie their behavior. 
 Despite the problems that the conflation of reasons and causes has led to, it is possible 
to take a more optimistic view, and treat these problems as “growing pains”. In this sense, the 
conflation of reasons and causes may be understood as an attempt to formulate a causal 
account of the processes that underlie intelligent behavior using a set of quasi-appropriate tools 
(knowledge claims). While the use of such tools is problematic, these problems may be 
addressed, and the corrected set of tools may be useful for explaining the causal basis of 
behavior.  
 This kind of conceptual development has been observed in other fields of science. 
Valsiner (2013) describes how the common concept of salt was incorporated into scientific 
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investigations in chemistry. There, the everyday meaning of salt (i.e., salty tasting things) was 
the historical starting point for the development of an (ultimately very different) concept. Today 
in chemistry, the concept of salt functions entirely independently of the everyday concept that 
was its ancestor. A similar development of common/everyday notions might be possible in the 
case of knowledge.  
 The work of Mark Bickhard provides an example of how this might be realized. Bickhard 
(1980, p. 43-63) elaborates a conception of knowledge that is related to, but also fundamentally 
distinct from the use of the concept in the types of knowledge claim discourse analyzed in this 
research. According to Bickhard, knowledge is something intrinsic to the interactions of a 
system (e.g., an organism) in a particular environment. Specifically, knowledge is intrinsic to 
interactions carried out by a system (living or artificial) whose outcomes are definable within the 
system itself. The process of knowing refers to the ways in which the control structure of a given 
system (possibly recursively) anticipates various interaction possibilities.39  
 Regardless of the utility of Bickhard’s specific formulation of knowledge, it is imperative 
that cognitive psychology and related parts of mainstream and developmental psychology 
address the need for conceptual and theoretical clarification. Currently, too much of the 
scientific work in these fields is spent on problems that are borne out of linguistic and 
conceptual confusion.   
 Resolving conceptual issues is a developmental process, and as such, may be 
                                                
39 An example of this formulation of knowledge can be seen in the case of a person’s interaction 
with an orange. In this example, the person has knowledge of the orange to the extent that they 
anticipate various interaction possibilities--and, possibly, the relations between these--with the 
orange. Described from the standpoint of an external observer, these interaction possibilities 
include smelling citrus (via the intermediate interaction of bringing the orange to the nose), 
bringing into view of hidden features of the orange (e.g., the bump where it previously 
connected to the plant), or peeling off the skin. Some of these interaction possibilities are 
reversible, whereas others are not. For instance, the orange may be picked up, sniffed, and 
then returned to the ground to be sniffed later, or interacted with in some other way. Irreversible 
interactions include peeling off the skin, or eating the orange (the latter would be recursively 
anticipated via the intermediary interaction of peeling the orange). The process by which these 
these interaction possibilities and their relations are indicated constitutes knowing, and the 
control structures that direct these indications constitute knowledge. 
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understood in terms of Werner’s (1957) orthogenetic principle: “wherever development occurs it 
proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing 
differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration” (Werner, 1957, p. 126). In the case of 
conceptual confusion in science, a useful developmental change would involve the progressive 
differentiation and organization of conflated concepts. The results of the current project aim to 
contribute to such a change by showing how issues relating to knowledge can be usefully 
addressed by examining them in discursive terms. This amounts to the differentiation of a 
discursive dimension of the concept of knowledge, as distinct from other ways in which the 
concept might be used (such as that described previously by Bickhard).  
 In line with Werner’s orthogenetic principle, it is necessary to not only distinguish 
knowledge (claims) as a part of discourse with knowledge as a property of organisms, but also 
to hierarchically integrate these differentiated notions to each other. This hierarchical integration 
is an important precondition for guiding future research efforts related to knowledge with 
consideration of whether a particular question pertains to the discursive or neuropsychological 
dimensions of knowledge. 
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APPENDIX 1: THE DISTINCTION AND CONFLATION BETWEEN REASONS AND CAUSES 
 
 The distinction between the reasons and causes of behavior was initially articulated by 
Wittgenstein (1953) and (slightly later), by Ryle (1949) (publication dates do not reflect the order 
of development of ideas), and is central to the work of both. The focus is on explanations for 
behavior in folk-psychological terms, e.g., the phrase he went out to the car because he 
believed that his keys were there, or she gave the correct change because she knew how to 
count. With varying degrees of explicitness, both Wittgenstein and Ryle argue that explanations 
like these cannot be coherently treated as causal accounts. That is, the belief in the first 
example did not cause the man to go to his car. In the second instance, the woman’s knowledge 
of counting did not cause her to give the correct change. 
Wittgenstein and Ryle both provide related arguments which demonstrate how it is 
necessary to treat these as reasons, distinct from causes, in order to provide a coherent 
account of psychological/cognitive processes. Wittgenstein (1953) illustrates this (somewhat 
implicitly) with the example of a shopkeeper following a simple order: 
Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I hand him a slip 
marked “five red apples”. He takes the slip to the shopkeeper, who opens the drawer 
marked “apples”; then he looks up the word “red” in a table and finds a color sample 
opposite it; then he says the series of cardinal numbers—I assume that he knows them 
by heart—up to the word “five” and for each number he takes an apple of the same color 
as the sample out of the drawer.-- --It is in this and similar ways that one operates with 
words.-- --“But how does he know where and how he is to look up the word ‘red’ and 
what he is to do with the word ‘five’?”-- --Well I assume that he acts as I have described. 
Explanations have to come to an end somewhere.—But what is the meaning of the word 
‘five’?”—No such thing was in question here, only how the word “five” is used. 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 3). 
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The subsequent questions that Wittgenstein implied and refuses to address are infinite—each 
one leads directly to the next. They arise (and are infinite) as a result of treating reasons for 
behavior (articulated in the language of folk psychology) as if they are the causes of behavior. In 
a causal sequence or chain of events, each successive event is necessarily determined by a 
preceding set of circumstances, which is itself the outcome of a previous set of events. If we 
treat reasons for a particular behavior (e.g., a person gave out the right number of items 
because they know the counting sequence by heart) as if each reason is a successive link in a 
causal chain that leads up to the performance of a behavior, then a single reason will not 
provide a full explanation since, as part of a causal chain of events, it must itself be supported 
by a preceding reason/cause. By rejecting the additional questions about the shopkeepers 
behavior (and implying the infinite regression that these types of explanations lead to) 
Wittgenstein is implying that explanations in terms of reasons do not constitute a causal account 
of behavior, and that there is a meaningful distinction between reasons and causes. Later on, 
he points to this distinction and its implications more explicitly: 
How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about 
the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the 
justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 
"This is simply what I do. (Wittgenstein, 1953, 217, p. 85). 
Ryle (1949) makes a related point in his criticism of the “ghost in the machine” style of thinking 
that pervades philosophy and psychology. Whereas Wittgenstein emphasizes that explanations 
(in terms of reasons) normatively come to an end, Ryle emphasizes the problematic infinite 
regress—Ryle’s regress—that results from the conflation of reasons and causes. In addition, he 
notes a particularly prevalent case of this type of conflation: the assumption that there must be a 
hidden mental justification behind every intentional behavior. Ryle describes this line of thinking 
as resulting from the assumption, typical of the cognitivist approach, that, 
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an operation that is characterized as intelligent must be preceded by an intellectual 
acknowledgement of these rules or criteria; that is, the agent must first go through the 
internal process of avowing to himself certain propositions about what is to be done 
(‘maxims’, ‘imperatives’ or ‘regulative propositions’ as they are sometimes called); only 
then can he execute his performance in accordance with those dictates. He must preach 
to himself before he can practice. (Ryle, 1949, p. 29) 
Historically, cognitivism attempted to go beyond behaviorism by investigating the hidden 
processes that underlie and mediate behavior. Stated in this way, this is not problematic. It is 
indisputable that there are hidden processes and structures that underlie people’s observable 
behavior. The crucial error, identified by Wittgenstein and Ryle, is the assumption that these 
causal processes can be described in psychological terms. If we characterize the underlying 
causes of behavior in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g., folk-psychological knowledge 
claims), the goal of explaining behavior is not met, since these explanations posit entities or 
processes that require precisely the same types of explanation that they were brought in to 
provide in the first place. For example, if we explain a person’s behavior by claiming that it is 
guided by knowledge that they possess, we have created something new—the knowledge—that 
needs to be explained, i.e., how the subject is able to properly bring forth interpret and use the 
knowledge they are claimed to possess. The problem here is not that the explanation of 
behavior in terms of knowledge leaves something unexplained, but rather that what it leaves 
unexplained is not substantially different from what it originally set out to explain. Ryle states 
this clearly: 
the consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be 
more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if for any operation to be intelligently 
executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed 
intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. 
(Ryle, 1949, p. 29) 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
142 
 
14 2 
Wittgenstein and Ryle both argue that this problematic infinite regress results from reducing 
folk-psychological concepts to structures or processes in the brain, i.e., reducing the reasons for 
behavior to its causes. In other words, by conflating causal-mechanical processes with folk-
psychological models of the mind, the reasons for behavior (articulated in folk-psychological 
terms) are treated as if they described the causes of behavior. 
 
Training and the Normative Basis of Social Action 
Wittgenstein, having identified the problematic regress that results from causal 
explanations given in terms of reasons, points to what is, in his view, a more coherent 
explanation of the causes of behavior. For Wittgenstein, a person is able to behave in the way 
that they do not because they have knowledge or principles that guide their behavior (since the 
question of how these knowledge/principles are interpreted would lead to an infinite regress), 
but instead on the basis of their mastery of a technique, or skilled activity. This notion of a 
technique cannot be broken down into further psychological language. Acting on the basis of a 
technique is not acting on the basis of some justified rule. It is in a sense “blind.” Wittgenstein 
uses the example of following a rule to illustrate the fundamental role of technique, existing prior 
to all reasons. 
 
"How am I able to obey a rule?"—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about 
the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. 
 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. 
Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 85) 
Later, he says: 
“When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 85) 
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This description of the role of techniques in activity is a reversal of the approach seen in 
cognitive psychology, where action is understood to be guided by underlying knowledge. For 
Wittgenstein, the basis of action is a technique that cannot be reduced to further propositions, 
since this would lead to an infinite regress of additional propositions. In a reversal of the 
cognitivist assumption that knowledge is the prerequisite for action, Wittgenstein argues that 
rules do not guide the execution of a technique. Rather, it is only in terms of a technique that it 
is possible to interpret the proper application of a rule. Therefore, the rule presupposes a 
technique, or it is “only through a technique [that we] can grasp a regularity (Wittgenstein, RFM, 
VI, 2). 
Training and Technique 
Wittgenstein’s ideas about the role of technique are explained in terms of a situation in which a 
novice is trained by a more competent “master” from total ignorance, towards mastery of a 
technique. In this situation, the master engages the novice in the activity, and provides ongoing 
feedback--i.e., ostensive training--to guide the learner. Importantly, the feedback is given in the 
context of the activity itself--the training situation is an apprenticeship. 
Through the training, the novice gains the ability to carry out actions typical of the 
technique, not by virtue of formal rules, or external specifications that account for why certain 
actions are carried out in a certain way, but only in terms of feedback from the master. With 
sufficient repetition of the activity accompanied by feedback from a master, the learner comes to 
master a particular technique. Importantly, it is only through such mastery that any rules 
governing the proper execution of the technique can be understood. As Williams (2011) writes, 
 
The pattern into which the child is being taught cannot be recognized as such until the 
child has mastered the techniques for using the rules through the actual repetition of 
constrained behavior. The child or novice must act out the part if she is to see the 
pattern. (Williams, 2011, p. 209). 
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The word “pattern” that is referred to above pertains to the way that the technique provides a 
source of regularity. This regularity might be the basis for the interpretation of a rule describing 
the technique, or for a word, pertaining to some aspect of the technique. It is only through the 
grounding of the technique that such a pattern can be established. 
 These regularities are not apparent to the learner during their first initiation into the 
technique. Nor are they apparent to the master (Williams, 2011, p. 209). Both master and 
learner are, at the beginning of the training, blind to the technique, but for opposite reasons. For 
the master, the technique is so ubiquitous that it can be taken for granted and ignored.So for 
example, an adult counting a set of items does so without any conscious consideration of the 
reasons for their actions, i.e., for why they counted in such and such a way. They simply carry 
out the counting activity without attention to these details. For the initiate learner, actions are 
similarly “reason-less”. Their initial training involves carrying out actions (and being given 
feedback) without a clear understanding of the rationale for these actions. They fail to see them 
as conforming to any rule or regularity. That is, in carrying out the actions typical of the exercise 
of a technique, they are initially unaware of the extent to which their actions constitute valid 
executions of some rule. Again, it is only through the repetition and feedback typical of training 
that a basis for interpreting the regularities and rules pertaining to the technique can be gained. 
An important implication of this description of the process of training in a technique 
(which can be applied to a learner’s initiation into any cultural practice) is the fact that the 
learning process is necessarily a social one. While the learner could develop forms of action to 
accomplish practical tasks independently of any assistance from others, Wittgenstein’s 
argument makes clear that any process that involves the use of language (and this includes 
counting and number use) is founded on a technique that can only be acquired through a social 
process of training. This is because the techniques themselves are normatively grounded. 
There is nothing about any particular instance of the execution of the technique that could, by 
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itself, provide criteria for correctness. Therefore, it is not just a coincidence that the training 
situation is social, it is fundamentally necessary. The social context provides the only way that a 
person can develop a sense of “how things are done” that is not carried out on the basis of 
consciously recognized rules. Since Wittgenstein shows that such rules cannot explain our 
capacity for action in the first place, the social basis of training is a necessary conclusion. 
 One important implication of this argument is the idea that normativity--a sense of the 
rightness or appropriateness of a certain action that is not justified by some prior reason--
provides the “bedrock” or foundational guide for our action. In the discursive perspective, 
normativity is a crucial concept insofar as it describes the characteristic of our active 
engagement with the world (i.e., its normativity) that explains how we are able to learn to use 
language to make meaningful distinctions.  
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APPENDIX 2: ASSESSMENT OF SYSTEMATIC VARIATION IN ADDRESSIVITY 
 
A presupposition of this analysis, and the model is that the functioning of knowledge 
claims (and language more generally) is dependent on a shared background of forms of life 
(Wittgenstein, 1953) between interlocutors. It is only with respect to these forms of life that 
particular uses of utterances—such as a justification given as support for a knowledge claim—
can be interpreted as normative, i.e., conventionally appropriate.   
Differences in forms of life between interlocutors require things to be made explicit that 
would otherwise be unstated.40 As this implies, speakers’ (or writers’) utterances are formulated 
with respect to an intended audience, and what can be anticipated to be normative for them. 
This influence can be labeled with Bakhtin’s (1986) term addressivity, used here to identify the 
way that the phrasing of any utterance defines a boundary between what is explicitly stated 
versus what is left unstated by virtue of interlocutors’ shared participation in a given form of 
life41. 
While addressivity is a constant aspect of language, different instances of language use 
(e.g., different utterances, the discourses of different communities) differ in terms of what is 
made explicit versus what is assumed to be understood. As a part of the larger analysis of the 
selected texts in Study 2, these types of addressivity-related differences were investigated. This 
sheds insights on the type of discourse or discourses within which knowledge claims are being 
made. This may address whether, in the analyzed texts, do the assumed understandings 
constitute only a “local” level of cultural consensus, perhaps restricted to the level of the 
                                                
40 However, even in these cases, what has been made explicit is still comprehensible only 
against a background of shared forms of life. A linguistic interaction would not be possible 
otherwise (see Appendix 1 for an explanation of this point). When otherwise unstated things are 
made explicit, what changes is merely what is assumed to be understood, i.e., intersubjectively 
normative. The fact that something is assumed to be understood remains constant, regardless 
of how much clarification is given. 
41 The notion of addressivity goes beyond this. In particular, it also stresses how any utterance 
is expressed so as to be answerable by the intended audience. 
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assumed audience of the journal or even a particular article, or alternately, whether Or, is what 
is assumed-as-understood is more general or broad (e.g., what college-educated English-
speaking adults are assumed to understand when reading a research article)? Before 
describing the analysis of addressivity-related differences, several considerations relative to this 
task are worth noting. 
 
Issues Particular to the Study of Addressivity-Differences in Research Texts 
Published research texts present a unique case for the assessment of the issue of 
addressivity. The fact that research reports are texts directed at a generalized audience, as well 
as the standard of methodological transparency in science, means that many details that will 
likely be made explicit in research texts might elsewhere have be treated as assumed-as-
understood. Furthermore, the judgments as to what can be taken for granted as assumed-to-be 
understood versus what must be made explicit are not made by a single interlocutor, but by the 
combined work of the author and editorial staff. One result of this is that the addressivity that 
might have resulted from a single speaker/writer is obscured, as a result of the author’s and 
editor’s possibly different assumptions about their assumed audience.  
Selection of Texts for “Addressivity-Analysis” 
To analyze whether there were systematic differences in addressivity—i.e., assumptions 
about the intended audience, pairs of texts from three journals were analyzed. The goal of this 
analysis was to identify differences in what is assumed-to-be understood (on behalf of some 
intended/perceived audience by the author/editor) versus what is made explicit. The pairs of  
texts came from the same, or similarly focused journals. This provided a way to gauge 
addressivitiy-related issues (i.e., patterns in what is assumed-to-be-understood versus made-
explicit) at the level of the journal itself. This was intended to reflect the fact that the analyzed 
texts were not utterances directed from a particular contextualized individual to another, but 
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rather from one individual towards a certain perceived audience as well as a perceived editorial 
staff (with their own assumptions about the audience). 
The selected articles included a pair from Child Development (Frye, et al., 1989; 
Sophian, 1988), a pair from Cognition (Davidson et al., 2012; Sarnecka 7 Carey, 2008), and 
finally a pair from more educationally-focused journals, The International Journal of Educational 
Research (Muldoon et al., 2003), and Educational Studies in Mathematics (Bruce & Threlfall, 
2004). The latter two articles were chosen in order to broaden the range of analyzed articles. 
They come from journals focused on educational issues, that were not seen to be cited in the 
other contemporary articles from the journal Cognition. Nevertheless, the freedom in choosing 
an alternative journal (intended as a proxy for an alternative community of interlocutors) was 
restricted by the need to find journals publishing similarly themed articles at a similar point in 
time (since the lack of topical similarity would have significantly reduced opportunities to 
observe differences in addressivity because different topics entail different, and hence, non-
comparable possible assumptions). 
The Challenge of Disentangling Assumed Understandings that Reflect Topical 
Differences from Those that Reflect Addressivity Differences  
Identifying systematic variation in what is assumed-as-understood across multiple texts 
as these imply different assumptions about the intended audience is a difficult and complex 
process, as a result of the fact that different topical foci will result in different things being 
assumed-as-understood, not because of differences in the intended audience, but because of 
differences in the topic at hand. For example, if I am telling someone about baseball, I would 
implicitly assume different things to be understood than if I were telling the same person about 
reading. The fact that I didn’t make the same assumptions in both cases is not a function of 
assumed differences in the addressed audiences, but rather a function of differences in the 
topic at hand. With regards to the current analysis, the focus is on differences in what different 
intended audience are assumed to understand with respect to the same issue, rather than 
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differences in what is assumed as understood that reflect topical differences only. An example 
of this type of a difference would be whether, across topically similar utterances about baseball, 
one utterance assumes understanding of baseball is a sport whereas the other does not, and 
makes this explicit. 
Unfortunately, the distinction between addressivity issues related to different assumed 
audiences versus those related to topical differences is not so clear cut. Addressivity issues 
reflecting topical differences and those reflecting differences in the assumed audience are 
frequently conflated with one another and impossible to disentangle. This can be illustrated with 
an example from Gelman who writes, “the child clearly possesses a logical system for 
manipulating number before he reaches the stage of concrete operations.“ (1972, p. 89). 
Elsewhere in the text, there is a description of Piaget’s conservation task, which is portrayed as 
a measure of whether the child treats number as invariant, which is in turn portrayed as (at least 
according to Piaget) indicative of the child’s number concept. Despite this, “concrete operations” 
is not brought up, or shown in any way to be linked to the conservation task, or to Piaget. This 
quote therefore, is assuming that the audience understands that “concrete operations” are 
related to performance on the conservation task. 
This example reveals problems with the previous distinction between addressivity issues 
related to different assumed audiences versus those related to topical differences. On one 
hand, none of the other articles assumed knowledge of concrete operations (even if they 
mentioned invariance), and many of them didn’t even bring up this issue (Briars and Siegler, 
1984; Brooks, Audet & Barner, 2012; Davidson, Eng & Barner, 2012; Frye, et al., 1989; Gelman 
& Meck, 1983; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008; Wynn, 1990). On one hand, this could be attributed to 
the fact that these articles had a different topical focus than Gelman (1972). The Gelman text 
was uniquely focused on children’s understanding of the invariance of number words in a way 
that the others were not, and in a way that is arguably more related to Piaget’s claims. Yet, 
these differences in topic are not a mere matter of coincidence. They reflect changes in the 
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historical orientation of the field of research, and the presence or absence of certain ideas. 
Therefore, while Gelman’s mention of Piaget and her assumption of the audience’s 
understanding of Piagetian research could be attributed to her topical focus (rather than 
differences in who the assumed audience will be), the choice of that topical focus is clearly 
linked to a certain historical period--a historical period in which some things and not others were 
understood and assumed as understood. Therefore, while the mention of “concrete operations” 
in the Gelman text is clearly related to addressivity, it does not clearly show a pronounced 
difference in assumptions about the intended audience, but rather addressivity-related issues 
that are bound up and conflated with historical ones, via the choice of topic. 
Strategic Basis for Justification/non-justification of Knowledge Claims  
Another interesting case of entanglement between the topical focus of an article and 
issues of addressivity is seen in cases where the lack of justification given to particular 
knowledge claims appears to be related to whether or not those claims are being advanced, 
contested, or are irrelevant to the overall arguments made in the text. One case of this is seen 
in the Brooks et al. (2012) article, which attempts to provide an alternative explanation for 
findings reported by Sarnecka and Gelman (2004). In introducing their study, Brooks et al. 
assert several knowledge claims but do not provide justifications (besides citations) for them. 
The lack of justification in this case may be best interpreted as reflecting the author’s 
understanding of their position within a particular academic discourse. The unjustified claims are 
not those that they themselves are ultimately asserting, but instead claims they later contest. 
The lack of initial justification42 may therefore reflect the authors’ assumption that any perceived 
(by the audience) need for justification will be more than rectified by the subsequent focus no, 
and ultimate contestation of the claims. 
                                                
42 Insofar as the lack of justification might suggest that Brooks et al. (2012) were attacking a 
straw man, it is worth noting that the claims were later justified.  
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    A similar case is found in Briars and Siegler (1984), who make several claims about 
children’s knowledge early on in their article that have no justification (with this being said, the 
claims are general). However, the strategy that the author’s appeared to be using in doing this is 
likely similar to what was seen in Brooks et al. In both cases, the author’s ability to make a claim 
without justification is likely premised on the fact that the overall arguments in their text are 
orthogonal, i.e., contrary, to these claims. 
Possible Solution 
Although addressivity-related issues can and will show up in any use of language, the 
identification of systematic differences in assumptions related to addressivity across texts 
corresponding to assumed differences in the intended audience can only be done with regards 
to something that is found across all of the texts. To the extent that addressivity is identified with 
features that are not common across texts, it is not possible to claim that it represents a 
difference in what the author assumes the audience understands (implying a distinct audience), 
as opposed to a specific assumption that was implied in one text but not another because of the 
nature of the topic. It is only in cases where there are differences in what is assumed versus 
what is explicit across texts, with regards to the same knowledge claim (or other statement), that 
there are grounds for conclusions about addressivity. 
Therefore, it is necessary to focus on specific claims that are found throughout all texts 
to allow for comparison. The current analysis ultimately focused on claims that were common in 
the analyzed texts—understanding counting, and/or understanding/knowing how to count (the 
differences between these were acknowledged and not treated as irrelevant), as well as claims 
about counting by itself (e.g., the child counted, the child could count to four). 
The use of each of these knowledge claims was analyzed in the selected pairs of texts. 
The analysis identified where the claims were first made in the text (both asserted or considered 
claims were included), any qualification, description, or explanation for what a particular claim 
meant was recorded in the form of quotes. The analysis was intended to identify cross-journal 
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differences in the manner and extent to which the introduction of a claim in particular texts 
involved explanation and extended description, intended to clarify what was meant. These 
differences would imply different assumed audiences. 
 
Results by Claim 
The analysis was focused on two things. First, the extent to which a given knowledge claim was 
treated as if it had the same or different implications. Secondly, the issue of whether these 
different implications were explicitly noted or not. These findings are discussed first for the claim 
understanding [how to] count[ing], and then secondly for counting itself.  
Understanding Counting/Understanding How to Count 
This claim was found to be used in four distinct ways, i.e., to have four distinct implications. 
These different uses were found in some articles but not others: 
• As a way to distinguish a roughly bounded collection of various forms of counting 
knowledge, rather than knowledge of a single discrete thing. For instance, Sophian 
(1988) writes that “These [counting] principles are thought to reflect knowledge that is 
implicit in children's counting and other action schemas.” [1R]. These uses were also 
found in Frye et al (1989). 
• As shorthand for CP-knowing. This was seen only in articles by Davidson et al. (2012) 
and Sarnecka & Carey (2008). In these articlesseveral cases of the claim that “children 
who understand counting” were observed which clearly referred to children who could 
create sets of any requested number of items (i.e., children who were identified as CP-
knowers). In each of these articles, this use of “understanding counting” was explicitly 
clarified, suggesting the assumption that this would not be the audience’s default 
interpretation. 
• As a way to refer to an understanding of the logical significance of counting, the meaning 
of counting, or conceptual knowledge of counting. This is a more general case of the 
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previous use of “understanding counting.” Rather than referring to CP-knowing, it was 
used to distinguish something general—i.e., anything other than “procedural knowledge” 
(the specific distinction was determined by the context)A clear example of this is seen in 
the Davidson et al. (2012) text:  “If a semantic induction occurs sometime after children 
become CP-knowers (by Wynn’s criteria) then children’s understanding of counting 
could, in theory, rely on a mapping to the ANS.” [24], which in the context of the text, is 
clearly intended to refer to something more than procedural knowledge. 
• As a broad conclusion made on the basis of children’s across-the-board performance on 
various counting tasks. This usage was seen in Sarnecka & Carey (2008), as well as in 
Davidson et al. (2012). In those articles, the implication of this meaning is either explicitly 
stated, or implied by the conditions on the claim’s use. An example of the former is seen 
in the following quote from Sarnecka & Carey (2008): “Cardinal-principle-knowers 
succeed across the board on these tasks. Such qualitative differences in the counting 
behavior of subset-knowers and cardinal-principle-knowers suggest that what ultimately 
separates the groups is not just the size of the sets they can generate. Rather, it is that 
cardinal-principle-knowers understand how counting works, whereas subset-knowers do 
not.” [5] 
 
What can be made of these different uses? Notably, the different implications of the claims do 
correlate somewhat to different journals (and eras). While this may imply different uses of the 
claims predominating at different contexts, it does not necessarily imply a difference in 
addressivity. As far as the issue of addressivity is concerned, the crucial difference is whether 
specific differences in the use and implications of claims are explicitly marked, or introduced 
with the assumption that they will be understood in a particular way, without this being made 
explicit. A close analysis of these different uses of knowing how to count/understanding 
counting provides little reason to think that the uses of this claim in different ways without 
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explicit mention of this fact, indicated the assumption of a different audience. There are several 
reasons for this conclusion. 
Some of these differences were superficial. Several of the apparent differences 
above were largely superficial. For example, the first and the fourth uses are not fundamentally 
distinct. Both involve the shared assumption that understanding how counting works is a highly 
generalized knowledge claim about using counting in normative ways across many different 
contexts. The difference between them has to do with the first not being an assertion of 
knowledge, but instead the use of the knowledge claim to draw a very general distinction 
(corresponding to the generality of the claim itself) about a particular set of knowledge claims. 
The fourth use involves the assertion of the claim on the basis of a stated variety of concurrently 
observed behaviors. 
Some uses were explicitly marked. The second use of understanding counting 
involved a somewhat unique meaning. However, there is little evidence that this meaning was 
assumed as understood for the audience. In every article where understanding counting was 
used to refer to CP-knowing, this was explicitly stated. In fact, in the articles that ultimately 
ended up asserting this claim (i.e., usage), extensive explanation was given for support 
(whereas in the Davidson et al. article where this usage was disputed, somewhat less, but still 
explicit explanation was given to account for why being a CP-knower would ostensibly imply that 
a child understands counting. The fact that this specialized meaning of understanding counting 
was made explicit indicates that it was not assumed as understood. 
Implicit contextual cues in the absence of explicit explanation of meanings. Some 
instances in which understanding counting was used in particular ways (specifically, the third 
usage) did not involve explication that this was the case. However, in these cases, it was not 
possible to conclude that this reflected assumed understandings by the author/editor about the 
audience. Despite the absence of explication about the meaning of understanding counting, the 
use of this term in context (of the text) provided cues to demarcate its meaning to the extent that 
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there was no indication of an audience that was more specialized than that assumed by the 
other texts. As an example of how these contextual cues functioned, consider how the claim 
that a child understands how to count could have different implications depending on whether it 
is used in the text to draw a contrast with understanding the conceptual significance of counting 
versus being used in contrast with being able to recite the count list. A clear example of how the 
same claim used with different meanings in the absence of explicit indications of these 
meanings does not necessarily implicate different assumed audiences can be shown with the 
following example, which concerns children who have learned how to count. 
Different meanings of the same knowledge claim: The case of ‘learning to count’. 
An example of the same claim used with different implications in the absence of any expicit 
mention of this is seen with the claim of learning to count sets (although this phrasing suggests 
a change over time, this was used as a knowledge claim description of a capacity at one point in 
time, essentially the same way that knowing how to count sets might be used). 
Learning to count is used by Davidson et al (2012) to describe children who have 
passed the Give-N task. This use of learning to count appears throughout the text (including in 
the title) and is evident in the quotes such as the following, from the introduction, 
 
By some accounts, children must make a semantic induction in acquisition, at which 
point they generalize the above number knowledge to all numerals they have learned, 
and to all numbers that they will ever learn (Sarnecka & Carey, 2008; Wynn, 1990, 
1992). Often, this inductive leap is said to occur when children become so called 
‘‘cardinal principle knowers’’, at around the age of 3 and a half. Here, we examine the 
empirical basis for this hypothesis and whether learning to count involves a semantic 
induction. 
In the early stages of acquisition, children’s knowledge of numerals is limited and 
is mainly procedural in nature. Before they learn any numeral meanings, children first 
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learn to recite the words in a list (e.g., ‘‘one, two, three...’’). As part of this procedure, 
they learn that numerals are always recited in the same order (i.e., the stable order 
principle) and that each numeral should be said when pointing to a different item (i.e., 
the one-to-one principle; Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). Sometime after 2 years of age, 
children begin to acquire meanings for words in their count list, beginning with one: 
‘‘one-knowers’’ can give one object when asked, and can correctly label a set as one. 
However, although these children can recite higher numbers (e.g., 5 or 10), and know 
that these higher words contrast in meaning (Condry & Spelke, 2008; Wynn, 1992), they 
appear to lack meanings for the rest of the words in their count list (Wynn, 1990, 1992, 
etc.). After this one-knower stage, children become ‘‘two-knowers’’, and are able to 
distinguish one and two from each other and from the rest of the numbers in their count 
list. Next they learn three, (three-knowers) and then (sometimes) four (four-knowers). At 
each of these stages children are known as ‘‘subset- knowers’’ since they have exact 
meanings for only a subset of the words in their count list. Finally, sometime between the 
ages of 3-and-a-half and 4, children discover that counting can be used to generate sets 
of the correct size for any word in their count list. These children are referred to as 
cardinal principle knowers (CP-knowers), since they appear to understand how counting 
represents cardinalities. [3-4] 
 
In the Davidson et al. (2012) text, the citations, the way particular tasks are used, and the 
overall logic of the experiment implies that learning to count is used here specifically to indicate 
children passing the Give-N task. However, in other texts, the same or similar knowledge claims 
are used by researchers to describe a more basic “procedural” knowledge of counting, rather 
than passing the Give-N task (in fact, this usage implies children who do not pass the Give-N 
task). An example of such a clearly different usage is seen with Nikoloska (2009), who uses 
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learning to count to describe children’s procedural knowledge of counting prior to becoming CP-
knowers: 
 
“Considering all presented studies it appears that children first learn how to count and 
only later they grasp the principles that guide the counting. No matter how easy the task 
children younger than about the age of 3;6 are presented with, they fail to demonstrate 
understanding of the cardinal principle, and without understanding this principle they 
have not mastered the concept of counting.” [6] 
 
Citations elsewhere in the Nikoloska article make very clear that “grasping the principles 
that guide counting” or “demonstrating understanding of the cardinal principle”--the two 
achievements that are contrasted with “learning to count, refer to children’s successful 
performance on the Give-N task. Consequently, when taken in conjunction with the previous 
example from Davidson et al., we find the same knowledge claim being used in exactly opposite 
ways. 
 To the extent that these different uses of the knowledge claim are intended to be 
interpreted as described here, this reflects a difference in what the author/editor assumes the 
audience understands. However, this doesn’t mean that the authors are assuming two 
audiences who are distinct from the outset, prior to reading the text. It is at least as plausible 
that the author’s assumed similar audiences, whose initial (non-rigid or potentially flexible) 
assumptions about learning to count have been transformed by the broader network of 
discursive distinctions made within each text. In relation to the network of distinctions within 
each text, the same knowledge claim could come to have opposing meanings for essentially 
similar audiences. What is most striking is that, although the differences in meaning of learning 
to count result from differences in how this phrase is used in each text, the possibility of 
reaching the differing meanings is dependent on the same background assumptions: In both 
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texts, the opposing meanings are reached as a result of the audience’s assumptions about the 
Give-N task as a measure of counting knowledge. 
 
Implications of the Analysis So Far 
The analysis so far has shown the task of assessing differences in addressivity to be a 
particularly difficult one. Although understanding counting has been used in different ways 
across different texts, there has so far been no indication that these differences reflect different 
assumed audiences. Even if particular ways of using the claim differ systematically with different 
journals, these differences have so far been more parsimoniously explained in terms of the 
differences in topical orientation, and in terms of how the semantic flexibility of the claims allows 
them to be constructed differently from one text to the other.  
While the analysis so far suggests that the background understandings of the assumed 
audience, vis a vis knowledge claims, are similar across the analyzed articles, one objection to 
this conclusion is that the knowledge claim in question (understanding counting) was fairly 
broad or generalized. This could have accounted for why, although it was sometimes taken to 
mean different things, these different meanings were not expected outright (by the author), but 
constructed (possibly implicitly) through the pattern of distinctions making up the text. It is 
possible that differences would become apparent if a more concrete claim were analyzed, one 
that is less semantically broad. To consider this possibility, the next section describes an 
analysis of a much more concrete knowledge claim--the claim that a child has counted. 
 
Counting 
In considering the use of counting, we are interested in whether counting is assumed to 
have some already-understood meaning, or whether it is explicitly described. Do the texts 
merely refer to counting as if it demarcates a clearly understood activity, or do they use this term 
only with qualification? To investigate counting, a similar approach to that used in the previous 
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example was used--i.e., instances of counting were identified, with attention given to whether 
this term was presented as an understood “given”, or whether it was qualified or defined 
explicitly. However, this time, to facilitate understanding of addressivity related differences 
across not just articles, but publications (reflecting the assumption that the publication itself 
might assume a particular audience), the analysis of counting was carried out on two articles 
from Child Development (published 1988, 1989), two articles from Cognition (2008, 2012), and 
two additional articles from more education-oriented journals, The International Journal of 
Educational Research (Muldoon et al., 2003), and Educational Studies in Mathematics (Bruce & 
Threlfall, 2004). 
Although these articles differed in focus, they all involved counting, and that word was 
used repeatedly throughout the text. When comparing across texts, as well as across journals, 
there appeared to be very consistent assumptions about what is assumed-as-understood 
regarding counting, and which types of things must be made explicit. Overall, and in every 
article, counting was introduced and initially used without explicit description of what this activity 
entailed, except in cases where counting was either qualified, or talked about within some 
broader context that necessitated explanation. Explanation of what was meant by counting in 
general was only found in parts of texts dealing with methodological details. It is reasonable to 
conclude that these added descriptions are given in the service of ensuring methodological 
rigor, rather than to address some anticipated confusion about what is meant by counting more 
generally. 
Although, as the previous paragraph implies, the knowledge claim counting (e.g., the 
child counted) was not generally given further specification or explanation, a more thorough 
investigation of the texts revealed that nearly every use of “counting” by itself (i.e., not as a part 
of a wider phrase such as knowing how to count, or counting principles) was intended to refer to 
the general act of reciting the number words, often accompanied by sequential pointing to 
objects. In almost every case, counting was used indiscriminately to refer to performances of 
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correct or incorrect counting, and counting carried out regardless of the counter’s understanding 
of what they were doing. 
The introduction of counting without further specification of what this implies is 
exemplified in the following quote from Muldoon et al. (2003). 
 
A number of recent studies have identified predictors of mathematical 
development among children between 5 and 11 years, and a picture is emerging of the 
components and relationships integral to this development in school (see, e.g., Geary, 
1994; Geary, Bow–Thomas, & Yao, 1992; Shayer, this issue). The same claim cannot 
be made about the relationship between earlier numeracy (also called mathematical 
literacy or number sense in the USA), around the age of 4, and children’s first 
experiences of more formal teaching. In this paper we focus on one of the most 
important skills children develop before they begin school, and one they typically take 
with them to the classroom; the ability to count. 
Children’s understanding of counting is important because of the crucial role it 
plays in the construction of mathematical knowledge (Frydman, 1995). Indeed, the 
knowledge they have about the number system before starting school is a strong 
predictor of attainment at the age of 7 (Tizard, Blatchford, Burke, Farquhar, & Plewis, 
1988). Early procedural mastery of counting suggests that children have a firm 
foundation for later developments in arithmetical understanding. However, it is one thing 
to be able to count, but it is another thing to know how counting and quantity are 
related.     Young children often have difficulty in extending their counting skills to 
questions other than ‘How many?’ (Frye, Braisby, Lowe, Maroudas, & Nicholls, 1989). 
Hughes (1986) has argued that some early numerical achievements are founded on 
procedures and not genuine insight. This is a potential problem for teachers who expect 
otherwise-proficient counters to recognise what counting achieves and to use it 
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appropriately to solve simple number problems. This begs the question of how children 
gain this conceptual insight. (Muldoon, et al, 2003, p. 696) 
 
In the above quote, counting is introduced (“the ability to count”), and then the discussion moves 
on to the understanding of counting, its importance, and finally the distinction between 
procedural mastery of counting. The notion of procedural mastery is then used to structure the 
distinction between being able to count and knowing how counting and quantity are related. 
Throughout the rest of the article, there is clarification of what it means to know how counting 
and cardinality are related (some of which is seen in the sentence following the introduction of 
this distinction, above). However, the idea that counting, by itself, refers to some kind of 
procedural knowledge or recitation activity is only given implicitly.   
 
Implications and an Alternative Approach 
The analysis of what is assumed versus explicit found clear commonalities in uses of 
understanding counting and counting across different texts. The identification of addressivity-
related differences in the implications of a given knowledge claim across texts from different 
journals turned out to be difficult to achieve. Differences in the uses of these claims tended to be 
(1) explicitly marked (e.g., by ‘understanding counting’, we mean that a child has passed the 
Give-N task) or (2) implicitly constructed in relation to other distinctions in the text (see the 
example of learning how to count, above). While there are certainly differences in what 
author’s/editors of the analyzed texts assumed their audiences understood, these were not 
apparent in this analysis, which suggests stability/homogeneity in the analyzed discourse. 
The lack of systematic cross-text (and across types of texts) differences in addressivity 
or in what is normative is partly a reflection of the dynamic nature of addressivity. While it is 
possible to make approximate generalizations about the boundary between what is explicit and 
what is unstated, this boundary is fundamentally dynamic and emergent; constantly defined by 
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the boundary between what is explicitly said, and what is not, but could have been said. Over 
the course of the expression of an utterance, what is left unstated is a function of who the 
audience is assumed to be, not just in general, but also at that moment in the course of the text 
(i.e., they are assumed to be the audience who is familiar with the preceding parts of the text). 
In other words, the audience is assumed to be continually changing over the course of the text. 
With every additional statement, they are transformed. Every statement makes something new 
explicit, which can then become a part of the just-stated background against which the next 
statement rests.  
 
Aspects of Addressivity-related Assumptions 
Although systematic differences in addressivity were not found in this analysis, it is possible to 
say several things about the general role of addressivity in the discursive functioning of 
knowledge claims. Addressivity-related assumptions that relate to the use of knowledge claims 
can be grouped into two categories: 
1. assumptions about an audience’s interpretive abilities (i.e., the way and the extent to 
which something will have to be described in order to be understood as intended) 
2. assumptions about the audience’s willingness to accept an asserted knowledge claim as 
true  
The first type of assumption is clearly evident in Type 2b explanations, among other places. 
These explanations functioned to establish a connection between a knowledge claim and a 
justification that, it is assumed, would not have otherwise been self-evident for the audience. For 
example, it might be assumed that without the 2b explanation, it would not be apparent to the 
audience that a given knowledge claim is a generalization that encompasses certain more 
concrete claims, and is itself more concrete with respect to more generalized knowledge claims.  
The first kind of addressivity-related assumptions were by no means only found in Type 
2b explanations. Assumptions about how thorough of a description will be sufficient for audience 
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comprehension also affect the extent to which knowledge claims/justifications/explanations were 
described more or less fully in the text. While the extent to which knowledge claims are 
described more or less thoroughly does indicate assumptions about the assumed audience, 
these are not assumptions about the particular person in general who will be reading the text 
(outside of any particular activity setting), but rather, expectations about that person in relation 
to a certain genre of text. In scientific research articles, the extent of description is a reflection of 
the cultural value of “rigorous” reporting of scientific results, which leads the writers of research 
articles to make certain details explicit on the assumption that they may be relevant objects of 
unforseen forms of scrutiny (or on the assumption that more detailed reporting will shield them 
from scrutiny of being “unscientific”).  
The second kind of addressivity-related assumption involves the asserted knowledge 
claims that the assumed audience is seen as willing/unwilling to accept without further 
justification, and in the latter case, the type and extent of additional justification they are 
assumed to require. These assumptions may lead an author to assert a knowledge claim 
without providing further justification (including citations).  
Like the first kind of assumption, addressivity-related assumptions of this second type 
involve the assumed audience in relation to the particular text (as it embodies a particular genre, 
makes particular arguments etc.). So, assumptions about the assertions they are likely to accept 
uncritically are based on assumptions about them in the context of their act of reading the 
particular text at hand. The same person may be assumed to be willing to accept a particular 
assertion in one text but not another, depending on the broader text and context. Examples of 
this were found in several texts, such as the following case from Briars and Siegler (1984). 
Briars and Siegler report, near the beginning of their article, that “young children clearly 
possess considerable knowledge of counting” [1R; 42]. Although further claims are given later 
on that may implicitly justify this claim, the claim itself is not immediately justified, despite being 
a claim that might, by the standards of other texts on this general topic, be given a 
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justification.  Instead, it is asserted as if under the assumption that the anticipated audience 
would not find it problematic. This must be considered in light of the overall claims made in the 
text. Briars’ and Siegler’s overall argument is that children’s knowledge of counting is less 
extensive than had been claimed by those they cite most frequently, and whose work the study 
they describe responds to: Gelman and Meck (1983). Given this orientation in the overall text, 
the claim that children have considerable knowledge of counting may have been asserted 
without justification on the basis that it opposes the general orientation of the other claims in the 
text, and aligns with those made by critical members of the audience, and is not a statement 
that is being asserted as a scientific conclusion.  
Locating Addressivity in the Model of Knowledge Claims 
Assumptions About What is Assumed-to-be Understood. The place of addressivity 
in the model of knowledge claim functioning can be further explained in terms of features of the 
analyzed texts themselves, in which addressivity-related assumptions—can be located as 
structural-relational characteristics in language use.  
The model characterizes what is assumed to be understood in a counterintuitive way. 
Intuitively, we may say that we express utterances that we assume will be understood by our 
audience. The model conceptualizes this issue differently. In the model, what is assumed 
as understood is precisely what is not stated, and it is not stated because it is assumed that it is 
already understood. Conversely, what is not assumed to be understood is precisely what is 
stated. This is meant in the most literal sense, i.e., the only thing that is not assumed to be 
understood is the spoken sequence of words comprising a stated claim. The meaning of this 
statement (unless it is further clarified) is assumed to be understood. 
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APPENDIX 3: EXAMPLE OF A TYPE 1 EXPLANATION PREMISED ON THE PRESENCE OF 
CONCURRENT VALIDITY 
 
Sarnecka and Carey’s (2008) claim that children who pass the Give-N task (i.e., cp-knowers) 
understand how counting works involves a Type 1 explanation premised on concurrent validity 
between passing the Give-N task, and performance on various other counting tasks. Their 
argument is quoted below: 
Within-child consistency on a wide variety of tasks suggests that cardinal-principle-
knowers differ qualitatively from subset-knowers. Most conspicuously, subset-knowers 
do not use counting to solve the Give-N task (even if they are explicitly told to count), 
whereas cardinal-principle-knowers do use counting – an observation that led Wynn, 
1990 and Wynn, 1992 to call subset-knowers “grabbers,” and cardinal-principle-knowers 
“counters”. But the differences do not end there. For example, a “two”-knower is, by 
definition, unable to give three objects when asked for “three.” But a “two”-knower is also 
 
(a) unable to fix a set when told, for example, “Can you count and make sure you gave 
the puppet three toys?... But the puppet wanted three – Can you fix it so there are 
three?” ( Le Corre et al., 2006); 
 
(b) unsure whether a puppet who has counted out seven items has produced a set of 
“seven” (Le Corre et al., 2006); 
 
(c) unable to point to the card with “three” apples, given a choice between a card with 
three and a card with four (Wynn, 1992); and 
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(d) unable to produce the numeral “three” to label a picture of three items (Le Corre et 
al., 2006). 
 
Cardinal-principle-knowers succeed across the board on these tasks. Such qualitative 
differences in the counting behavior of subset-knowers and cardinal-principle-knowers 
suggest that what ultimately separates the groups is not just the size of the sets they can 
generate. Rather, it is that cardinal-principle-knowers understand how counting works, 
whereas subset-knowers do not. [4-5; 5-32 (from 4; 9 to 5; 32)] 
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APPENDIX 4: INTRODUCTION OF SARNECKA AND CAREY (2008) TEXT WITH 
HIGHLIGHTED KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS AND UNDERLINED JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
The following is a segment of the first several pages of the Sarnecka and Carey (2008) text in 
which knowledge claims, justifications, and explanations (Type 1 only) have been marked. 
Knowledge claims are highlighted in green, justifications are underlined (and in green), and 
explanations are indicated by bold typeface. 
Abstract 
This study compared 2- to 4-year-olds who understand how counting works (cardinal-
principle-knowers) to those who do not (subset-knowers), in order to better characterize 
the knowledge itself. New results are that (1) Many children answer the question “how 
many” with the last word used in counting, despite not understanding how counting 
works; (2) Only children who have mastered the cardinal principle, or are just short of 
doing so, understand that adding objects to a set means moving forward in the numeral 
list whereas subtracting objects mean going backward; and finally (3) Only cardinal-
principle-knowers understand that adding exactly 1 object to a set means moving 
forward exactly 1 word in the list, whereas subset-knowers do not understand the unit of 
change. 
1. Introduction 
It seems uncontroversial to say that some children know how to count and others do not. 
But how can we tell them apart? If knowing how to count just means reciting the 
numeral1 list (i.e., “one, two, three...”) up to “five” or “ten,” perhaps pointing to one object 
with each numeral, then many two-year-olds count very well (Baroody and Price, 1983, 
Briars and Siegler, 1984, Fuson, 1988, Fuson et al., 1982, Gelman and Gallistel, 1978, 
Miller and Stigler, 1987 and Schaeffer et al., 1974). That kind of counting is good for 
marking time (e.g., close your eyes and count to ten...) or for playing with one’s parents, 
but reciting the alphabet or playing patty-cake would do just as well. The thing that 
makes counting different from the alphabet or patty-cake is that counting tells you the 
number of things in a set. 
Of course, counting only tells you this if you do it correctly, following the three ‘how-to-
count’ principles identified by Gelman and Gallistel (1978). These are (1) The one-to-one 
principle, which says that “in enumerating a set, one and only one [numeral] must be 
assigned to each item in the set.” (p. 90); (2) The stable-order principle, which says that 
“[Numerals] used in counting must be used in the same order in any one count as in any 
other count.” (p. 94); and (3) The cardinal principle, which says that “the [numeral] 
applied to the final item in the set represents the number of items in the set.” (p. 80). 
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As Gelman and Gallistel pointed out, so long as the child’s counting obeys these three 
principles, the numeral list (“one,” “two,” “three,”... etc.) represents the cardinalities 1, 2, 
3,... etc. The relation of numerals to cardinalities is governed by the successor function: 
If numeral “N” represents cardinality N, then the next numeral on the list represents the 
cardinality N + 1, which is the successor of N. The counting principles are what make 
counting equivalent to saying “one, (plus one is) two, (plus one is) three,...” 
In their 1978 book, Gelman and Gallistel argued that even 2-year-olds honor [the 
counting] principles when counting, because the principles are intuitively understood. 
This view has come to be called the principles-first (or principles-before-skills) view. 
Other studies, however, have failed to provide support for the principles-first view. For 
example, three-year-old children often violate the one-to-one principle by skipping or 
double-counting items, or by using the same numeral twice in a count (Baroody and 
Price, 1983, Briars and Siegler, 1984, Frye et al., 1989, Fuson, 1988, Miller et al., 1995, 
Schaeffer et al., 1974 and Wagner and Walters, 1982). Children also violate the stable-
order principle, by producing different numeral lists at different times (Baroody and Price, 
1983, Frye et al., 1989, Fuson et al., 1983, Fuson et al., 1982, Miller et al., 
1995 and Wagner and Walters, 1982). These findings have led many observers to 
conclude that the how-to-count principles, rather than being understood from the outset, 
are in fact gradually learned. This is known as the principles-after (or skills-before-
principles) view. 
Of course, as Greeno, Riley, and Gelman (1984) point out, children might have 
trouble pointing to objects and reciting the list even if they do understand how 
counting represents number. Much more troubling for the principles-first view is 
evidence that young children do not understand the cardinal principle. That is, children 
do not seem to recognize that the last numeral used in counting tells the number of 
items in the set. One type of evidence comes from How-Many tasks. The version used 
by Schaeffer et al. (1974) is typical: 
“Each child was asked to count the chips in a line of x poker chips, where x varied 
between 1 and 7. After the child had counted the chips, the line was immediately 
covered with a piece of cardboard and the child was asked how many chips were 
hidden. Evidence that he knew... [the cardinal principle] was that he could respond by 
naming the last [numeral] he had just counted.” (p. 360) 
Some investigators have argued that the How-Many task overestimates children’s 
knowledge, because some children actually do repeat the last numeral used in 
counting without (apparently) understanding that it refers to the cardinal value of 
the set (Frye et al., 1989 and Fuson, 1988). 
Conversely, it has been claimed that the How-Many task underestimates children’s 
knowledge (Gelman, 1993 and Greeno et al., 1984), because many children 
respond incorrectly to the question “how many,” even after they have counted the 
array correctly. Rather than answering with the last numeral of their count, children who 
are asked “how many” usually try to count the set again. If they are prevented from 
recounting, they either make no response or give some numeral other than the last 
numeral of their count ( Frye et al., 1989, Fuson, 1992, Markman, 1979, Rittle-Johnson 
and Siegler, 1998, Schaeffer et al., 1974, Wynn, 1990 and Wynn, 1992). 
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Supporters of the principles-first position argue that such behavior generally 
demonstrates that children do understand the cardinal principle. They point out 
that it is pragmatically strange to ask “how many” immediately after counting 
(Gelman, 1993 and Greeno et al., 1984). To demonstrate this point, Gelman (1993) did a 
How-Many task with college students: “When we asked undergraduates a how-many 
question about 18 blocks, all of them counted but only one bothered to repeat the last 
count word said. Repeats of the question elicited puzzlement, some recounting, and so 
forth... “ (p. 80). 
In short, people disagree about whether the How-Many task underestimates, 
overestimates, or accurately measures children’s knowledge of the cardinal principle. 
This raises other questions – namely, if the How-Many task doesn’t test understanding 
of the cardinal principle, what does it test? And conversely, if cardinal-principle 
knowledge cannot be tested by the How-Many task, then how can this knowledge be 
tested? 
1.1. The Give-N task 
The Give-N task 2 provides a different way of measuring cardinal-principle knowledge. In 
this task, the child is asked to create a set with a particular number of items. For 
example, the experimenter might ask the child to “Give two lemons” to a puppet. Studies 
using this task have found that children are often unable to create sets for numerals that 
are well within their counting range. For example, many children who can count to “five” 
are not able to create sets of five objects. Thus, if cardinal-principle knowledge is tested 
using the Give-N task (rather than the How-Many task) children appear to acquire the 
cardinal principle relatively late, and only after mastering the other two counting 
principles. 
Give-N studies have also yielded a new picture of how numerals are learned. It turns out 
that a child’s performance on the Give-N task goes through a series of predictable 
levels, first reported in a longitudinal study by Wynn (1992) and supported by many 
cross-sectional studies since (Condry and Spelke, 2008, Le Corre and Carey, 2007, Le 
Corre et al., 2006, Sarnecka and Gelman, 2004, Sarnecka et al., 2007, Schaeffer et al., 
1974 and Wynn, 1990). These performance levels are found not only in child speakers 
of English, but also for Japanese ( Sarnecka et al., 2007) Mandarin Chinese ( Le Corre 
et al., 2003 and Li et al., 2003) and Russian speakers (Sarnecka et al., 2007). 
The developmental pattern is as follows. At the earliest level, the child makes no 
distinctions among the meanings of different numerals. On the Give-N task, she may 
always give one object to the puppet or she may always give a handful, but the number 
she gives is unrelated to the numeral requested. A child at this level can be called a 
”pre-numeral-knower,” for she has not yet assigned an exact meaning to any of the 
numerals in her memorized numeral list. 
At the next level (which most English-speaking children reach by age 2-1/2 to 3 years) 
the child knows only that “one” means one. On the Give-N task, she gives one object 
when asked for “one,” and she gives two or more objects when asked for any other 
numeral. This is the “one”-knower level. 
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Some months later, the child becomes a “two”-knower, for she learns that “two” means 
two. At that point, she gives one object when asked for “one,” and two objects when 
asked for “two,” but she does not distinguish among the numerals “three,” “four,” “five,” 
etc. For any of those numerals, she simply grabs some objects and hands them over. 
This level is followed by a “three”-knower level, and some studies also report a “four”-
knower level. Collectively, children at these levels have been termed “subset-knowers” 
(Le Corre and Carey, 2007 and Le Corre et al., 2006) because although they have often 
memorized the numeral list up to “ten” or higher, they know the exact meanings for only 
a subset of those numerals. 
After the child has spent some time (often more than a year) as a subset-knower, her 
performance undergoes a dramatic change. Suddenly, she is able to generate the right 
cardinality for numerals “five” and above. But whereas she progressed through the 
subset-knower levels gradually (learning “one,” then “two,” then “three,”...) she seems to 
acquire the meanings of the higher numerals (“five” through however high she can 
count) all at once. We call children at this level cardinal-principle-knowers (sometimes 
abbreviated CP-knowers). 
Within-child consistency on a wide variety of tasks suggests that cardinal-principle-
knowers differ qualitatively from subset-knowers. Most conspicuously, subset-knowers 
do not use counting to solve the Give-N task (even if they are explicitly told to count), 
whereas cardinal-principle-knowers do use counting – an observation that led Wynn, 
1990 and Wynn, 1992 to call subset-knowers “grabbers,” and cardinal-principle-knowers 
“counters”. But the differences do not end there. For example, a “two”-knower is, by 
definition, unable to give three objects when asked for “three.” But a “two”-knower is also 
(a) 
unable to fix a set when told, for example, “Can you count and make sure you gave the 
puppet three toys?... But the puppet wanted three – Can you fix it so there are three?” 
(Le Corre et al., 2006); 
(b) 
unsure whether a puppet who has counted out seven items has produced a set of 
“seven” (Le Corre et al., 2006); 
(c)5; 9-29 
unable to point to the card with “three” apples, given a choice between a card with three 
and a card with four (Wynn, 1992); and 
(d) 
unable to produce the numeral “three” to label a picture of three items (Le Corre et al., 
2006). 
Cardinal-principle-knowers succeed across the board on these tasks. Such 
qualitative differences in the counting behavior of subset-knowers and cardinal-
principle-knowers suggest that what ultimately separates the groups is not just 
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the size of the sets they can generate. Rather, it is that cardinal-principle-knowers 
understand how counting works, whereas subset-knowers do not. 
Because these two groups are separated by their knowledge of the cardinal 
principle, they offer us a way of finding out whether the How-Many task 
underestimates, overestimates, or accurately taps cardinal-principle knowledge. 
More importantly, they give us a way to explore the nature of cardinal principle 
knowledge itself. 
1.2. Unpacking the cardinal principle 
The cardinal principle is often informally described as stating that the last numeral used 
in counting tells how many things are in the whole set. If we interpret this literally, then 
the cardinal principle is a procedural rule about counting and answering the question 
‘how many.’ If so, then cardinal-principle-knowers should answer the ‘how many’ 
question correctly (i.e., they should repeat the last word of a count) whereas subset-
knowers should not. In other words, the How-Many task should accurately tap cardinal-
principle knowledge. The first question of the present study then, is: Is the cardinal 
principle a procedural rule about counting and saying ‘how many’? 
Alternatively, the cardinal principle can be viewed as something more profound – a 
principle stating that a numeral’s cardinal meaning is determined by its ordinal position in 
the list. This means, for example, that the fifth numeral in any count list – spoken or 
written, in any language – must mean five. And the third numeral must mean three, and 
the ninety-eighth numeral must mean 98, and so on. 
If so, then knowing the cardinal principle means having some implicit knowledge of the 
successor function – some understanding that the cardinality for each numeral is 
generated by adding one to the cardinality for the previous numeral. The second 
question of the present study then, is: Is the cardinal principle a conceptual rule that is 
related to knowledge of the successor function? 
If children know how the numeral list instantiates the successor function, they should 
understand two things: (1) The direction of numerical change: In the numeral list, the 
word that denotes cardinality N + 1 will come after the word denoting cardinality N. (2) 
The unit of numerical change: The word for cardinality N + 1 must be the very next word 
in the numeral list, after the word for cardinality N. 
1.3. The present study 
In order to answer the first question (i.e., Is the cardinal principle a procedural rule about 
counting and saying ‘how many’?) We devised a How-Many task that avoids the 
pragmatic oddness of asking how many items are in a set the child just counted. 
In our task, the experimenter counted a set the child could not see, and then asked the 
child how many items there were. This task allowed us to assess when children learn a 
procedural ‘how-many’ rule (i.e., a rule saying that the answer to the question ‘how 
many’ is the last word of a count) and whether mastery of this rule corresponds to 
understanding of the cardinal principle (as measured by the Give-N task). 
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To answer the second question (i.e., Is the cardinal principle a conceptual rule that is 
related to knowledge of the successor function?), we devised two tasks (the Direction 
task and the Unit task) to tap children’s understanding of how the direction and unit of 
numerical change are represented by moving forward or backward along the numeral 
list. If knowledge of the cardinal principle is closely related to knowledge of the 
successor function, then cardinal-principle-knowers should succeed at these two 
tasks and subset-knowers should fail. These tasks are especially suitable because 
they involve addition and subtraction from sets, which according to Gelman and 
colleagues is the best way to reveal children’s conceptual competence with respect to 
number representation ( Cordes and Gelman, 2005 and Zur and Gelman, 2004). 
The strategy of the present study thus involved testing each child on six different tasks. 
First, the Give-N task was used to sort children into knower-level groups. Next, two tests 
of counting fluency (the Sequence and Correspondence tasks) were included to provide 
a baseline measure of the child’s mastery of the numeral sequence and standard 
counting procedure. Then, our How-Many task was used to probe the child’s 
understanding that the last word in a count sequence is the correct answer to a 
subsequent ‘how many’ question. Finally, two new tasks (the Direction and Unit tasks) 
tested whether children knew that (a) adding an element to a set requires going forward 
in the numeral list to represent the cardinality of the resulting set, whereas subtracting 
requires going backward (the Direction task) and (b) if one item is added, the resulting 
cardinality is named by next numeral in the list, whereas if two items are added, the 
resulting cardinality is named by the numeral after that (the Unit task). 
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APPENDIX 5: SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PROCEDURAL AND CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
CLAIMS 
 
Given the sometimes unclear difference between knowledge claims and justifications, it 
is perhaps not surprising to find that the boundary between different types of knowledge claims 
was also blurry. Specifically, the distinction between procedural and conceptual knowledge—a 
distinction which was prominent in several of the analyzed texts, and raised in all of them—did 
not correspond, on a discursive level, with knowledge claims that appeared to function in 
categorically different ways. In one example of this, Nikoloska (2009) makes an explicit 
distinction between so-called procedural knowledge and conceptual knowledge. The claim is 
that younger children have procedural knowledge of counting (or in some cases, it is merely 
claimed that they “can count (correctly)”, but lack conceptual knowledge. While treated as two 
qualitatively different forms of knowledge, both procedural and conceptual knowledge are 
shown to function--within the language game of knowledge claims--in roughly the same way as 
knowledge claims. This is illustrated with the following quotes from the Nikoloska (2009) text. 
The first quote mentions the distinction between procedural and conceptual knowledge. 
 
Although most researchers (Wynn, 1990; Le Corre, Van de Walle, Brannon & Carey, 
2006) seem to agree that in the verbal counting domain the procedural knowledge (skill) 
develops before the conceptual knowledge (the underlying principles that govern the 
counting), the issue is debated (Siegler & Rittle-Johnson, 1998). [2; 18-20] 
 
This distinction is reflected in the empirical study reported in the text, which involves a measure 
of conceptual knowledge (the Give-N task) and procedural knowledge (a basic measure of 
counting ability). The latter is described in the quote below:  
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Upon arrival the child was given 10 yellow blocks arranged in a straight line 
approximately 1 cm apart and was asked to count them. The purpose of this task was to 
see whether the child could count to 10 and whether they used the standard counting 
sequence or not. If they did not manage to count to 10 they were given the counting task 
again at the end of the session to see whether they knew the counting sequence to 10 
but failed to demonstrate that knowledge. [7; 40-44] 
The above quote describes an attempt to measure what researchers refer to as procedural 
knowledge. Despite the centrality of the conceptual vs. procedural knowledge distinction in the 
literature, the quote shows that the way that knowledge claims for procedural knowledge are 
justified (implied in the above quote) is essentially similar to the way claims about conceptual 
knowledge are justified. Namely, a behavioral performance is used to justify the assertion of a 
more general knowledge claim (the latter is described in the quote in several ways, first as count 
to ten and use the standard counting procedure, later as count to 10, and finally as that 
knowledge.  
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APPENDIX 6: CODING MANUAL 
 
The general approach taken in this research involved approaching each selected text 
with a familiarity with the general discursive context in which the text is produced—which was 
possible given the author’s familiarity with the body of research involved. This refers to a 
sufficient level of intersubjectivity (or shared understanding) with the discursive context into 
which each text was collaboratively produced to make the logic of the text apparent, at least in 
most places (an exception might be descriptions of highly technical statistical procedures). Such 
intersubjectivity is lacking when one reads a text in an unintelligible foreign language, or reads a 
highly technical paper outside of one’s field of expertise. This intersubjectivity was necessary to 
the analytic process carried out in the current research. Without it, it would have been 
impossible to identify exemplars of the initial analytic categories (knowledge claims, 
justifications, explanations) and by extension, to refine these categories and develop the 
general model of knowledge claim functioning. Exemplars of each of the categories were 
identified according to the criteria listed below (Note: the following criteria are the final criteria 
arrived at at the outcome of the current research. They do not, for example, describe the criteria 
used in the initial analysis. Presenting anything besides the final criteria would be impossible, 
since only the final criteria are systematic.   
 
Knowledge claims include: 
● Claims that a someone knows that x 
● Claims that someone knows how to x 
● Claims that someone did/will do/can do X 
○ These claims must be things that a person does intentionally and non-
accidentally (i.e., not descriptions of things that a person happened to do by 
chance, or did once, but could not do again, or actions that are implied to be 
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possibly unintentional as a result of the use of criteria for repetition (e.g., children 
passed the task if they got at least 9/10 answers correct. 
● Any of the above types of statements that use alternatives to the verb know such as 
understand, grasp, realize, comprehend, infer, has a concept of etc. 
● Groupings of knowledge claims (see section on grouping below)  
● Statements that don’t look like other knowledge claims as a result of phrasing and 
possibly involving objectification/reification or other forms of figurative language, but 
which otherwise function as such (i.e., are justified, contested, negotiated). Examples: 
○ The child’s concept of number is abstract 
■ This statement may be used as a knowledge claim that means children 
are able to act in accordance with specific numerical principles across a 
wide variety of situations. A version of the original statement with a 
grouping would also be considered a knowledge claim (e.g., the 
abstraction of a child’s concept of number). 
○ Children’s invariance schemes contain rules for reversing operations  
■ This is two knowledge claims. The first is essentially the claim that 
children know that addition and subtraction (but not displacement) change 
the numerosity of a set. The second is the claim that they also know 
which operation is needed to reverse the effects of addition/subtraction to 
return a set to its original numerosity. 
● Knowledge claims embedded in researcher’s questions to children 
○ e.g., “Where do you think the winner is?” would count, but “Is that the winner” 
would not. However, a report that the child says “That’s the winner” would count. 
Knowledge claims are not: 
○ Sections of statements that modify the application of a given knowledge claim 
(e.g., higher level knowledge claims). For example, consider the claim: Children 
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know that number words are precise before they become CP knowers. In this 
example, knowing number words are precise and cp-know[ing] would be 
knowledge claims. The claim that one form of knowledge occurs “before” the 
other would not be included, since this is not a knowledge claim per se, but 
rather the result of a statement constructed by integrating across multiple 
knowledge claims.  
○ References to what the experimenter or researcher knows/does, unless given to 
address some issue relevant to the study of the child’s knowledge are not 
counted (despite being knowledge claims). 
○ Descriptions of what the children do related to describing the sample (e.g., “all 
children attended the preschool”) 
○ Descriptions of passive things the child “does”, such as “seeing the display” 
○ Descriptions of passive states such as “readiness” 
■ e.g., “The child was ready” 
 
Groupings of knowledge claims 
Groupings refer to the conglomeration of related varieties of either knowledge claims (or 
justifications). Groupings of knowledge claims involve the grouped positive and negative 
assertions of the claim (note that the expanded category of knowledge claims includes both 
statements literally about what someone knows, as well as statements about what they did, e.g., 
on a task). Examples of groupings: 
● Knowledge of the cardinal principle (implying knowing/not knowing the cardinal 
principle).  
● Performance on the Give-N task (implying passing/failing the Give-N task)  
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● The Give-N task measures the cardinal principle (this statement would be interpreted as 
a grouped justification (the Give-N task) and a grouped knowledge claim (the cardinal 
principle). 
 
Justifications are: 
● Any reason given in support (or entertained as possible support) for the assertion/denial 
of a knowledge claim 
● Groupings of justifications  
● A citation may be a part of a justification, although it is taken as a reference to a more 
detailed statement(s) functioning as a justification in another text (the exception to this is 
in the Addressivity analysis  (Appendix 2), where the issue of whether or not something 
is made explicit, or merely cited is relevant). Citations are only included as justifications 
when they are explicitly framed as such. Citations that are given to indicate who made a 
particular claim do not count. 
 
Justifications are not: 
● Explanations, i.e., statements that mediate the relationship between a knowledge claims 
and justifications do not count as justifications. 
● Descriptions of individual behavioral events that, for various reasons, are treated as 
though they may not be capacities are not counted as knowledge claims. For example, if 
a knowledge claim is asserted contingent on a child’s passing a certain task, and 
passing the task is defined as some number of consecutive correct answers, then 
descriptions of individual answers are not considered to be part of the justification, 
unless they are clearly used to determine the assertion/contestation of a given 
knowledge claim.  
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● The description of certain types of inability do not function as justifications. For example 
consider the example of the claim that children whose knowledge of counting is limited 
to recitation of the counting procedure would have no obvious basis for using counting to 
compare two sets. This case would contain a knowledge claim (first half), but the 
description of what someone with this knowledge could not do (second half) would not 
constitute a justification.  
 
What Counts as an Explanation? 
Any statement that explains why a particular justification is or would be grounds for the 
assertion/denial of a knowledge claim, or any statement that explains why a particular 
knowledge claim is grounds for the expectation of a particular justification. 
 There were four unique types of explanations: 
 
Type 1a Explanations: Any statement that addresses the pairing (or lack thereof) between a 
knowledge claim and justification in relation to the presence of unexpected concurrent validity or 
the absence of expected concurrent validity. There are a variety of types of 1a explanations: 
● Lack of concurrent validity explained in terms of performance factors: Children who pass 
the Give-N task don’t necessarily demonstrate knowledge of cardinality on other tasks 
because of excessive performance demands. (In this example, the other tasks which 
lack concurrent validity with the Give-N task are explained to involve excessive 
performance demands.  
● Lack of concurrent validity explained as a result of successful performances being due to 
simple procedural knowledge, rather than conceptual knowledge: Children who pass the 
How-Many task still fail other measures of cardinality knowledge, such as the Give-N 
task, which suggests that they pass the How-Many task by using a simple procedural 
rule, rather than a true understanding of cardinality.  
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● In many Type 1a explanations, the lack of concurrent validity may be implicit, i.e., 
logically entailed, rather than explicitly mentioned.  
● For instance, in descriptions of methodological details that are given with the explicit 
purpose of ruling out other (implied) knowledge claim-justification pairings would be 
considered Type 1a explanations. These explanations need not mention non-concurrent 
performance on other tasks; this is implied by the mention of things like performance 
factors. Example: 
○ Children’s failure on the task was not due to memory error, since they passed a 
memory check afterwards.  (although a lack of concurrent validity is not 
mentioned, it is implied by the mention of the memory check. The memory check 
reflects an anticipated objection to the validity of the mentioned task involving an 
otherwise similar task that lacks the memory demands, and on which 
performance might be expected to be better. 
● Presence of concurrent validity between successful/unsuccesful performance on 
measures of two different knowledge claims used to argue that one measure is a 
measure of both knowledge claims.  
○ Example: Children who pass the Give-N task also pass many other counting 
tasks that children who fail the Give-N task fail. Therefore, children who pass the 
Give-N task don’t just understand the cardinal principle, they understand how 
counting works more generally.  
 
Type 1b Explanations: Any statement(s) that claim that a particular knowledge claim can be 
the only implication of a particular justification, because no other conclusion is possible. For 
example 
● There is no other explanation for why children would change their answer except that 
they understood that the addition of an item changed the numerosity of the set. 
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Type 2a Explanations: Any statement(s) that negotiate the pairing or lack thereof between a 
knowledge claim and justification by identifying the text with a specific discursive community 
within which the claim would be normative. For example:  
● What does it mean to know numbers? Well, parents talking [in informal conversational 
settings] could claim their children understand numbers if they can recite the counting 
list. 
● Although these were not included in the analysis, any indicators within the text, or in the 
context in which it is accessed by a reader, which align it with a specific discourse could 
be considered to be, or at least function as Type 2a explanations. 
 
Type 2b Explanations: Explanations that involve explicit description of why a particular 
justification and knowledge claim are or are not paired with each other. Type 2b explanations 
encompass most cases of Types 1a and 1b explanations. The only exceptions are Type 1a 
explanations premised on the finding of unexpected concurrent validity between justifications of 
different knowledge claims, which is used to argue that one of the justifications is a measure of 
both knowledge claims. However, Type 2b explanations don’t necessarily have the specific 
qualities of either Types 1a or 1b (i.e., they don’t necessarily reflect an explicit or implied lack of 
concurrent validity, and they don’t necessarily claim that there can be no other conclusion, as 
Type 1b explanations do). For example: 
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APPENDIX 7: OBJECTIFICATION 
 
Cases of Conclusions Reached about Objectified Forms of Knowledge 
Researchers used the discursive technique of objectification to treat the knowledge described in 
knowledge claims as if it were an object, rather than merely a description of a capacity. As 
defined by Sfard (2008), objectification involves the reification of a discourse-dependent object 
(treating it as if it were a real entity in the world), and the alienation of that object from the 
discursive contexts in which it is constructed. In the case of knowledge claims (specifically 
conceptual knowledge of number and counting), objectification can be seen in the treatment of 
the knowledge described in knowledge claims as if it were an actual entity whose existence and 
specifications can be studied empirically (albeit indirectly). While conclusions made about 
objectified forms of knowledge are still fundamentally descriptions of capacities, the discursive 
possibilities provided by objectification allow for them to be reached and characterized in 
somewhat novel ways. So, rather than conclusions being of the form s/he knows X, they can 
take a variety of different forms, as illustrated by the following examples.  
 
Conclusions Drawn About Objectified Forms of Knowledge 
Example 1 
Objectification is evident in investigations report findings about not just what children 
know, but also about the nature of the knowledge itself. Gelman’s (1972) research provides one 
example of this: 
 
Because the operations of displacement and rearrangement produce changes in the 
irrelevant properties of a set (e.g., length, area, configuration), a demonstration of the 
use of invariance rules provides evidence with which to assess the conception of 
number. If the judgment of number for sets of X (when X is a cardinal number) is not 
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altered by these changes, we may conclude that the person's concept of number does 
not depend on any of these properties and that the sets of X that include variations in 
these properties are treated as belonging to the same cardinal number class. [3; 6-13] 
 
In the above quote, the child’s knowledge of number is objectified as a concept they possess, 
and consequently, pertinent justifications (i.e., “the child’s judgment of number…[being] 
unaltered by these changes”) are not directly used as the basis of claims about what the child 
knows, but are instead treated as if they provided information about a little-known but real 
object: the child’s concept of number. In unobjectified form, this conclusion might be phrased as 
the person knows that number is not altered by changes in length, area or configuration.  The 
technique of articulating findings as if they represented additional information learned about 
knowledge-as-object) is also seen in the Sarnecka and Wright (2013) text, whose conclusion 
clearly objectifies “the concept of five/six”. This is evident in the following short quote from the 
abstract of that article: 
 
The present study investigates the link between cardinality and equinumerosity for these 
numbers, finding that children either understand both cardinality and equinumerosity, or 
they understand neither. This suggests that cardinality and equinumerosity (along with 
succession), are interrelated facets of the concepts five and six, the acquisition of which 
is an important conceptual achievement of early childhood. [1; 22-25] 
 
Over the course of the Sarnecka and Carey (2008) article as a whole, the conclusion about 
“interrelated facets of the concept” is constructed in the following way. First, researchers draw 
on standard routines and practices of knowledge claim discourse, justifying two claims 
(specifically the claims that children understand cardinality and [that they understand] 
numerosity for the numbers five and six) in terms of observed task behaviors. Then, since the 
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claims were found to be concurrent (children either knew both, or neither), they are claimed to 
be related aspects of the concept of five/six.  
This assertion is accomplished by adapting a routine from knowledge claim discourse 
(the equating of one claim with another) onto the basic conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999) of an object (objects are things that can have different 
aspects). Without this figurative language, the statement might have been phrased in the 
following way:  
 
Children who understand (i.e., have a concept of) the number five also understand the 
cardinal meaning and principle of numerosity for the number five. 
 
Example 2 
In yet another example, an objectified notion of knowledge is taken even further than has 
previously been illustrated. Proceeding from the assumption that children who pass the Give-N 
task can be claimed to understand the cardinal principle, Sarnecka and Carey (2008) attempt to 
extend these claims by asking about the specific nature of the known cardinal principle. This 
constitutes a notable use of the knowledge claim language game, embodying many features of 
the model, albeit in an idiosyncratic way. As such, it is worth quoting at length.  
The cardinal principle is often informally described as stating that the last 
numeral used in counting tells how many things are in the whole set. If we interpret this 
literally, then the cardinal principle is a procedural rule about counting and answering the 
question ‘how many.’ If so, then cardinal-principle-knowers should answer the ‘how 
many’ question correctly (i.e., they should repeat the last word of a count) whereas 
subset-knowers should not. In other words, the How-Many task should accurately tap 
cardinal-principle knowledge. The first question of the present study then, is: Is the 
cardinal principle a procedural rule about counting and saying ‘how many’? 
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Alternatively, the cardinal principle can be viewed as something more profound – 
a principle stating that a numeral’s cardinal meaning is determined by its ordinal position 
in the list. This means, for example, that the fifth numeral in any count list – spoken or 
written, in any language – must mean five. And the third numeral must mean three, and 
the ninety-eighth numeral must mean 98, and so on. 
If so, then knowing the cardinal principle means having some implicit knowledge 
of the successor function – some understanding that the cardinality for each numeral is 
generated by adding one to the cardinality for the previous numeral. The second 
question of the present study then, is: Is the cardinal principle a conceptual rule that is 
related to knowledge of the successor function?  [6; 4-16] 
The above question seems highly unlike other discourse about children’s knowledge, which 
pertains to what children (do/don’t/may) know. In contrast, the above question starts with a form 
of knowledge—the cardinal principle—and asks what kind of knowledge it is. Since the model of 
knowledge claim discourse developed here suggests that knowledge is merely a discourse 
construct, how is it possible to answer such a question—i.e., to investigate “the knowledge 
itself?” As the following explanation will show, despite the apparent novelty of this question, it 
and its answer can be fully explained in terms of the model developed here.  
The unique character of Sarnecka and Carey’s question is a result of the way that the 
researchers equate knowledge claims, their justifications, and the children who perform the 
behaviors described in these. This occurs in several steps. First, the authors assess whether 
successful performance on the Give-N task was concurrent with success on tasks that measure 
(a) knowledge of a procedural rule and (b) knowledge of the successor function. Based on these 
results, the authors could have made conclusions such as the following: 
While many children (including many who fail the Give-N task) pass a task measuring 
knowledge of a procedural rule for counting and saying how many, only those children 
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who pass the Give-N task also pass tasks measuring knowledge of the successor 
function., and vice versa. Consequently, these may be related.43  
However, instead of phrasing the conclusion in this way, the authors instead equate children 
who performed successfully on the Give-N task with that performance itself, and further equate 
that performance with the knowledge claim it justifies (knowledge of the cardinal principle). 
Having done this, they are forced to state the conclusion as if it were about the knowledge, 
since the alternative would not be grammatically possible (i.e., one could not say only 
knowledge of the cardinal principle also understands the successor function. 
The results reported by Sarnecka and Carey are not as clear cut as those described in 
the above example conclusion. In short, they found that success on the Give-N task was not 
concurrent with the measure of procedural knowledge (which was achieved by many children 
who were not yet CP-knowers), nor was it concurrent with the results of one (but not the other) 
measure of the successor function. Consequently, they are unable to say, unequivocally, that 
the cardinal principle is either a procedural rule or a conceptual rule. However, their 
methodology and arguments throughout the text suggest that these are precisely the 
conclusions they had intended to make. 
Sarnecka and Carey’s (2008) findings showing a lack of concurrent validity between CP-
knowing and the other measures are treated as surprising under the assumption that the rapidly 
improving performance on the Give-N task that’s indicative of becoming a CP-knower must be 
the reflection of some underlying knowledge that is separate from the performance itself. In 
other words, it is assumed that an increase in performance can only occur on the basis of some 
additional underlying knowledge. This assumption reflects the objectification of knowledge, 
insofar as this line of reasoning treats the knowledge as separate from the performances that it 
generates/causes. 
                                                
43 This was not the actual conclusion of Sarnecka and Carey’s (2008) study, which produced 
mixed results. What is presented in the above example is a simplified outcome which makes the 
methodological and interpretive practices of the authors more clear.  
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Of course, there is necessarily something different about a child who shows the behavior 
of a CP-knower versus a subset knower on the Give-N task. It makes very little sense to say 
that two children are identical as organisms in every sense except that they will perform very 
differently on one particular task. Such differences must have a cause that is separate from the 
observed effect. Yet, it does not follow that this difference is something that can be adequately 
characterized at the general level of a knowledge claim. To assume otherwise is to conflate the 
reasons and causes of behavior.  
  
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
188 
 
18 8 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Allen, J. W. P., & Bickhard, M. H. (2013). Stepping off the pendulum: Why only an action-based 
approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate. Cognitive Development, 28(2), 96–
133. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2013.01.002 
Adolph, K., Joh, A. S., Franchak, J. M., Ishak, S., & Gill, S. V. (2008). Flexibility in the 
Development of Action. In E. Morsella, J. A. Bargh, & P. M. Gollwitzer (Eds.), Oxford 
Handbook of Human Action (pp. 399–426). New York: Oxford University Press, USA. 
Aristotle. (2004). The Nicomachean Ethics. (J. A. K. Johnson, Trans.). Penguin. 
Baerveldt, C., & Verheggen, T. (1999). Enactivism and the Experiential Reality of Culture: 
Rethinking the Epistemological Basis of Cultural Psychology. Culture & Psychology, 5(2), 
183–206. http://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X9952006 
Baerveldt, C., & Verheggen, T. (2012). Enactivism. In J. Valsiner (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Culture and Psychology (1st ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. Retrieved from 
http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195396430.013.0009 
Baerveldt, C., & Voestermans, P. (2005). Culture, Emotion and the Normative Structure of 
Reality. Theory & Psychology, 15(4), 449–473. http://doi.org/10.1177/0959354305054747 
Bakhtin, M. M. (1986). Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. (C. Emerson & M. Holquist, 
Eds., V. W. McGee, Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
Bamberg, M. & Andrews, M. (2004). Considering counternarratives: Narrating, resisting, making 
sense. Amsterdam: John Benjamin. 
Bernstein, Nikolai (1967). The Coordination and Regulation of Movements. Oxford: Pergamon 
Press. 
Bickhard, M. H. (1980). Cognition, Convention and Communication. New York, N.Y: Praeger 
Publishers Inc. 
Bickhard, M. H. (2003). Process and Emergence: Normative Function and Representation. In J. 
Seibt (Ed.), Process Theories (pp. 121–155). Netherlands: Springer Netherlands. Retrieved 
from http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/ProcessEmergence.pdf 
Bickhard, M. H. (2004). The social ontology of persons. In J. I. M. Carpendale & U. Müller 
(Eds.), Social interaction and the development of knowledge (pp. 111–132). Retrieved from 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=aYV5AgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA111&dq=bic
khard+social+ontology&ots=ViG41ymjJs&sig=t6AJVEq_YfVFSDpcQ3WsoXW_g68 
Bickhard, M. H., & Terveen, L. (1995). Foundational Issues in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive 
Science: Impasse and Solution. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier. 
Bondy, J. A. & Murty, U. S. R. (1976). Graph theory with applications. Elsevier Science 
Publishing, Ltd.: New York. 
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. Retrieved from http://www.cambridge.org/st/academic/subjects/anthropology/social-
and-cultural-anthropology/outline-theory-practice?format=PB 
Briars, D., & Siegler, R. S. (1984). A featural analysis of preschoolers’ counting knowledge. 
Developmental Psychology, 20(4), 607. 
Brooks, P. (2004). Grammatical competence is not a psychologically valid construct. Journal of 
Child Language, 31(2), 467-470. 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
189 
 
18 9 
Brooks, N., Audet, J., & Barner, D. (2012). Pragmatic Inference, Not Semantic Competence, 
Guides 3-Year-Olds’ Interpretation of Unknown Number Words. Developmental 
Psychology, No Pagination Specified. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0029384 
Byers, P. (2016). Knowledge claims in cognitive development research: Problems and 
alternatives. New Ideas in Psychology, 43, 16-27. 
Carey, S. (2009). The Origin of Concepts. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Chalmers, D. J. (1995). Facing up to the problem of consciousness. Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 2(3), 200–219. 
Chandler, M., & Chapman, M. (1991). Criteria for Competence: Controversies in the 
Conceptualization and Assessment of Children’s Abilities. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc. 
Chomsky, N., 1959. “Review of Verbal Behavior,” Language, 35: 26–58. 
Chomsky, N. (1988). Language and Problems of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures. MIT 
Press. 
Clark, A. (2010). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, USA. 
Clearfield, M. W. (2013). Recognizing transcendence when you see it: Dynamical systems 
theory as an action-based approach: Commentary on “Stepping off the pendulum: Why 
only an action-based approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate” by J. Allen 
and M. Bickhard. Cognitive Development, 28(2), 134–137. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogdev.2013.01.003 
Condry, K. F., & Spelke, E. S. (2008). The development of language and abstract concepts: The 
case of natural number. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137(1), 22–38. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.137.1.22 
Coulter, J. (1979). The Social Construction of Mind: Studies in Ethnomethodology and Linguistic 
Philosophy. Retrieved from http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=12375188 
Crain, S. & Thornton, R. (1998). Investigations in universal grammar. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Dąbrowska, E. (2015). What exactly is Universal Grammar, and has anyone seen it? Front. 
Psychol. 6:852. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00852 
Daiute, C. & Lightfoot, C. (2004). Narrative analysis: Studying the development of individuals in 
society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Davidson, K., Eng, K., & Barner, D. (2012). Does learning to count involve a semantic induction? 
Cognition, 123(1), 162–173. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.12.013 
Discourse. (n.d.). In Wikipedia. Retrieved January 26, 2016, from 
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discourse. 
Dixon, J. A., & Bangert, A. S. (2004). On the spontaneous discovery of a mathematical relation 
during problem solving. Cognitive Science, 28, 433-449. 
Dixon, J. A., & Kelley, E. (2006). The probabilistic epigenesis of knowledge. In R. Kail (Ed.) 
Advances in child development and behavior, vol. 34 (pp. 323-361). New York: Academic 
Press. 
Dixon, J. A., & Kelley, E. (2007). Theory revision and redescription: Complementary processes 
in knowledge acquisition. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16, 111-115 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
190 
 
19 0 
Dixon, J. A., Holden, J. G., Mirman, D., & Stephen, D. G. (2012). Multifractal dynamics in the 
emergence of cognitive structure. Topics in Cognitive Science, 4(1), 51–62. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01162.x 
Douven, Igor, "Abduction", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/abduction/>.      
Edwards, D. (1993). But What Do Children Really Think?: Discourse Analysis and Conceptual 
Content in Children’s Talk. Cognition and Instruction, 11(3/4), 207–225. 
Edwards, D. (1997). Discourse and Cognition. London: Sage. 
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). Discursive Psychology. SAGE. 
Feigenson, L., Carey, S., & Spelke, E. (2002). Infants’ Discrimination of Number vs. Continuous 
Extent. Cognitive Psychology, 44(1), 33–66. http://doi.org/10.1006/cogp.2001.0760 
Foucault, M. (1972). The archaeology of knowledge. New York: Pantheon. 
Fischer, K. W., Bullock, D., Rotenberg, E. J., & Raya, P. (1993). The dynamics of competence: 
How context contributes directly to skill. In R. H. Wozniak and K. W. Fischer (Eds.), 
Development in Context: Acting and Thinking in Specific Environments, (pp. 93–117) New 
York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Frye, D., Braisby, N., Lowe, J., Maroudas, C., & Nicholls, J. (1989). Young children’s 
understanding of counting and cardinality. Child Development, 60(5), 1158–1171. 
Fuson, K. C. (1988). Children’s counting and concepts of number. Springer-Verlag. 
Fuson, K. C. (1992). Relationships between counting and cardinality from age 2 to age 8. In J. 
Bideaud, C. Meljac, & J.-P. Fischer (Eds.), Pathways to number: Children’s developing 
numerical abilities. (pp. 127–149). Hillsdale, NJ England: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc. 
Garfinkel, H. (1967). Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Gelman, R. (1972). Logical Capacity of Very Young Children: Number Invariance Rules. Child 
Development, 43(1), 75–90. http://doi.org/10.2307/1127873 
Gelman, R., & Gallistel, C. R. (1978). The Child’s Understanding of Number. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Gelman, R., & Meck, E. (1983). Preschoolers’ Counting: Principles Before Skill. Cognition, 
13(3), 343–359. 
Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social psychology as history. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 26(2), 309–320. http://doi.org/10.1037/h0034436 
Godel, K. (1947). What is Cantor’s Continuum Problem? The American Mathematical Monthly, 
54(9), 515. http://doi.org/10.2307/2304666 
Gordon, P. (2004). Numerical Cognition Without Words: Evidence from Amazonia. Science, 
306(5695), 496 –499. http://doi.org/10.1126/science.1094492 
Greeno, J. G., Riley, M. S., & Gelman, R. (1984). Conceptual competence and children’s 
counting. Cognitive Psychology, 16(1), 94–143. 
Gould, S. J. (1981). The Mismeasure of Man. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Gunderson, E. A., & Levine, S. C. (2011). Some types of parent number talk count more than 
others: relations between parents’ input and children’s cardinal-number knowledge. 
Developmental Science, 14(5), 1021–1032. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
7687.2011.01050.x 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
191 
 
19 1 
Hardy, G. H. (2005, 1940). A Mathematician’s Apology. University of Alberta Mathematical 
Sciences Society. Retrieved from 
http://www.math.ualberta.ca/~mss/misc/A%20Mathematician%27s%20Apology.pdf 
Harré, R. (1984a). Personal being: a theory for individual psychology. Harvard University Press. 
Harré, R. (1984b). Some Reflections on the Concept of “Social Representation.” Social 
Research, 51(4), 927–938. 
Harré, R. (1989). Language games and texts of identity. In J. Shotter & K. Gergen (Eds.), Texts 
of Identity (pp. 20–35). London: Sage Publications. Retrieved from 
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1989-97177-002 
Harré, R. (1999). The Rediscovery of the Human Mind: The Discursive Approach. Asian Journal 
of Social Psychology, 2(1). Retrieved from 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=4369845&site=ehost-live 
Harré, R. (2009). The Second Cognitive Revolution. In After Cognitivism (pp. 181–187). 
Springer. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4020-9992-2_11 
Harré, R., Clarke, D. D., & Carlo, N. A. D. (1985a). Motives & Mechanisms: An Introduction to 
the Psychology of Action. Taylor & Francis. 
Harré, R., Clarke, D. D., & Carlo, N. D. (1985b). Motives and mechanisms: an introduction to 
the psychology of action. New York: Methuen. 
Harré, R., & Gillett, G. (1994). The discursive mind. Sage Publications. 
Harré, R. (1982). Theoretical preliminaries to the study of action. In M. von Cranach & R. Harré 
(Eds.), The Analysis of Action: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Advances (pp. 5–34). New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Hetherington, S. (2006). How to know (that knowledge-that is knowledge-how). In S. 
Hetherington (Ed.), Epistemology futures (pp. 71–94). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Kloos, H. & Van Orden, G.C. (2009). Soft-assembled mechanisms for the grand theory. In J.P. 
Spencer, M. Thomas, & J. McClelland (Eds.), Toward a New Grand Theory of 
Development? Connectionism and Dynamics Systems Theory Reconsidered, (pp. 253-
267). Oxford University Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors: We Live by. University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: the embodied mind and its challenge 
to Western thought. Basic Books. 
Lakoff, G., & Núñez, R. E. (2000). Where Mathematics Comes from: How the Embodied Mind 
Brings Mathematics Into Being. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
Le Corre, M., & Carey, S. (2007). One, two, three, four, nothing more: An investigation of the 
conceptual sources of the verbal counting principles. Cognition, 105(2), 395–438. 
Le Corre, M., Van de Walle, G., Brannon, E. M., & Carey, S. (2006). Re-visiting the 
competence/performance debate in the acquisition of the counting principles. Cognitive 
Psychology, 52(2), 130–169. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.07.002 
Lee, M. D., & Sarnecka, B. W. (2010). A Model of Knower-Level Behavior in Number Concept 
Development. Cognitive Science, 34(1), 51–67. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1551-
6709.2009.01063.x 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
192 
 
19 2 
Lee, M. D., & Sarnecka, B. W. (2011). Number-knower levels in young children: Insights from 
Bayesian modeling. Cognition, 120(3), 391–402. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2010.10.003 
Levine, S. C., Suriyakham, L. W., Rowe, M. L., Huttenlocher, J., & Gunderson, E. A. (2010). 
What counts in the development of young children’s number knowledge? Developmental 
Psychology, 46(5), 1309–1319. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0019671 
Luria, A. R. (1976). The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuropsychology. New York, N.Y.: 
Basic Books. 
Lourenco, O., & Machado, A. (1996). In Defense of Piaget’s Theory: A Reply to 10 Common 
Criticisms. Psychological Review, 103(1), 143–64. 
Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow 
progress of soft psychology. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 46(4), 806. 
Mix, K. S. (September). The construction of number concepts. Cognitive Development, 17(3-4), 
1345–1363. http://doi.org/10.1016/S0885-2014(02)00123-5 
Mix, K. S., Levine, S. C., & Huttenlocher, J. (2002). Quantitative development in infancy and 
early childhood. New York, NY: Oxford University Press US. 
Molder, H. te, & Potter, J. (2005). Conversation and Cognition. Cambridge University Press. 
Munn, P. (1998). Symbolic function in pre-schoolers. In The Development of Mathematical Skills 
(pp. 47–71). New York: Taylor and Francis US. 
Muldoon, K., Lewis, C. and Freeman, N. H. (2003). Putting counting to work: Preschoolers’ 
understanding of cardinal extension. International Journal of Educational Research, 39(7), 
695-718. 
National Governors Association Center for Best Practices & Council of Chief State School 
Officers. (2010). Common Core State Standards for Mathematics. Washington, DC: 
Authors. 
Nelson, K. & Nelson, R. (2002). On the nature and evolution of human know-how. Research 
Policy, 31(8-9), 1510. 
O’Brien, D. P. (1998). Introduction: Some background to the mental-logic theory and to the 
book. In M. D. S. Braine & D. P. O’Brien (Eds.), Mental Logic (pp. 1–6). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Piaget, J. (1965). The Child’s Conception of Number. New York: Norton. 
Piaget, J. (1970). Genetic Epistemology. Columbia University Press. 
Piaget, J. (1971). Biology and knowledge: an essay on the relations between organic 
regulations and cognitive processes. University of Chicago Press. 
Potter, J., & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and 
Behaviour. SAGE. 
Potter, J., & Wiggins, S. (2007). Discursive psychology. In Handbook of qualitative research in 
psychology (pp. 73–90). Sage. Retrieved from http://www-
staff.lboro.ac.uk/~ssjap/JP%20Articles/Wiggins%20Potter%20-
%20Discursive%20psychology%20Willig%202008.pdf 
Przyborski, A., & Slunecko, T. (2009). Against Reification! Praxeological Methodology and its 
Benefits. In J. Valsiner, P. C. M. Molenaar, M. C. D. P. Lyra, & N. Chaudhary (Eds.), 
Dynamic Process Methodology in the Social and Developmental Sciences (pp. 141–170). 
Springer US. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-387-95922-1_7 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
193 
 
19 3 
Rittle-Johnson, B., Schneider, M., & Star, J. R. (2015). Not a One-Way Street: Bidirectional 
Relations Between Procedural and Conceptual Knowledge of Mathematics. Educational 
Psychology Review, 27(4), 587–597. http://doi.org/10.1007/s10648-015-9302-x 
Rogoff, B. (1991). Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in Social Context (New 
edition edition). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rogoff, B. (2003). The cultural nature of human development. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press US. 
Rorty, R. (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1st edition). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. University of Chicago Press. 
Salt [Def. 2]. (n.d.). In Merriam-Webster Online, Retrieved September 4, 2015, from 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/salt 
Salvatore, S., & Valsiner, J. (2010). Between the General and the Unique Overcoming the 
Nomothetic versus Idiographic Opposition. Theory & Psychology, 20(6), 817–833. 
http://doi.org/10.1177/0959354310381156 
Sarnecka, B. W., & Carey, S. (2008). How counting represents number: What children must 
learn and when they learn it. Cognition, 108(3), 662–674. 
Sarnecka, B. W., & Gelman, S. A. (2004). Six does not just mean a lot: preschoolers see 
number words as specific. Cognition, 92(3), 329–352. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2003.10.001 
Sarnecka, B. W., & Lee, M. D. (2009). Levels of number knowledge during early childhood. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 103(3), 325–337. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2009.02.007 
Sarnecka, B. W., & Wright, C. E. (2013). The Idea of an Exact Number: Children’s 
Understanding of Cardinality and Equinumerosity. Cognitive Science, 37(8), 1493–1506. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12043 
Saxe, G. B. (1979). Developmental relations between notational counting and number 
conservation. Child Development, 50(1), 180–187. 
Saxe, G. B. (1991). Culture and cognitive development: studies in mathematical understanding. 
Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates. 
Saxe, G. B. & Esmonde, I. (2012). Cultural development of mathematical ideas: Papua New 
Guinea studies. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from 
http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=NE5pCCZlP1EC&oi=fnd&pg=PR13&dq=sax
e+cultural+development+of+mathematical+ideas&ots=hol_poYfl6&sig=Hn6G__471V6qoqb
SqiKzf-m_IYA 
Saxe, G. B., & Gearhart, M. (1988). Children’s mathematics. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
Schaeffer, B., Eggleston, V. H., & Scott, J. L. (1974). Number development in young children. 
Cognitive Psychology, 6(3), 357–379. http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0285(74)90017-6 
Sfard, A. (1998). On Two Metaphors for Learning and the Dangers of Choosing Just One. 
Educational Researcher, 27(2), 4 –13. http://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X027002004 
Sfard, A. (2008). Thinking as Communicating: Human Development, the Growth of Discourses, 
and Mathematizing. Cambridge University Press. 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
194 
 
19 4 
Sfard, A., & Lavie, I. (2005). Why Cannot Children See as the Same What Grown-Ups Cannot 
See as Different?— Early Numerical Thinking Revisited. Cognition and Instruction, 23(2), 
237–309. http://doi.org/10.1207/s1532690xci2302_3 
Slunecko, T., & Hengl, S. (2007). Language, Cognition, Subjectivity: A Dynamic Constitution. In 
The Cambridge Handbook of Sociocultural Psychology. Cambridge University Press. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511611162.005 
Slusser, E. B., & Sarnecka, B. W. (In press). Find the picture of eight turtles: A link between 
children’s counting and their knowledge of number word semantics. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, In Press, Corrected Proof. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2011.03.006 
Sophian, C. (1988). Early Developments in Children’s Understanding of Number: Inferences 
about Numerosity and One-to-One Correspondence. Child Development, 59(5), 1397–
1414. http://doi.org/10.2307/1130502 
Sophian, C. (1992). Learning about numbers: Lessons for mathematics education from 
preschool number development. In J. Bideaud, C. Meljac, & J. -P (Eds.), Pathways to 
number: Children’s developing numerical abilities (pp. 19–40). Hillsdale, NJ, England: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Sophian, C. (1995). Representation and Reasoning in Early Numerical Development: Counting, 
Conservation, and Comparisons between Sets. Child Development, 66(2), 559–577. 
http://doi.org/10.2307/1131597 
Spelke, E. S. (2000). Core knowledge. American Psychologist, 55(11), 1233. 
Spelke, E. S., & Kinzler, K. D. (2007). Core knowledge. Developmental Science, 10(1), 89–96. 
http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2007.00569.x 
Stanley, J., & Williamson, T. (2001). Knowing how. The Journal of Philosophy, 98(8), 411–444. 
doi:10.2307/2678403. 
Stephen, D. G., Dixon, J. A., & Isenhower, R. W. (2009). Dynamics of representational change: 
entropy, action, and cognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and 
Performance, 35(6), 1811–1832. http://doi.org/10.1037/a0014510 
Tabor, W Lexical change as nonlinear interpolation. In: Moore JD, Lehman JF (eds) 
Proceedings of the 17th annual cognitive science conference. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Taylor, C. (1993). To follow a rule. Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, 6, 45–60. 
Thelen, E. (2005). Dynamic systems theory and the complexity of change. Psychoanalytic 
Dialogues, 15(2), 255–283. 
Thelen, E. S., & Smith, L. B. (1996). Dynamic Systems Approach to the Development of 
Cognition and Action. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Tomasello, M. (1992). The social bases of language acquisition. Social Development, 1(1), 67–
87. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1992.tb00135.x 
Tomasello, M. (2003). Constructing a Language: A Usage-Based Theory of Language 
Acquisition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Turvey, M. T., Shaw, R. E., Reed, E. S., & Mace, W. M. (1981). Ecological laws of perceiving 
and acting: in reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981). Cognition, 9(3), 237–304. 
Valsiner, J. (2013). Guided science: history of psychology in the mirror of its making. New 
Brunswick: Transaction. 
The discursive functioning of knowledge claims in research studies 
195 
 
19 5 
Van Geert, P. (1991). A dynamic systems model of cognitive and language growth. 
Psychological Review, 98(1), 3. 
Van Geert, P. (1994). Dynamic systems of development: Change between complexity and 
chaos. Hertfordshire, England: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Retrieved from 
http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/1995-97670-000 
Van Orden, G. C., Holden, J. G., & Turvey, M. T. (2003). Self-organization of cognitive 
performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132(3), 331–350. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.132.3.331 
Van Orden, G. C., Holden, J. G., & Turvey, M. T. (2005). Human Cognition and 1/f Scaling. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134(1), 117–123. 
http://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.134.1.117 
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function 
of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103 –128. 
Vygotsky, L. (1978). Interaction between learning and development. Readings on the 
Development of Children, 23(3), 34–41. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: the development of higher psychological processes. 
Harvard University Press. 
Vygotsky, L. S. (2012). Thought and Language. MIT Press. 
Werner, H. (1957). The concept of development from a comparative and organismic point of 
view. In D. B. Harris (Ed.), The concept of development. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. p. 126. 
Wiese, H. (2004). Numbers, Language, and the Human Mind. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Williams, M. (2002). Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning: Towards a Social Conception of Mind. 
Routledge. 
Williams, M. (2011). Master and novice in later Wittgenstein. American Philosophical Quarterly, 
48(2), 199–211. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell Publishing. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1981). Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. (G. E. M. Anscombe, 
Trans.). Blackwell Publishers. 
Wynn, K. (1990). Children’s understanding of counting. Cognition, 36(2), 155–193. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(90)90003-3 
 
